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ABSTRACT
The mathematical theory of optimal control/differential games is
used to study the structure of optimal allocation policies for some tactical
allocation problems with combat described by Lanchester-type equations of
warfare. Both deterministic and stochastic attrition processes are con-
sidered. For the optimal control of deterministic Lanchester-type attri-
tion processes, a general solution algorithm for the synthesis of the
optimal policy is developed. Optimal allocation policies are developed
for numerous one-sided optimization problems of tactical interest in order
to study the dependence of the structure of these optimal policies on model
form. Consideration has been given to singular extremals, multiple extremals
(including dispersal surfaces), and state variable inequality constraints.
It is shown how to apply the theory of state variable inequality constraints
to determine the optimal control of deterministic Lanchester-type processes
in order to treat non-negativity restrictions on force levels and thus to
study the dependence of optimal policies upon the force levels. Various
attrition models are considered (reflecting different assumptions as to
target acquisition process, command and control capabilities, target
engagement process, variations in range capabilities of weapon systems).
Solutions are developed for Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare
with variable attrition-rate coefficients. The optimal control of the
Lanchester stochastic process is studied.
This task was supported by the Naval Analysis Programs, Office of




This report documents my research on tactical allocation in
dynamic combat situations over the past two years under the sponsor-
ship of the Office of Naval Research (both as part of the Foundation
Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School and under contracts
NR 276-027 and P0 2-0150). Some of this work is recent; some of it
is not so recent. In all cases, however, the documentation is new
and does not duplicate any past reports.
Much of this work has been submitted for publication in the
open literature. However, because of long "turn around times" for
refereeing in several journals (sometimes over a year before receiving
the referees' initial comments), I felt that it was appropriate to
include several manuscripts as appendices that had been previously
submitted for publication in the open literature. Hence, some of
this work is not of recent vintage: the paper "On the Solution to
Lanchester-Type Equations With Variable Coefficients" was submitted
for publication to Operations Research in January 1971. In many
instances I have obtained far more extensive results but have not had
the time to fully document them.
Thus, the appendices of this report are more or less separate
entities in themselves and may be read independently of each other.
Accordingly, each appendix contains its own list of references and
reference numbers apply only within the appendix in which they appear.
A similar remark applies to the numbering of equations. Also, the
pagination is separate for each individual appendix.
The emphasis in this report is on the applications of control
theory to tactical allocation problems in dynamic combat situations.
Although consideration of the various problems contained in this
report has required knowledge of research on the frontiers of deter-
ministic optimal control theory, I have felt it to be inappropriate
for the scope of this research to supply proofs for any optimization
theory results. However, I have tried to give the appropriate
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1. Introduction .
This report documents research performed under the sponsorship
of the Office of Naval Research (contract PO 2-0150) during the time
period of 27 March 1972 to 16 June 1972. We discuss the results of
a study of some idealized models for the optimization of combat
dynamics and their possible implications for defense planners. Our
research approach has been to combine Lanchester-type formulations
of combat attrition (both deterministic and stochastic) and generalized
control theory [64] (both deterministic and stochastic optimal control,
dynamic programming, differential games)
.
A quantitative theory of tactical allocation is developed
through the examination of a sequence of simplified models. These
combat models are too simple to be taken literally but should be
interpreted as indicating general principles to serve as hypotheses
for subsequent computer simulation studies or field experimentation.
The effects of various modelling assumptions upon the structure of
the optimal allocation policies are systematically studied by con-
trasting the solutions for various models.
A major result of our research is that optimal tactical
allocation policies are quite sensitive to the precise type of model
adopted, even as to whether the tactical scenario lasts a specified
period of time or terminates only when a pre-determined state has
been reached. Insights are provided into such important questions
as
:
(1) How should targets be selected?
(2) Do target priorities change with time?
(3) Do battle termination circumstances affect the optimal
allocation policies?
(4) How does the nature of the attrition process affect target
selection?
(5) What is the effect of ammunition constraints?
(6) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect
the optimal selection rules?
To develop our theory of tectical allocation we have extensively
studied some specific combat scenarios. Optimal tactics for the
following have been studied: selection of target type at which to
fire, regulation of firing rate. The influences of the following
factors have all been considered:
(1) combatant objectives (form of criterion function and
valuation of surviving forces)
,
(2) weapon system performance characteristics,
(3) termination conditions of conflict,
(4) force strengths,
(5) type of attrition process,
(6) effect of resource constraints,
(7) range capabilities of weapon systems.
The tactical situations are described by deterministic Lanchester-
type equations of warfare. The combat continues over a period of time
with a choice of tactics available to both sides and subject to change
over time. The mathematical theory of deterministic optimal control/
differential games has been used to solve the problems under
consideration. Thus, it seems appropriate to discuss these techniques
briefly.
a. Differential Games/Optimal Control .
The theories of optimal control and differential games were
developed for optimization problems in which the (deterministic)
system's dynamics are described by a system of ordinary differential
equations. The reader can find references additional to those given
here and a brief review of past developments in our previous report
[113].
In a two-person zero-sum deterministic differential game (hence-
forth abbreviated to simply differential game) each player chooses
strategies (for precise definitions, see [12] or [52]) in order to
maximize his own criterion functional (which when added to that of
his opponent yields zero) for a system whose dynamics is governed by
a system of ordinary differential equations. An example problem
relevant to our research on tactical allocation problems is
n m
maximize minimize{ £ w.y.(T) - £ v.x.(T)} with T specified,
*
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where
x.(t),y.(t) are force levels,
r.,s. are replacement rates,
v.,w. are the utilities assigned survivors,
a., is the rate at which one Y. unit can destroy X.,
ij 3 ' i
b.. is the rate at which one X. unit can destroy Y.,
<J).. is the fraction of X. who fire at Y.,ij J i
and \\> , . is the fraction of Y. who fire at X..
ij J i
For our illustrative purposes here, let us assume that the battle is
scheduled to last a prescribed duration of time (we further assume that
no side is annihilated before T) . Such problems (mainly pursuit and
evasion) have been extensively studied in recent years. The goal of
this research has been to study tactical allocation problems using
such models
.
Pioneering research on differential games was done by R. Isaacs
and culminated in his book [72] . Isaacs developed a general principle
(the tenet of transition) in order to develop his "main equation"
(which is basically a two-sided extension of the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation (see [52])). L. Berkovitz [12] has justified in a rigorous
manner many of Isaacs' original results, which were heuristically
obtained. In [10] Berkovitz developed many basic results for differ-
ential games according to variational arguments.
The above theories apply to differential games which possess
solutions in pure strategies. It is a simple matter to devise problems
for which this is not true (see [11], [13], [52]). However, Isaacs
conjectured that when the Hamiltonian is separable, i.e. a function
independent of 4» plus a function independent of \p , then the
*
differential game has a solution in pure strategies. This conjecture
was later proven to be true by L. Berkovitz (see pp. 170-173 of [10])
and A. Friedman [52] . We shall see below that the Hamiltonian for
(1) will be separable in this sense.
Let us consider the above example (1) again. The Hamiltonian
is given by
m n
HI(t,x,p,<f>,ij;) = I p {r - I iK a y }
i=l
x x j=i 1J XJ J
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where
p (t) denotes the dual variable corresponding to x.,
and q^(t) denotes the dual variable corresponding to y..
We use the symbol <\> to denote all the variables under control of X.
In the case when the differential game has a saddle-point (in pure
strategy solutions) so that a value exists, let us denote the value
function as W(t,x,y). This value function is well-known [12] to be
C 1 (i.e. continuously dif ferentiable with respect to each of its
arguments) except at certain manifolds of discontinuity. Except at





From (2) , we see Hamiltonian is indeed separable in the sense discussed
above. However, as not noted by Isaacs, Berkovitz, or Friedman, the
above expression (2) for the Hamiltonian function is appropriate only
when none of the state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's) of (1)
*
is active. In Appendix E, we discuss the fact that although problems
with SVIC's have been extensively studied in the literature of deter-
ministic optimal control theory (our study of tactical allocation
problems in the Lanchester theory of combat, however, has led to the
uncovering of an important gap in the existing theory of SVIC's [115]),
a current gap in the theory of differential games is the lack of treat-
ment of problems (such as (1) above) with inequality constraints on
functions of the state variables only (the control variables not
*
In (1) x for i = 1, . .
.
,m and y . for j = 1, . . . ,n are state
variables, while the <J>'s and \|;'s are called control variables. An
example of a SVIC is the condition that x^ ^ 0, i.e. the X^ force
level must be non-negative. Thus, (2) is appropriate only for x. >
and y, > for all i.
explicitly appearing in these inequality constraints). In fact, the
approach that R. Isaacs used to solve the "War of Attrition and Attack"
(see pp. 96-104 in [72]) is easily shown to be inadequate for other
similar problems (for further details see Appendix E) . (This important
gap in existing theory and the inadequacy of Isaacs' (and others)
treatment of SVIC's is not noted in the recent work of S. Sternberg
[111].)
Thus, when x > and y, > for all i, the Hamiltonian
is given by (2) . Hence the Hamiltonian is separable (in the sense
discussed above) so that a solution in pure strategies can be found
to (1) . Let us pursue further details of solution development to
illustrate additional difficulties.
Assuming that x. > and y. > for all i, we determine
* *
an extremal strategy pair, denoted as (<|> t \\> ) , by the max-min
principle
* * * *
Maximum minimum H(t ,x,p,<J> ,\J>) = H(t,x,p ,<{> ,ty ) . (3)
This leads to the problem
m
*
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which may be routinely solved to yield
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otherwise,
and k(j,t) is the index such that
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*
so that <|>..(t) is analogously determined.
It may be that the index k(j,t) is not unique, i.e. the
linear program (A) has alternate optima. This causes no difficulty
unless this situation continues for a finite interval of time. When
this happens, we say that the corresponding segment of the battle
trajectory is a singular subarc . Of great practical significance is
the fact that the max-min principle does not provide adequate tests
for whether a singular subarc can yield an optimal outcome. Thus,
the possibility of singular subarcs must be investigated in tactical
allocation differential games, since the control (decision) variables
appear linearly in problems such as (1) . We shall discuss this
important aspect further below (see Appendix D for further details in
one-sided case) , but for now let us simply state that it may be shown
that it is not possible to have a singular solution to (1)
.
From (5) we see that this model (1) yields that the optimal
tactic is to concentrate all fire on one enemy target type. However,
we really don't gain that much insight into changes in the optimal
target selection policy with time, since we don't easily see explicitly
how the dual variables (and hence the optimal tactic via (4) and (7))
change over time. The adjoint system of differential equations for
the dual variables is, of course, given by
^f 2U * * * !} *
(t,x,p ,<j> y \\> ) = I 1H blp .q, for i = 1,...,dt 3x, * b»-»* >* »* ' .Vki ki ki k=l m
*
^i 8H * * * ~ * *








Hence, at the end of battle at t = T we have
*«<«>-«l.k<J.I>' »)
where k( j ,T) is the index such that
a. .v = maximum{a 1 .v , . . . ,a ,v }, for j = 1, . . . ,n.kj k lj 1 mj m J » » i
and
<!<«> " 6t,*C3,i)' C10)
where £(j,T) is the index such that
b n .w. = maximum{b n ,w n , . . . ,b .w }, for j = l,...,m.
xj Jt lj 1 nj n J
In Appendix C, we show how the extremal (candidate for optimal
control) control may be explicitly determined as a function of time
for a one-sided analogue of the problem at hand.
Thus , we see that for separable controls as occur in target
selection problems in the Lanchester theory of combat the solution
method (i.e. the max-min principle) essentially (speaking somewhat
imprecisely now) reduces the problem of determining the solution of the
differential game to solving two "separated" one-sided optimization (optima!
control or variational) problems. Moreover, in [10] L. Berkovitz
reduces a differential game to two such control problems (problems
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of Bolza with differential inequalities as side conditions) in order
*
to deduce necessary conditions for optimal paths.
It should therefore be clear that if there are difficulties
(either theoretical or computational) in solving such optimal control
problems, then there will be difficulties in solving the corresponding
differential game. (Alternatively, we may think of an optimal control
problem as a differential game in which the strategy (s) of one of the
two players is fixed beforehand.) Accordingly, our research approach
has been to study optimal target selection problems for dynamic combat
situations with decisions available to both sides by first considering
corresponding one-sided (optimal control) problems. After the difficult
points have been mastered in the simple one-sided problems, then the
differential games are most profitably tackled.
In the next section we discuss some aspects of deterministic
optimal control problems that can cause difficulties. All these
subtle points may also arise in differential games. We have found
that by studying both the theory and examples of difficult aspects in
one-sided problems we have appreciably increased our ability to solve
corresponding differential games. In fact, as noted above, one of our
research findings is that a theory of state variable inequality con-
straints (which is essential in problems such as (1) because of the
This is done by the famous method of Valentine (see [125]). M. Hestenes
[61] formulated the (now standard) general control problem and deduced
necessary conditions (including the maximum principle (frequently
referred to as the Pontryagin maximum principle)) according to this pro-
gram in 1949. The same approach is readily extended to nonlinear program-
ming (including linear programming) , but this apparently has been over-
looked by workers in the field. However, our recent paper [118] remedies
this gap.
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requirement that force levels be non-negative) is lacking in the
current theories for differential games. We plan to develop such a
theory in the future.
Based on this intimate relationship between the mathematical
theories of differential games and optimal control [63], our research
approach (as stated above) has been to consider one-sided versions of
some tactical allocation structures before tackling the more realistic
two-sided decision problem. Our intent has been to make sure that
both theoretical and computational aspects are firmly established for
these optimal control problems before attempting to solve the more
complex differential game versions of such problems.
Optimal control theory has emerged as a vigorous discipline
since World War II. Professor Magnus Hestenes of the USA apparently
first gave the now standard control formulation for a variational
problem (as well as developed optimality conditions) and urged others
to follow his approach in 1949 [61]. Professor Hestenes did not feel
that it was appropriate to publish this work in the open literature,
since, for example, his development of a "Weierstrass maximum principle"
was a translation of well-known results from the classical calculus
of variations. Consequently, this pioneering work [61] received little
*
A. Friedman (see Chapter 6 of [52]) has developed a non-variational
theory of differential games via a limit approach. Although he has
established that a certain class of differential games (our problem (1)
belongs to this class) with state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's)
do possess a value and the optimal strategies (see pp. 238-240 of [52])
does not appear to be adequate. Specifically, Friedman makes an unsup-
ported assumption about a property of optimal strategies (the assumption
that it is optimal to have x (T) > 0)
.
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attention from researchers other than some at RAND. In 1956 Pontryagin
and his associates announced their celebrated "maximum principle" [19]
.
This event ushered in over a decade of intense activity on variational
methods. Due to this intense activity in the field of optimal control
theory during the past 15 years and our specific interest in applica-
tions to military operations research problems, it does not seem
appropriate to cite here voluminous research articles (however, see
[3] and [99] for surveys) . The current state of the art in deterministic
optimal control theory is reflected in the following contemporary text-
books and monographs from which a further more specialized guide to
the literature can be obtained [A], [6], [18], [28], [40], [42], [45],
[51], [62], [89], [91], [101].
b. Special Features of Optimal Control Problem .
As we have discussed above, our research approach has been to
initially study dynamic tactical allocation problems by considering
one-sided optimal control versions of them. Moreover, these deter-
ministic optimal control problems that we have studied within the
framework of the Lanchester theory of combat have contained certain
special features that have caused difficulty (both theoretically and
computationally) . Let us consider some examples to illustrate such
difficulties.
For illustrative purposes, we first consider the following
optimal control problem for target selection in Lanchester combat
(see [117] (reproduced in this report as Appendix A) for further dis-
cussion of model)
14




subject to: -r— = -<j>a
n yJ dt 1
dx
£ = -Vl - b2X2 (11)
£ <j> ^ 1 (inequality constraint on control variable)
,
x ,x_,y ^ (state variable inequality constraints),
where
x (t) , x (t)
,
y(t) are force levels,
p, q, r are utilities assigned survivors,
a
, a , b- , b_ are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
and ^ is the fraction of Y fire directed at X .
The stopping rule for the battle is that the conflict terminates
at t = T defined by
(a) y(T) = 0,
or (b) X;L (T) = x2
(T) = 0.





: Xl (T) = 0, x2





(T) = before x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0,
C
3
: X;L (T) = after x2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0,
C
4
: Xl (T) > 0, x2
(T) = 0, y(T) = 0,
C
5
: X;L (T) > 0, x2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0.
A constraint such as X . ^ is referred to as a state
variable inequality constraint (SVIC from [29]). When such a constraint
is active (as when X
-
(t) = for t. £ t £ t
? )
, the usual necessary
conditions of optimality (maXimum principle) require modification:
the adjoint equations are modified, boundary conditions for the dual
variables require special treatment, juncture (corner) conditions
must be satisfied, some special multiplier conditions must be satisfied
(see AppendiX E for details) . This area of deterministic optimal
control theory (problems with SVIC's) has had much recent research
activity (see bibliographies in [79], [115]). However, the appropriate
treatment of a SVIC in order to determine the optimal trajectory is
apparently not widely known among practitioners of optimal control
(as pointed out by our recent note [115]), although the appropriate
necessary conditions (as well as sufficient conditions) are, of course,
well-known by active researchers.
When X
,







y} - p 2 (t){(l-<J))a2y}
- p^tMb^ + b^}, (12)
where p, (t) is the dual variable corresponding to x , etc. By
(12) we see that the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control
variable so that a singular solution [80], [81] is possible. Singular
solutions to target selection problems in the Lanchester theory of
combat are discussed in Appendix D. This aspect of the optimal
control of deterministic Lanchester attrition processes is of great
practical significance, since it means that it is possible to have
other than
<f>
=0 or 1 as an optimal fire distribution policy (in
contradiction to the results presented in [111]).
Let us further elaborate upon singular solutions in deterministic
problems of optimal control. In such a problem, the maximum principle
may fail to determine an optimal trajectory, since the maximization
of the Hamiltonian may not lead to a well-defined expression for
optimal control [80], [81] (also see Chapter 8 of [28]). Singular
solutions usually occur when the Hamiltonian is a linear function of
the control variables (as is the case for fire distribution problems
in the Lanchester theory of combat as formulated by Isbell and Marlow
[74] and Weiss (see pp. 94-95 of [129])). However, all problems for
which the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control variables
do not have singular subarcs (see below) in their solution. In par-
ticular, we shall see that problem (11) does not.
The above problem (11) has one control variable (denoted as <j>) ,
and it appears linearly in the Hamiltonian. By a singular subarc we
17
denote that part of an optimal trajectory on which the maximum
principle cannot be used to determine the control because the coeffi-
cient of the control variable in the Hamiltonian is zero (see pp. 226-
227 of [80]). Then the term "singular solution" will be used to
refer to any optimal trajectory which contains one or more singular
subarcs
.
To elaborate further, when the Hamiltonian H is a linear
f)H
function of the control variable d> , then if — = for a finite
dtp
interval of time (or, another way to say this, the coefficient of
cp vanishes identically for a finite interval of time) , then the
maximum principle does not determine the control. When this situa-
tion occurs, neither the maximum principle nor the classical variational
theory provide adequate tests for maximality of the singular subarc.
However, Kelly [82], [83] generalized the Legendre-Clebsch condition
of local optimality of extremal paths containing singular subarcs
(see [75], [78], [110] for very recent developments).
3H
Observe that on a singular subarc for which — = for a
d(p
finite interval of time all feasible values of <j> maximize the
Hamiltonian. On a singular subarc we determine the singular control
3H
by requiring that we remain on the singular subarc, i.e. — remains
dcp
3H
zero. If —- is to be identically equal to zero for a finite
dip
interval of time, then all of its derivatives with respect to time
must also be equal to zero. We determine the singular control, which
keeps the system on the singular subarc, by considering as many of the
18
3H
time derivatives of -r— as are required for the control variable
4> to appear explicitly so that it may be determined from an algebraic
equation. Thus, in general we consider
a* dtW dt*W c 3)
We must further check to see that we can get a maximum return
(in the case when we wish to maximize the criterion functional) from
use of the candidate singular subarc. The following condition (gener-
alized Legendre-Clebsch condition) is necessary for a singular subarc
to yield a maximum return
2k
It is obtained by examining the negative semidef initeness of the
second variation for a special class of explicitly defined control
variations [83] . For the problem (15) considered below, it suffices
to consider the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition with k = 1.
For fire distribution problems in the Lanchester theory of com-
bat it turns out that when the rate of target-type attrition is pro-
portional to the number of enemy firers only (as in the above problem
(11)), it is impossible (excluding the pathological case when a -ib-i =
A J^ J-T
a_b.) to have — (-rr) = 0. Thus, it is impossible to have a singular
2. 2. dt ^a<p j
*
solution. (However, such important aspects were not discussed in [111] )
*
This is a common gap in applications of optimal control theory by many
practitioners. For example, the vital subject of singular solutions is
not discussed in [1], [2], [67], or [106], even though singular solutions
are treated by heuristic means.
19
Our research has yielded the fact that the possibility of
singular solutions must be investigated for all such fire distribution
problems in the Lanchester theory of combat. In particular, a singular
solution arises in the following problem













g = -b xx - b 2x2 (15)
£ <j> £ 1 and x ,x_,y ^ 0.
In Appendix D we show that it is possible to have an optimal fire







9 ). For the problem at hand, this
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by use of the conditions — = Trhrr) = and the canonical equations
o<p at M<Jr
(i.e. both state and adjoint system).
A more subtle difficulty in obtaining a complete solution to
fire distribution problems is that there may be more than one extremal
20
(an extremal is a path on which the necessary conditions of optimality
(maximum principle) are almost everywhere satisfied) leading from an
initial point in the force level (state) space to the terminal surface,
This occurs both in the Isbell-Marlow problem [74], [117] and the
supporting weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [130], [122]. Such a
situation occurs when it is possible to reach different points on
the terminal surface from the same point in the initial state space
(see pp. 276-284 of [4]). Such extremals are difficult to identify,
since sufficient conditions of optimality [53] may be satisfied along
each of the multiple extremals.
In problem (11) above, there are circumstances under which more
than one extremal (battle trajectory on which the necessary conditions
are satisfied) leads from the same initial force levels x , x
, yn
to the terminal surface. For example, under the appropriate circum-
stances extremals may lead to both C. and C^. Moreover, it may
be shown that sufficient conditions of optimality [53] are satisfied
for each extremal. However, this difficulty in solution development
is probably best treated by example so that we defer further in depth
discussion until the appendices.
To summarize, we have identified three aspects of fire distri-
bution problems in the Lanchester theory of combat that have not been
adequately treated previously. These aspects are as follows:
*
Actually, there are two types of extremals that may lead to C_.
21
(1) state variable inequality constraints,
(2) singular subarcs,
(3) multiple extremals.
Moreover, each of these aspects can be vital in developing solutions
in applications.
2. Objectives of Research .
The general objective of this research is to determine the
structure of the optimal fire distribution/ target selection policies
for various specific scenarios of tactical interest. The specific
objective of this research on applications of control theory to Lan-
chester-type formulations of combat attrition is to determine the
sensitivity of target selection and force allocation strategies to
the form of the attrition model and to the time history of force
levels
.
3. Related Work of Others .
Additionally, we will review in more depth developments in the
quantitative analysis of military tactics/strategies through Lanchester-
type models of warfare (i.e. variational models to determine optimal
allocations (e.g. target selection, fire distribution, etc.) as a
function of time and/or force levels in combat between heterogeneous
forces) . Hence, we consider the related work of others in the fields
of
22
(a) Lanchester-type models of warfare,
(b) differential games, and
(c) optimal control of Lanchester attrition processes.
We are aware of probably well over 200 titles of papers and
books which contain information that, in one sense or another, would
probably assist in the attainment of the above stated objectives of
this research. For the present we shall highlight some major works.
In this survey we consider the subject area of differential games to
be representative of applicable material within the more extensive
framework of "generalized control theory" (see [64] , where this term
was coined by Y. C. Ho). More extensive reviews of pertinent litera-
ture are to be found in two of our past reports [112], [113].
a. Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare .
One of the earliest attempts to establish a mathematical model
of the dynamics of mass combat was by Lanchester [87] in 1916. He
postulated several deterministic models that were a system of ordinary
differential equations which related the strengths of opposing military
forces to length of combat. During World War II B. Koopman extended
Lanchester 's results and also suggested a reformulation of the problem
in stochastic form [96]. After World War II the RAND Corporation
carried on further studies [60], [97], [98] whose results were
summarized by R. Snow [109]. H. K. Weiss (then at Aberdeen Proving
Ground) and others [5], [26], [46], [58], [59], [128], [129] have
subsequently extended deterministic Lanchester models.
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R. Brown developed models for the stochastic analysis of combat
[27]. The relationship between the above mentioned stochastic and
deterministic Lanchester formulations was pointed out relatively
early in their development (see [109], for example) but is probably
best discussed in a recent paper by B. 0. Koopman [86]. The first
probability analysis of Lanchester-type equations apparently appeared
in the (now classical) Morse and Kimball book [96] . Using a stochastic
model, an expression was obtained for the probability of one side
winning in a fight to the finish in which the random attrition process
corresponds to a deterministic Lanchester linear-law attrition process.
Stochastic and deterministic model results are compared. A more in
depth comparison of stochastic and deterministic model results has
been given by G. Weiss [127]. R. Brown developed not only expressions
for the probability of winning but also approximations to the probability
of winning as determined by stochastic models of combat attrition
corresponding to both the Lanchester linear law and the square law
[27]. Further extensions of these results have been given by Smith
[108] and Kisi and Hirose [85]. To date, the most thorough comparison
of deterministic and stochastic homogeneous-force Lanchester formula-
tions has been by G. Clark (see Chapter 11 of [16] and [41]), who has
also developed the time-state solution for the stochastic attrition
process corresponding to a deterministic Lanchester linear-law process
[41].
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S. Bonder [22] did the pioneering work on the determining the
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient (for weapon systems that adjust
fire based on the results of the immediately preceding round). C.
Barfoot [7] later suggested defining the Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficient as the harmonic mean of the attrition rates (or, equiva-
lently, the reciprocal of the expected time to kill a single target)
.
Barfoot also presented an alternate and more general method for com-
puting the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient. Bonder [23] then
showed that the mean attrition rate for Markov-fire weapons is readily
obtainable by the methods described in [22] when one defines the
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient as the reciprocal of the expected
time to kill a single target. Kimbleton [85] has extended the above
work by deriving the distribution of the time required to destroy a
target. Other papers [104], [103] have discussed the estimation of
parameters for the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient.
A good review of the Lanchester theory of combat is by Dolansky
[46] , and this includes a comprehensive list of references through
1965. A recent thesis directed by us [56] contains a fairly compre-
hensive bibliography of articles appearing in the open literature
since 1964. Recent trends in the Lanchester theory of combat were
discussed at a 1967 NATO Conference [48], [126]. Of particular rele-
vance to our recent work is the pioneering work of D. Etter [49] (also
to appear in [48]), who has formulated and (partially) solved several
allocation of fire problems (see below for further details) . Etter
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has also given consideration to the spatial dimension of combat and
force mobility [49]
.
H. K. Weiss [129] extended Lanchester-type equations to include
the relative movement of two homogeneous forces, allowing time and
space to be "traded" for casualties. He considered the two attrition-
rate coefficients to be dependent upon force separation in such a way
that their ratio was constant. S. Bonder [20], [21] used Weiss' extension
to study the effects of mobility and various range dependencies for
the attrition-rate coefficients on the number of surviving forces. He
has studied scenarios for combat between two homogeneous forces, and
developed solutions for the case of a constant attack velocity under
special circumstances. In our past research, we have shown [114] that
a simple closed-form solution is possible in all those cases when the
ratio of attrition-rate coefficients is constant, regardless of whether the
attack velocity is constant or not (see also [116]). We have subse-
quently developed [123] a completely general solution to variable
coefficient Lanchester-type equations for combat between two homogeneous
forces and further developed analytic results in the following important
cases: (1) opposing weapon systems whose kill rates have different
range dependencies and (2) weapons systems with different effective
ranges. Some related work appears in [24] and [43].
b. Differential Games .
The study of differential games was initiated by R. Isaacs at
RAND in the early 1950's [68], [69], [70], [71], but his work has not
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been available to a wide audience until more recently [72] . His basic
concept, "the tenet of transition," is generalization of Bellman's
[8] "Principle of Optimality" to a competitive environment, and this
is used to develop necessary conditions for optimal strategies. A
more recent and more rigorous development of these basic necessary
conditions is by Berkovitz [12],
Since the excellent paper by Ho, Bryson, and Baron [65] in 1965,
there has been a literal explosion of papers on differential games but
almost all deal exclusively with pursuit-evasion problems. Excellent
survey papers which bear this out are by Simakova (Russian literature)
[107] and Berkovitz [13]. (However, applications to the Lanchester
theory of combat are discussed in the next section.) Besides Isaacs'
book, others which treat differential games are by Blaquiere et al
[17] (extension of their geometric approach to optimal control)
,
Bryson and Ho [28] (Chapter 9), and Friedman [52]. This latter work
appeals to be the most authoritative one on the mathematical theory
of differential games to date and contains a fairly comprehensive
bibliography for the purely mathematical aspects of differential
games
.
c. Optimal Control of Lanchester Attrition Processes .
In 1964 Dolansky [46] noted that an underdeveloped area in the
Lanchester theory of combat was optimal target selection in combat
between heterogeneous forces (optimal control/differential games)
.
Our past results [117], [122] have extended all the previously published
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results [74], [130] in the open literature cited by Dolansky. Recently,
we have extended these results even further [119], [120], [121].
In [117] we showed that the solution originally obtained by
Isbell and Marlow [74] (also given in [111]) is incorrect for a cer-
tain range of model parameters and presented a general methodology for
solving all such problems. In [122] we extended this methodology to
differential games by considering the supporting weapon system game
of H. K. Weiss [130], which was previously only treated by heuristic
means. (It was not noted in [111] that Weiss did not apply the
mathematical theory of differential games to obtain his solution to
this problem.)
More recently, we have discussed the influence of various
factors (combatant objectives, termination conditions of conflict,
type of attrition process, variable attrition-rate coefficients, and
limited ammunition) [119] . In [120] we presented some preliminary
results for optimal fire distribution/target selection in combat
between heterogeneous forces (the special case of a homogeneous
force against heterogeneous enemy forces) . We considered both con-
stant attrition-rate coefficients and some special cases of variable
attrition-rate coefficients. In [121] we treated a simple problem of
target selection for a homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against
two enemy force types each of which undergoes attrition at a rate
proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and targets.
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Some similar problems had been previously studied by D. Etter
[49] (also to appear in [48]). Although not using modern optimal
control theory, his arguments (which failed to give consideration to
the long-run battle outcome) did lead to results which in many cases
anticipated many of our recent results. Etter [49] pointed out the
fundamental difference between the optimal allocation of fire with
square-law attrition and with linear-law attrition and has done some
computational studies.
Work in this area has also been done at the University of
Michigan [24]. However, the dependence of optimal strategies upon
model form (i.e. type of attrition process, battle termination condi-
tions, replacements, combatant objectives, range dependent attrition
rates, etc.) was not noted (our results are reported in Appendix C of
[113] and [117]) and certain subtleties of optimal target selection
policies not detected. Moreover, in [111] S. Sternberg apparently
gave the same solution to a two-on-one problem as originally obtained
by Isbell and Marlow [74] and presented the same solution development
methodology as they did. In our past research [117] (reproduced for
the reader's convenience in this report as Appendix A (see also
Appendix F)) we have shown that the solution originally obtained by
Isbell and Marlow [74] is not completely correct. Hence, Sternberg's
claim (see p. 153 of [111]) that a "two-on-one example was then solved
in its entirety" does not seem justified to us.
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In view of the similarities in the research areas considered
by Sternberg [111] and the research results presented in report, it
seems appropriate to make a few critical comments about Sternberg's
work. As we have noted above, Sternberg did not develop solution
methodology capable of obtaining a complete solution to the two-versus-
one fire distribution problem. Even more serious, however, is his
failure to note the well-known fact [63], [65] that differential
games are a class of two-sided optimal control problems. It is not
surprising then that Sternberg does not discuss the well-known control
theory results for singular solutions, state variable inequality con-
straints (SVIC's), non-uniqueness of extremals, etc., as applied to
differential games in the Lanchester theory of combat. Furthermore
Sternberg [111] does not note that a theory for state variable
inequality constraints has not been developed for differential games
or that Weiss [130] did not use the necessary conditions of optimality
to develop his "solution" to the supporting weapon system game.
The practical significance of the above facts is that, for
example, the solution of the war of attrition and attack given by
Isaacs in [72] (and partially reproduced by Sternberg on pp. 17-25 of
[111]) is not justified (the treatment of the boundary conditions for
the dual variables is inadequate as is that for constrained subarcs
when a SVIC is active) . (It is easy to give an example (see Appendix
E) for which Isaacs' approach does not yield the correct solution.)
Hence, Sternberg's attempt to solve a "two-on-two" differential game
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appears premature to us. Our own research indicates that use of the
appropriate necessary conditions of optimality appreciably reduces
the volume of allocation strategy combinations that have to be
considered.
Additionally, Sternberg [111] did not investigate the dependence
of optimal allocation strategies upon model form. His major research
conclusion (on pp. 153-154 of [111]) that optimal allocation strategies
in Lanchester-type processes are always 0, 1 is incorrect as stated,
since it is easily shown that for two-versus-one combat in which
target types undergo attrition at rates proportional to the product of
the numbers of firers and targets, the optimal allocation strategy may
be other than or 1 (see [121]). Thus, Sternberg's conclusion
must be qualified be stating that his results apply to, for example,
Lanchester-type processes in which the rate of attrition of each target
type is proportional to (the sum over all firer classes of) the number
of firers only (speaking somewhat imprecisely, Lanchester square-law
processes)
. It was not noted by Sternberg that the structure of the
optimal allocation policy may be different in prescribed duration
battles and fights to the finish.
Finally, Bonder and Farrell (see pp. 27-28 of [24]) state that
(for Lanchester attrition processes in which target type attrition rate
due to each class of firers is proportional to the number of firers
*
In Appendix E of this report we develop a theory of SVIC's for one-
sided fire distribution problems in the Lanchester theory of combat.
Some of the results we give are not to be found in the literature. As
we have done in the past [115], we hope to publish some of these
results in the control theory literature.
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only) the optimal target selection policy is independent of the
number of weapons in the firer or target group. Our research results
(see [117] or Section 9 of Appendix G) contradict the above statement
made by Bonder and Farrell: the optimal fire distribution policy may
depend indirectly upon force levels.
Other similar tactical/strategic allocation problems that have
been studied using differential game models are the supporting weapon
system game of H. K. Weiss [130], missile warfare (counter-value
versus counter-force targeting) [105] , and the logistics allocation
game of Moglewer and Payne [95] . We have already noted that Weiss did
not use the subsequently well-known necessary conditions of optimality
to develop the solution in his pioneering work [130] . Our previous
work [122] (see also Appendix B of [113]) corrects this gap. Several
authors [38], [39], [66] (see also pp. 54-57 of [105]) have considered
differential equation models of a strategic missile exchange and have
attempted to study optimal tactics via differential game theory.
Moglewer and Payne [95] consider a similar model for the optimal allo-
cation of logistics resources. However, there are many gaps in the
above work. For example, Moglewer and Payne [95] consider (in our
terminology presented in [117]) a terminal control differential game.
However, they fail to determine the domains of controllability for
terminal states and express optimal tactics in terms of terminal force
levels . In [117] we showed that it is essential to express optimal
tactics in terms of initial force levels.
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It seems appropriate to briefly touch upon the implications
for operational gaming (see [100] or [124] for discussion of terminology
and background) of our analytic study of tactical allocation problems.
We believe that the primary value of operational gaming is in formulat-
ing the problem. (Accordingly, we are coordinating our analytic efforts
with the operational study work of P. Chaiken of Stanford Research
Institute (Naval Warfare Research Center).) Moreover, we agree with
L. Berkovitz and M. Dresher in their opinion (see p. 612 of [14]) that
"operational gaming is not a helpful device for solving a game or
getting significant information about the solution." We believe that
insights into optimal allocation strategies are to be obtained through
analytic work such as ours.
Finally, we could find no previous work on the optimal control
of the Lanchester stochastic process (i.e. stochastic versions of the
problems discussed above)
.
4. Overview of Research Program .
In this section we briefly discuss the various subject areas
that we have considered in developing our quantitative theory of
tactical allocation.
a. Combat Attrition Models .
In our research on tactical allocation we have given considera-
tion to the various different types of models that have been proposed
(hypothesized) in the literature to describe combat between two homo-
heneous forces. Such homogeneous force formulations are readily
extended to describe the
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attrition for fire distribution problems in combat between heterogeneous
forces. Our purpose in considering the various modelling alternatives
for combat attrition has been to determine the sensitivity of optimal
target selection and force allocation strategies to the form of the
attrition model. Based upon our research, we conclude that optimal
allocation policies are significantly affected by the nature of the
attrition model.
The reader should recall that there are two general approaches
which may be taken to the modelling of the attrition process:
(a) deterministic formulation which takes the form of a system
of first order ordinary differential equations, and
(b) stochastic formulation which views the casualty process as
a Markov process
.
In the remainder of this section we shall discuss deterministic formu-
lations as related to our study of allocation strategies. Stochastic
combat attrition models are discussed in the next section.
Besides our review of the literature above, the interested
reader can find comprehensive reviews in [41], [46], [56]. The various
forms that the attrition rates can take in models of combat between
two homogeneous forces has been discussed by Lanchester [88] , Snow
[109], H. Weiss [129], Brackney [26], Willard [131], and Helmbold [59].
(The reader can find a further discussion in Appendix H.) In our past
research [117], [120], [121] we have studied optimal target selection
policies when the attrition rate of each target type is proportional
to:
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(a) the number of firers only,
(b) the product of the numbers of firers and targets.
These correspond to the classical Lanchester square-law process and
linear-law process, respectively.
R. Helmbold [59] has proposed a general formulation of combat
attrition for combat between two homogeneous forces (based upon his
empirical study of a large number of land battles [57]). His general
model [59] accounts for inefficiencies of scale when force sizes are
grossly unequal. In this report we present some preliminary results
for optimal target selection when Helmbold' s general model is used
to describe attrition in combat between heterogeneous forces. In
doing this work we have extended his formulation to combat between
heterogeneous forces and present some analytic solutions.
b. Deterministic Versus Stochastic Models of Combat Attrition .
As indicated by our review of the pertinent literature and
noted above, two basic approaches to analytic war gaming are (1) the
Lanchester-type deterministic differential equation models [24], [25],
[50] or (2) stochastic models (such as DYNTACS [16], a high resolution
simulation) . Almost all previously published research on tactical
**
allocation problems (including our own work) has treated attrition
as a deterministic process. We have briefly discussed work on stochastic
formulations in the review of pertinent literature above. In Section 2
These are frequently referred to as expected-value models.
**
The one exception of a stochastic optimization problem is the work
of Isbell and Marlow [73].
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of Appendix I the reader can find a more comprehensive review of past
work on the Lanchester stochastic process. There are, however, con-
flicting views in the literature as to whether these two approaches
yield the same results. (We certainly don't plan to try to settle
this difficult question, but wish to caution the reader that there
is not universal agreement among workers in the field about this
important question.)
G. Clark has studied (see Chapter 11 of [16] and [41]) the differ-
ence between deterministic and stochastic homogeneous-force Lanchester
formulations and concludes that (see p. 11-19 of [16]) "the determin-
istic model would have difficulty approximating a stochastic simulation"
with respect to the time history of force levels. Based upon our study
of Clark's work [41], we raise the question as to whether there may
be significant differences between optimal allocation policies for
deterministic and stochastic attrition processes. If such a difference
were to be observed, then this would raise the more basic question of
whether or not different study results could be obtained merely by
the choice of modelling technique, i.e. deterministic or stochastic
formulations.
c. Special Features of Deterministic Optimal Control Models
for Tactical Allocation .
In Section 1. above, we have discussed three important problem
areas in applying deterministic optimal control theory to study tactical
allocation problems
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(a) non-uniqueness of extremals,
(b) state variable inequality constraints,
(c) singular subarcs.
(These topics were not discussed in [111].) Most of our research
effort has been directed at developing a satisfactory treatment of
these topics for tactical allocation problems. All are relatively
near the frontiers of research in deterministic optimal control theory.
Further detailed discussions of the above topics can be found
in the appropriate appendices which are as follows
:
(a) non-uniqueness of extremals: Appendices A, F, G,
(b) state variable inequality constraints: Appendix E,
(c) singular subarcs: Appendix D.
It seems appropriate, however, to give further general discussion of
these aspects in order to emphasize their importance in the optimiza-
tion of combat dynamics via optimal control theory. Additionally, we
will review their current status within deterministic optimal control
theory.
(1) Non-uniqueness of Extremals .
The purpose of this research is to determine optimal fire dis-
tribution/target selection policies for tactical allocation problems.
However, as is well-known, the maximum principle (or the max-min
principle for two-sided (differential game) problems) provides only
necessary conditions of optimality. Moreover, let the reader recall
that we refer to a path on which the necessary conditions of optimality
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(maximum printiple) are almost everywhere satisfied as an extremal .
Thus, in order to determine the optimal allocation policy one must
show that a particular extremal is indeed an optimal trajectory
(otherwise one may incorrectly identify a non-optimal policy as being
optimal)
.
Two ways of determining optimal trajectories are as follows:
(a) check whether sufficient conditions of optimality [92], [53]
are satisfied on the extremal,
**
(b) by citing the appropriate existence theorem, show that an
optimal control exists to the problem at hand; there are two
further subcases: (1) if the extremal is unique, then it is
optimal or (2) if the extremal is not unique and only a
finite number exist, then the optimal trajectory is determined
by considering a finite number of alternatives.
It turns out, however, that the former approach is inadequate for most
tactical allocation problems that we have considered, since existing
sufficient conditions [92], [53] only apply to optimal control problems
of fixed length (i.e. fixed terminal time). Without going into subtle
details at this time, let us state that the results of [92], [53] cannot
be applied to, for example, the Isbell-Marlow problem [74], [117]
without qualification (if they are, it is easy to falsely conclude
that certain non-optimal extremals are optimal)
.
The second approach given above is the one we have taken in this
research. If an extremal is unique, then it is optimal and no difficulty
For the purposes of our expository discussion here we are speaking
somewhat imprecisely in order to communicate to the general reader why
certain topics have received so much attention in our research.
**
This is essentially a condensation of the general solution procedure
given in Appendix A (and further extended in Appendix G)
.
38
exists. However, in the simplest fire distribution problem we have
shown that extremals may not be unique [117]. (Apparently, this was
not noted in any past research on this problem [74], [111].) Moreover,
we have shown how to determine the optimal allocation policy when
there are multiple extremals in such a problem (see Appendices A and
F for further details) . In the latter case, one may have to contend
with a dispersal surface (see pp. 132-141 of [72]) being present in
the solution.
In our past research, we have shown that dispersal surfaces may
exist in the solution to even the simplest fire distribution problem
[117]. This rare singular surface is very difficult to determine, since
its presence in a solution cannot be determined directly by the maximum
principle but requires "considerations in the large." Besides the
examples (all two-sided problems) given in Isaacs' book (see pp. 135-
155 of [72]), we are aware of only one other problem [44] studied in
the literature in whose solution a dispersal surface has been found.
The existence of multiple (i.e. non-uniqueness of) extremals in
tactical allocation problems within the Lanchester theory of combat
has important implications for computational methods (such as dynamic
programming or other finite difference approximation techniques)
.
Approximate solutions to optimal control problems may be developed
by discretizing time (i.e. using finite difference approximations)
and treating the resulting problem as a mathematical programming problem
[30], [93]. The difficulties caused by the existence of multiple extremals
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or dispersal surfaces in the solution to a continuous-time optimal
control problem are not circumvented by considering an approximating
mathematical programming (finite-dimensional optimization) problem.
With such subtle features being present in even the simplest
fire distribution problem, the reader might well ask, "Can anything
be done to circumvent such mathematical complexities?" We believe
that this can be partially done by identifying the circumstances under
which such difficult mathematical points arise in the model's solution.
In other words, it is very important to have complete (and mathemati-
cally correct) solutions to the simplest tactical allocation problems
if for no other reason than to identify which formulations lead to
prohibitive mathematical complexities (and hence should be avoided)
.
For example, we know that for n-versus-one combat such difficulties
don't arise when surviving target types are valued in direct proportion
to their kill capability as measured by their Lanchester attrition-
rate coefficient.
Finally, except for the references cited above (and pp. 276-284
of [4]), we could find no other treatment of multiple extremals in the
current literature of deterministic optimal control theory.
(2) State Variable Inequality Constraints .
As we saw in our discussions in Section 1 above, all tactical
allocation problems contain negativity restrictions on the force
levels due to physical reasons (negative force levels don't make sense).
In general, force levels will be represented by state variables so that
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such a restriction is mathematically called a state variable inequality
constraint (frequently denoted as SVIC) . The maximum principle (in
its original form [101]) is inadequate to handle SVIC's and special
mathematical theories have been developed for state-variable-inequality-
constrained problems. When we started our research, we found that
results were widely scattered in the literature and that a completely
adequate theory to solve even the simplest fire distribution problem did
not exist. Hence, we have developed a theory of SVIC's for tactical
allocation problems within the Lanchester theory of combat (see
Appendix E)
.
A mathematical theory of SVIC's is essential for solving tac-
tical allocation problems within the Lanchester theory of combat.
Using such a theory, one can determine when it is not optimal to
drive a force level to zero, the optimal order in which to annihilate
target types, etc. Thus, the mathematical theory (necessary conditions)
allows one to (significantly) reduce the volume of allocation strategy
combinations which one has to examine in solving a differential game
(thus circumventing the computational difficulty encountered by
Sternberg (see pp. 154-155 of [111])).
As noted frequently in this report, no adequate theory of SVIC's
exists within the current mathematical theory of differential games.
*
tA. Friedman, of course, has treated differential games with SVIC s
(i.e. games with restricted phase coordinates) [52] . His approach is
different than the variational approach used in optimal control theory,
and his emphasis is on existence theorems. Moreover, his treatment
(see pp. 239-240 of [52]) of Isaacs' war of attrition and attack (see
pp. 96-104 of [72]) implicitly requires an unsupported assumption.
41
The development of a mathematical theory of SVIC's for differential
games which occur within the Lanchester theory of combat appears to
be the most needed extension of the existing theory of differential
games for military operations research applications.
Although optimal control problems involving inequality con-
straints on a function of the state variables with no explicit
dependence upon the control variables have received fairly compre-
hensive treatment in recent years (see [77], [79], [94], [115] for
comprehensive bibliographies) , most results are widely scattered in
the literature. (Moreover, the theory which has appeared in textbooks
has some important gaps in it and is inadequate (by itself) to solve
the fire distribution problems that have been the subject of our
research [115].) The poineering work of the Russian R. Gamkrelidze in
1959 (see Chapter VI in [101]) was followed in the USA by that of
L. Berkovitz [9], S. Dreyfus [47], and Bryson, Denham, and Dreyfus
[29]. Berkovitz and Dreyfus [15] subsequently have shown the equiva-
lence of the results of Gamkrelidze and Berkovitz with those of
Dreyfus.
Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [94] have written an excellent survey
article on the theory of SVIC's and summarize theoretical results
through 1966. Subsequent work has been by Jacobson and Lele [77] and
Jacobson, Lele, and Speyer [79], the latter authors deriving their
results by considering generalized Kuhn-Tucker conditions in a Banach
space. Sufficient conditions of optimality for problems with SVIC's
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have been given by Funk and Gilbert [53]. Finally, we would like
to mention the work by two students of M. Hestenes [55], [102].
Moreover, as we have recently pointed out [115], practitioners
of optimal control have not always been aware of the precise content
of the above work. We are aware of no previous work relating the
theory of SVIC's to allocation problems in the Lanchester theory of
combat
.
(3) Singular Subarcs .
As we have seen in Section 1 above, tactical allocation problems
within the Lanchester theory of combat may be formulated (see equations
(1) above) as differential games in which the strategy variables (e.g.
fraction of X. who fire at Y.) appear linearly . Such problems
are called singular (because the matrix of second partial derivatives
of the Hamiltonian with respect to the strategy variables is a singular
matrix) and require special treatment. One-sided versions of such
fire distribution problems then are singluar problems of optimal
control. A discussion of terminology and the mathematical aspects of
singular optimal control problems has been given in Section l.b. above.
We saw there that the maximum principle does not determine the singular
control and that the classical theory does not provide adequate tests
of optimality for singular subarcs.
A mathematical theory of singular subarcs is essential for
solving tactical allocation problems within the Lanchester theory of
combat because it is required to determine the optimality of fire
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distribution policies that are not extreme points of the control
variable space (i.e. policies that are other than or 1). We




< 1 arises in the simple problem of target selec-
tion for a homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against two enemy
force types each of which undergoes attrition at a rate proportional
to the product of the numbers of f irers and targets [120]
.
The establishment of the singular subarcs in such a problem as
above requires examination of the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condi-
tion (a second order condition) . In a problem such as (11) in which
target-type attrition corresponds to Lanchester 's classical square-law
attrition process (i.e. the attrition rate of a target type is propor-
tional only to the number of firers) the absence of singular subarcs
is established by showing that it is impossible to have (except for
pathological cases) — f——j = 0, where H denotes the Hamiltonian.
at v d<p y
The importance of the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is empha-
sized by the fact that we have encountered a problem (suggested by
the work of P. Chaiken) in which it is the only way to establish the
non-optimality of splitting forces in combat.
Singular problems of optimal control were apparently first
explicitly studied in 1963 by Johnson and Gibson [81] (see [80] for
a discussion of singular solutions in optimal control problems within
a broad perspective of applied mathematics) . Since that time the
subject has grown to comparative maturity although most recent results
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are widely scattered in the literature. Surveys of early work are
contained in the works by Kelley, Kopp, and Moyer [83] (summarizes
results through 1966) and Bryson and Ho (see Chapter 8 of [28])
(summarizes results through 1968) . The above work is sufficient to
adequately treat all the singular problems of the optimal control of
deterministic Lanchester processes which we have so far encountered.
Kelly [82] , [83] apparently first generalized the Legendre-
Clebsch necessary conditions to singular subarcs. This was further
generalized to singular extremals involving several control variables
by Goh [54], Jacobson later derived an additional necessary condition
via differential dynamic programming [75]. Very recently, Jacobson
[76] has given a general sufficiency theorem for the second variation
which allows one to treat both singular and non-singular problems.
This yields conditions analogous to the well-known no-conjugate-
point condition (see pp. 181-184 of [28]) for singular subarcs and has
led to necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality for singular
control problems [110] (see also [78]).
Except for our own work [121], we are aware of no previous
work applying the theory of singular extremals to tactical allocation
problems within the Lanchester theory of combat.
d. Optimal Control of the Lanchester Stochastic Process .
A totally underdeveloped area in the Lanchester theory of combat
has been optimal target section in combat among heterogeneous forces
when attrition is a stochastic process. Based on our review of the
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pertinent literature (see Section 1 of Appendix I) , we conclude that
there has been no past adequate treatment of stochastic versions of
the fire distribution problems that we have previously studied
using deterministic models. By studying such stochastic versions,
we plan to see if the "best" tactics for target selection are depend-
ent upon how attrition is modelled, i.e. deterministic or stochastic
process. In this report we present preliminary results (development
of the fundamental functional equation for the optimal expected value
function, its analytic solution in some special cases, and a numerical
approximation for the general case) . Although our results are special
cases of well-known results in the field of optimal stochastic control,
the optimal control of the Lanchester stochastic process had apparently
never been studied in the past by this approach.
In Appendix I we consider a battle which is to last a prescribed
length of time as an optimal stochastic control problem. Our idea is
to compare the structure of the optimal allocation policies between
deterministic and stochastic formulations. Accordingly, we have
developed a complete "solution" to the corresponding deterministic
control problem (see Appendix G) . We are currently directing a
graduate student (LT R. Powers, USN) in making a numerical comparison
between results obtained by these two models, and we will report
these results at a later date.
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5. Guided Tour of the Appendices .
In this section we summarize the work which is contained in
the appendices and explain why this work was done. In our first report
[113] we emphasized the extension of results which had previously
appeared in the literature. In the present report we give further
extensions and, moreover, develop the mathematical foundations for
more extensive future work.
In Appendix A we derive a complete solution to the Isbell and
Marlow fire programming problem [74]. This current work revises
earlier preliminary results on this problem. We develop general
methodology for solving such deterministic optimal control problems
and then demonstrate its application by developing a complete solution
(however, further extensions are given in Appendix F) for a terminal
control battle (the battle only terminates when the course of battle
has reached some specified state) between a homogeneous force and a
heterogeneous enemy force of two target types. Our methodology is
more general, though, and may be applied to the cases of one-versus-n
target types, variable attrition-rate coefficients, etc.
The structure of the optimal fire distribution policy for the
Isbell-Marlow problem is discussed. We show how the optimal fire
distribution policy may depend indirectly upon the force levels. For
the attrition model used (attrition rate of target types proportional
to the number of firers only) the optimal policy is always to concen-
trate all fire on one target type. Our work extends that of Isbell
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and Marlow [74] by showing that the solution to this optimal control
problem contains dispersal furfaces. Additionally, we show how to
determine the domain of controllability for extremals to each terminal
state.
The work presented in Appendix A was done because the Isbell-
Marlow problem [74] represents the simplest terminal control fire
distribution problem. Any mathematical theory developed to handle
more complex tactical allocation problems of greater practical signi-
ficance must be able to adequately handle this simple case.
In Appendix B we examine the structure of optimal allocation
policies for tactical situations described by Lanchester-type models
of warfare by studying a sequence of simplified models. We do this
because no previous work had ever systematically investigated the
dependence of tactics upon model form. We consider models for two
types of choice situations
(1) selection of target type,
(2) regulation of firing rate.
These problems are solved by the mathematical theory of optimal
control.
In the first sequence of models we examine the effects on the
optimal target selection policy of the following factors: objectives
of the combatants, termination conditions of the conflict, number of
target types, some special cases of time-dependent attrition-rate
coefficients, and type of attrition process. We then examine a sequence
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of models to see how ammunition limitations affect firing rates. Next
we discuss two-sided extensions of such problems but point out the
value of studying one-sided problems as considered in this report.
Finally, various implications of the models are discussed. Some of
the results presented in this appendix are further extended in
Appendix G.
In Appendix C we develop partial solutions to a sequence of
models for the optimal fire distribution policy for a homogeneous
force in combat against geterogeneous enemy forces. We consider a
prescribed duration battle and concentrate on the special case when
no force type is annihilated during combat. For both one-versus-two-
target-types combat and one-versus-n-target-types combat we develop
our results for both constant attrition-rate coefficients and also
some special cases of variable attrition-coefficients.
We undertook the work of Appendix C to show how our results
for one-versus-two-target-types combat could be extended to one-
versus-n combat and variable attrition-rate coefficients (thus closer
modelling real world complexities). In this work we draw heavily
upon our research on homogeneous force models with variable
attrition-rate coefficients [114], [116], [123] (see also Appendix
H)
.
First, we consider the problem of optimal fire distribution over
two target types for some special cases of variable attrition-rate
coefficients. Next, we consider several target types and constant
attrition-rate coefficients. Then, we treat the more general case
of several target types for some special instances of variable
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attrition-rate coefficients. Finally, we make some observations on
the results presented in this appendix.
Our results presented in Appendix C show that some special
cases of variable attrition-rate coefficients are mathematically
tractable for optimal control problems within the Lanchester theory
of combat. Additionally, we show that in one-versus-n combat the
solution to the optimal fire distribution problem takes a particularly
simple form when enemy target types are valued (linearly) in direct
proportion to their kill capability (as measured by the Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficient) . In this special case, the optimal fire
distribution policy is particularly simple: namely, concentrate all
fire upon the available target type with the largest product of
attrition-rate coefficients (i.e. largest a.b.). This is even true
for some special cases of variable attrition-rate coefficients.
In Appendix D we treat a simple problem of fire distribution
for a homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against two enemy force
types, each of which undergoes attrition at a rate proportional to the
product of the numbers of firers and targets. We undertook this work
in order to study the dependence of optimal tactics upon the attri-
tion model. In addition to the Pontryagin maximum principle, the
theory of singular extremals is required to solve this problem.
Our major result is that for fire distribution problems in
which target-type attrition corresponds to the classical Lanchester
linear-law attrition model "the optimal fire distribution policy is
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not always to concentrate all fire on a single target type . There are
circumstances when the optimal policy is to split one's fire between
the two target types. Additionally, we show how to synthesize the
optimal fire distribution policy from the basic optimality conditions.
For constant attrition-rate coefficients we show that whether or not
changes can occur in target priorities depends solely on how survivors
are valued and is independent of the type of attrition process.
In Appendix E we summarize results for the theory of state
variable inequality constraints (frequently denoted as SVIC's) which
had previously been widely scattered in the literature. Then we apply
this theory to two tactical allocation problems. The first problem
(tactical air-war campaign) is a one-sided version of R. Isaacs'
"War of Attrition and Attack" [72]. However, the non-negativity of
the force levels was not adequately handled mathematically in past
work [72], and we consider versions of the problem for which the
previous method of analysis does not lead to an optimal policy. The
second problem is the fire programming problem studied by Isbell and
Marlow [74]. We consider several versions of both these problems.
For one-versus-n-target-types combat we extend our past results by
developing necessary conditions of optimality for annihilating a
target type in two important cases: (1) two target types with a
special case of variable attrition-rate coefficients and (2) n
target types with constant attrition-rate coefficients.
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We undertook the work presented in Appendix E since no past
work on optimal tactical allocation had given an adequate treatment
of the non-negativity restrictions on force levels in developing
optimal policies. In our own previous work on the Isbell-Marlow
problem [74] we followed the heuristic treatment originated by Isbell
and Marlow [74] (who, in turn, were following Isaacs [70]) for deter-
mining the boundary conditions for the dual variables. Our work here
establishes a firm theoretical foundation for such important aspects
and justifies certain assumptions that we made in developing our
solution to the Isbell-Marlow problem [117]. Thus, we re-consider
the development of certain key necessary conditions of optimality
within the framework of the theory of SVIC's.
In Appendix F we consider some further aspects of the solution
to the Isbell and Marlow fire programming problem. We show how the
Isbell-Marlow problem is solved using the theory of SVIC's. Addition-
ally, we show that for certain values of model parameters (1) the
optimal policy may not be unique and (2) in treating multiple extremals
there is a dominated return (i.e. the return associated with one family
of extremals dominates that associated with another family of extremals)
besides the dispersal surfaces in this problem's solution. We under-
took this work because our treatment of more complex tactical allocation
problems relies heavily on the complete solution of simpler problems.
This important theory (SVIC's) had never been applied previously to
determine the optimal control of deterministic Lanchester processes.
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In Appendix G we develop a complete solution to the prescribed
duration battle using the theory of SVIC's. We do this in order to
compare the structure of the optimal fire distribution policy for the
prescribed duration battle problem with that of other problems (i.e.
terminal control battle and optimal control of the Lanchester stochas-
tic process) . We give a general solution algorithm that applies to
all such deterministic optimal control problems. We have used this
algorithm to generate all the results given in this report. Discus-
sions of the following important topics are given : (1) the structure
of the optimal fire distribution policy and (2) the development of
solutions to such problems. We show that even when target types
undergo a "square-law" attrition process, the optimal allocation
policy may depend indirectly upon the force levels .
In Appendix H we develop solutions to extensions of F. W.
Lanchester' s classical equations of modern warfare (frequently referred
to as aimed-fire equations) for combat between two homogeneous forces.
In these extensions the lethality of the fire (as expressed by the
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) depends upon time. When the
dependence is arbitrary, the solution is an infinite series of recur-
sively related integrals; in special cases, more convenient representa-
tions (including representation in terms of tabulated functions) are
available. Solutions are obtained in the following cases: (1)
lethality of each side's fire proportional to a power of time and both
lethalities initially zero, and (2) lethality of each side's fire
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linear with time but only one side's lethality initially zero. The
latter case models the constant speed approach between forces whose
weapons have different maximum effective ranges. We undertook this
work because we could find no adequate treatment available in the
literature. These results have been subsequently used for problems
on the optimal control of deterministic Lanchester processes with
variable attrition-rate coefficients.
In Appendix I we present preliminary results on the optimal
control of the Lanchester stochastic process. We consider a stochastic
version of the prescribed duration fire distribution problem studied
in Appendix G. Our purpose for doing this work is to determine
whether the structure of the optimal allocation policy is affected by
whether the attrition process is modelled as being deterministic or
stochastic.
Thus, in Appendix I we develop the fundamental functional
equation satisfied by the optimal expected value function and derive
solutions in some special cases. Except for these special cases,
the fundamental functional equation (actually a system of differential-
difference equations) possesses a solution that is too complex for the
development of a closed-form analytic solution. Therefore we have
developed a finite difference approximation which can be used to
generate numerical solutions for small numbers of combatants.
Using the above finite difference approximation, a thesis student
has done some numerical computations for us. It has only proven to
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be feasible to use the computer to generate numerical results for
battles with up to 10 Y's versus 10 X 's and 10 X 's due to
computer memory requirements. Additionally, we have considered
approximations valid for large numbers of combatants. In pursuing
this approach, we have developed a diffusion approximation to the
Lanchester stochastic process.
In the fire distribution problems studied above for a homog-
enous force in combat with a heterogeneous enemy it has always been
assumed that fire can always be instantaneously re-distributed from
being entirely concentrated on one target type to any other one.
For example, in "two-on-one" combat the decision (or control) variable
represents the fraction of Y fire that is directed against X .
Instantaneous jumps in this control variable (for example, from
to 1) have been permitted. This corresponds, in a sense, to a
"perfect" command and control capability. In Appendix J we present
preliminary results for the more realistic assumption that there is
a limit to how fast
<J)
can be changed corresponding to command and
control limitations.
We undertook this work presented in Appendix J in order to
explore the effects of command and control capabilities upon the
structure of the optimal fire distribution policies. We show that
the presence of command and control limitations (which cause the rate
of re-distribution of fire to be bounded) causes fire to be shifted
earlier than when fires can be instantaneously re-distributed in
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anticipation of changes in target priorities. This phenomenon is
analogous to the situation when with reduced reaction times, one
tries to "anticipate" the actions of an enemy. The development of
these results has required some advanced theory for SVIC's (treatment
of a second order SVIC)
.
Finally, in Appendix K we further investigate the sensitivity
of the optimal target selection policy to the form of the combat
attrition model by considering a two-against-one-target-type selec-
tion problem with combat attrition following a general form proposed
by R. Helmbold. For combat between homogeneous forces Helmbold [59]
has proposed a general Lanchester-type model in which the effective-
ness of a force is dependent upon the force ratio. This general
formulation yields Lanchester's square law and Lanchester's linear
law as special cases. We extend Helmbold' s model to combat between
heterogeneous forces and use this extension as the attrition model
in a tactical allocation optimization problem.
In Appendix K, then, we present preliminary results for optimal
target selection for Helmbold' s general attrition structure. These
preliminary results indicate that when target-type attrition follows
Helmbold 's general model, the optimal policy is always to concentrate
all fire on a single target type . (In other words, we could find no
singular solution in this case.) This should be contrasted with our
result [121] that when target types undergo attrition corresponding to
a "linear-law" Lanchester process, it is sometimes optimal to split
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one's fire. In other words, as far as the optimal distribution of fire
is concerned, Helmbold's general attrition structure behaves like
that in which a target type's attrition rate is proportional only to
the number of firers.
6 . Relevance to Current Navy Problems .
In this section we explain the relevance of our research on
the optimal control of Lanchester processes to current Navy problems.
a. Our theoretical work on tactical allocation problems is
being interfaced with the ONR supported study effort of P. Chaiken of
Stanford Research Institute. Chaiken has pioneered [31], [32], [33],
[34] in the application of quantitative (Lanchester-type) methodology
for force level planning, development of contingency plans, etc. This
methodology has been used for significant force level problems defined
by the military—Commander-in-Chief-Pacific (CINPAC) , Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC) , and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) [34].
To determine optimal allocation strategies in dynamic problems,
Chaiken uses a heuristic optimization approach of assuming a certain
type of strategy (constant or piecewise constant) and then comparing
computed campaign outcomes for various levels of strategy variables
(essentially, a so-called direct method of optimization [90]). Our
research supports his study objectives by (1) justifying such assump-
tions, (2) suggesting strategy alternatives to explore in more detailed
computer simulations such as BALFRAM [37], (3) explicitly showing the
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effects of modelling assumptions on optimal tactical allocation
strategies, (4) developing insights into optimal allocation strate-
gies for various attrition structures of interest.
b. Thus, we are striving to provide a sound theoretical basis
for application efforts such as by Chaiken. In our present work we
have concentrated on solution techniques and methodology, since this
was a gap in the current state-of-the-art for applications of optimal
control/differential game theory to Lanchester-type models of warfare.
We have studied idealizations (abstractions) of allocation structures
arising in more complex (realistic) defense planning studies. Through
such idealization and/or simplification we have tried to identify
factors or concepts which merit further investigation in more detailed
computer simulations (such as BALFRAM [37]). For example, uses have
never exercised the "linear-law" attrition option of MILISTRAC and
BALFRAM [36]. Yet our research indicates that optimal tactics with
"linear-law" attrition are fundamentally different than those with
"square-law" attrition. Hence, planners should be alerted (educated)
to this fact about the dependence of optimal tactics on type of
attrition process.
c. It seems appropriate to briefly discuss a modelling issue
of abstraction versus realism. The mass of details present in a
realistic (complex) model inevitably obscures essential modelling
issues such as type of attrition process, type of objective (criterion)
function. Our work is oriented towards clarifying basic issues by
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examining simplified models. For example, versions of a well-known
model (see pp. 96-104 in [72]) which are used for justifying tactics
in the air war consider a combat payoff in terms of net sorties of
ground support missions flown and totally ignore the effects of such
sorties on the outcome of the ground war. Our theoretical analysis
of this situation provides motivation (and justification) for a
current ONR study [35] to determine the optimal tactics of the air
war in the context of the ground war objectives for contingency plans
of interest.
d. A sequential game arises in a current application of P.
Chaiken's BALFRAM methodology [35]. Our research lays the theoretical
foundations (via the research on differential games) for the inclusion
of the capability to handle such a sequential game within the BALFRAM
software system.
e. The questions of target priority rules for target selection
frequently arises in the evaluation of proposed weapon systems and/or
doctrine of employment for weapon systems. The study of idealized
combat models would provide insight into the optimization of combat
dynamics hopefully leading to a better quantitative basis for defense
planning decisions.
f. In the Navy mission of fire support, the question of target
priority rules for target selection frequently arises. An understanding
of optimization principles in various dynamic combat situations would
lead to better utilization of such resources.
59
7 . Summary of Research Findings .
Here we summarize our research results. We found that solution
techniques were insufficiently developed for the optimization of
combat dynamics. Accordingly, this aspect received top priority in
our work. Results are organized under the following headings:
(1) solution techniques,
(2) insights into optimal tactical allocation,
(3) implications for defense planning.
Items (2) and (3) differ in that the latter is a management-oriented
digest of the practical implications of our research whereas the
former is oriented towards a technical audience. Further amplification
of results and conclusions is to be found in the appendices.
a. Solution Techniques .
Our research has produced the following results on solution
techniques for the optimization of combat dynamics. Specifically, we
have accomplished the following:
(1) developed general solution algorithm (based on results from
modern optimal control theory) to determine the optimal
control of deterministic Lanchester processes,
(2) developed the basic equations of optimality for the optimal
control of the Lanchester stochastic process,
(3) developed a theory (theory of state variable inequality
constraints) for the adequate treatment of non-negativity
restrictions on force levels in optimal control problems
for deterministic Lanchester processes,
(4) discovered that no adequate theory of state variable inequality
contraints exists in current theories for differential games,
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(5) shown how to treat the following difficult aspects of optimal
control problems for deterministic Lanchester processes:
(a) singular solutions,
(b) state variable inequality constraints,
(c) multiple extremals (including dispersal surfaces and
dominated returns)
,
(6) developed complete solutions for optimal fire distribution
tactics in one-against-two-target-types Lanchester combat for
two cases
:
(a) terminal control battle (f ight-to-the-f inish)
,
(b) prescribed duration battle,
(7) developed partial solutions for optimal fire distribution tactics




(A) some special cases of variable attrition-rate
coefficients,
(B) "linear-law" attrition of target types,
(C) bounded rates for changing the distribution of fire,
(D) Helmbold's general attrition model,
(E) stochastic attrition process,
(b) one-against-n-target-types combat,
(A) constant attrition-rate coefficients,
(B) some special cases of variable attrition-rate
coefficients,
(8) developed solutions to homogeneous force models with variable
attrition-rate coefficients.
*
In (6) and (7) the attrition process is deterministic and the attrition
rate of a target type is proportional to only the number of firers
unless otherwise noted.
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b . Insights into Optimal Tactical Allocation .
Based on our study of the optimization of combat dynamics using
the mathematical theories of differential games/optimal control we
have reached the following conclusions:
(1) the structure of the optimal allocation policy for fire
distribution/target selection depends upon model form ; more
specifically, the optimal policy depends on force levels,
weapon system capabilities (as measured by Lanchester attri-
tion-rate coefficients), the type of attrition process, the
target acquisition process, the values placed upon surviving
force types, and the termination conditions of combat,
(2) for deterministic Lanchester one-versus-n-target-types
combat in which the attrition rate for each enemy target type
is proportional to only the number of firers, the optimal
fire distribution policy has the following properties (for
linear utility of survivors and no replacements)
:
(a) fire is always concentrated on a single target type
(which may change without the annihilation of the
previous target type)
,
(b) it may depend indirectly upon force levels (depending
upon how survivors are valued)
,
(c) when enemy survivors are valued in direct proportion to
their kill capability (as measured by their Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficient against the homogeneous force)
,
(A) for constant attrition-rate coefficients
(I) fire is always concentrated on the available
enemy target type which has the largest product
of attrition-rate coefficients (i.e. the largest
a.b. where a. represents the kill capability
or the friendly force against the enemy's ith
target type and b. represents that of the
enemy's i th force type),
(II) fire is only shifted to a new target type after
the annihilation of the previously available
target type with the largest product of attri-
rate coefficients (i.e. no change in fire dis-




(B) for variable attrition-rate coefficients in the
case when the ratio of enemy weapon system capabili-
ties (as measured by Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficients) is a constant for any two enemy
weapon system types
(I) assuming that no target type is annihilated,
all fire is always concentrated on the target
type with the largest product of attrition-
rate coefficients,
(II) additional assumptions are required to analyze
the case when a target type is annihilated,
(d) target priorities are not directly influenced by replace-
ment rates when these are added to the model,
(3) for deterministic Lanchester one-versus-two-target-types
combat in which the attrition rate for each enemy target type
is proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and
target types, the optimal fire distribution policy has the
following properties (for constant attrition-rate coefficients,
linear utility of survivors, and no replacements):
(a) it depends directly upon force levels,
w%
(b) (j> (the optimal fraction of Y-fire directed at X )
takes on one of three values: 0,1, or a_/(a +a J;
thus, it is sometimes optimal to split one's fire,
(c) when enemy survivors are valued in direct proportion to
their kill capability (as measured by their attrition-
rate coefficients against the homogeneous force)
(A) the ranking of target priorities is never reversed
over time,
(B) the optimal policy is given explicitly by
*


















(d) the structure of the optimal policy is not sensitive to
the type of attrition sustained by the homogeneous force,
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(4) for deterministic Lanchester one-versus-two-target-types
combat in which the attrition rate for each target type is
proportional to only the number of firers with (a) constant
attrition-rate coefficients, (b) linear utility of survivors,
and (c) no replacements, the optimal fire distribution policy
may be different in the following two cases:
(a) prescribed duration battle,
(b) f ight-to-the-f inish,
(This difference can only occur when for a..b > a
?
b enemy target
type two is valued in greater proportion to its kill capability than
target type one is.)
(5) for the stochastic version of the prescribed duration battle
described in (4) above, the optimal fire distribution policy
sometimes depends upon the force levels,
(6) for the battle described in (4) above, when there is an upper
bound on the rate of changing one's distribution of fire
(through command and control limitations) , the structure of
the optimal fire distribution policy is not appreciably
changed; the following statements can be made about the
optimal policy:
(a) the same conditions remain for it to be optimal to have
<j>* = or 1 (although clearly <j>* may have to take
on intermediate values)
,
(b) one starts to shift fire earlier (as measured by the
rate of destruction of target type value, i.e. product
of attrition-rate coefficient and marginal value of
target type) than in the previous case when $* can
instantaneously jump, for example, from to 1,
(7) the optimal fire distribution policy does not appear to be the
same for models with a deterministic attrition process and
those with a stochastic attrition process.
c . Implications for Defense Planning .
In our research reported here we have studied abstractions
(idealizations) of allocation structures that commonly occur in defense
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planning studies. After studying these simplifications in order to
obtain significant information about the structure of the optimal
allocation strategies, we have reached the following conclusions
(generalizations of phenomena that we have observed in simplified
cases) as to considerations that should be brought to the attention
of defense planners. These results should be kept in mind by
practitioners who perform more detailed computer simulation studies.
(1) The nature of the attrition process has a significant effect
upon optimal strategies. At present we feel that the highest
priority should be given to educate planners to the fact that
the type of optimal allocation strategy is dependent on the
nature of the attrition model. This has the operational
planning implication that studies should be run with both
square-law attrition and then linear-law attrition. Past
history shows that, for example, the linear-law attrition
option has never been exercised in BALFRAM [36].
(2) Force levels do affect optimal strategies. Whether one "wins'
(superiority) or "loses" (inferiority) affects optimal
strategies
.
(3) Even the nature of the scenario (terminal control n pre-
scribed duration conflict) may affect optimal strategies.
Thus, if one develops "good" tactics for a 90 day European
campaign, such tactics need not be "good" if the conflict
does not terminate at the prescribed time.
(4) Optimal tactics for the air war are dependent upon whether or
not the air war is evaluated in the context of ground war
objectives
(5) Optimal tactics are also significantly influenced by the
nature of the target acquisition process and command and
control capabilities.
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8. Suggested Future Research Tasks .
After performing the research documented in this report, we
feel that the current state-of-the-art for applying optimal control/
differential game theory to determine optimal allocation strategies
for deterministic Lanchester processes is such that more significant
results may be readily obtained in the future. We do not feel that
previous applied research has been on a sound theoretical basis, and
we hope that our work here has established that basis. With the
development of a theory of state variable inequality constraints
(SVIC's) for differential games we feel that the capabilities for
solving applied problems would be appreciably increased. Therefore,
we give this task top priority.
Based on our past research experience we feel that there is
much to be accomplished in the future. Specifically, we suggest the
following as future research tasks:
(a) Development of a theory of state variable inequality constraints
for Lanchester-type differential games.
(b) Development of further results for deterministic Lanchester
one-versus-n-target-types combat. This work would build upon
past research results and would include
(1) development of more complete solutions (for cases of both
constant attrition-rate coefficients and also variable
attrition-rate coefficients)
,
(2) incorporation into the models of such additional factors
as replacements, logistics, and supporting weapons,
(3) further consideration of "linear-law" attrition of
target types.
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(c) Study of the optimal division of forces to engage target
types. A slightly different attrition model than in the
Isbell-Marlow fire distribution problem is one in which the
friendly forces (assumed homogeneous) only suffer casualties
when they engage an enemy target type. (In the Isbell-Marlow
problem the friendly forces sustain casualties from an enemy
target type regardless of whether or not they engage it.)
This model is especially important, since it can be used to
answer several questions that have arisen in the work of P.
Chaiken.
(d) Development of simple (probably non-optimal) fire distribution
policies as approximations to the optimal policy. The worth
of such an approximate optimal policy would be evaluated by
comparing the payoff associated with it to the optimal return.
Besides the intrinsic importance of this aspect, we suggest
this task, since we have developed complete solutions to
several deterministic Lanchester one-versus-two-target-type
combat problems.
(e) Examination of other one-sided allocation problems of tactical
interest in the Lanchester theory of combat (for example, the
optimal distribution of supporting fires (such as Naval fire
support) over enemy units in Lanchester combat with friendly
forces) . Emphasis would be on solution development for each
of various modelling alternatives in order to study the
dependence of optimal tactics on model form.
(f) Performance of computational studies on the optimal control
of the Lanchester stochastic process. Using the finite
difference approximation developed in Appendix I, we would
compare optimal strategies for deterministic and stochastic
Lanchester processes. Furthermore, we would develop the
fundamental functional equation for the terminal control
battle (in Appendix I we consider the prescribed duration
battle) and again make such a comparison. Theoretical inves-
tigations should concentrate on gaining more insight into the
structure of the optimal target selection policy when the
attrition mechanism is stochastic.
(g) Further study of the optimal control of deterministic Lan-
chester processes when there is a bound on the rate of change
of the distribution of fire. Results of our initial effort
on this topic are contained in Appendix J. We suggest exten-
sion of these preliminary results.
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(h) Further study of the dependence of the optimal fire distribution
policy on the nature of the attrition model. We have given
some preliminary results in Appendix K for Helmbold's general
attrition structure. We suggest further extension of this
work and consideration of still other attrition models (for
example, that of Willard [131]).
(i) Examination of optimal tactics for other objective functions
(i.e. performance (effectiveness) criteria). For all the work
contained in this report the objective function has been a
linear function of the number of survivors. Other objective
functions that might be considered are
(1) nonlinear valuation of survivors (such as quadratic as
motivated by Lanchester's square law),
(2) the value of losses rather than survivors.
(j) Consideration of some simple Lanchester-type differential
games. All previous work has been handicapped by the lack
of an adequate theory of SVIC's for differential games. Such
a theory can be used to reduce the volume of allocation
strategy combinations that must be considered. Previous
work in the literature for which the non-negativity restric-
tions on the force levels has not received adequate treatment
is as follows:
(1) the war of attrition and attack of R. Isaacs [72],
(2) the supporting weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [130],
(3) the logistics allocation game of Moglewer and Payne [95]
,
(4) the "two-on-two" differential game studied by S. Sternberg
[111]-
After the development of a theory of SVIC's for Lanchester
differential games, it would seem appropriate to re-examine
the above work. Results from studying these problems are
useful to the work of P. Chaiken.
(k) Study of the optimal tactics for the air war in the case when
the air war is evaluated in the context of ground war objectives.
Further details on proposed future work is to be found in the
discussion sections of Appendices E, G, I, J, and K.
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Appendix A. On the Isbell and Marlow Fire Programming Problem.
1. Introduction .
In this appendix a complete solution is derived to the Isbell
and Marlow fire programming problem. The original work of Isbell
and Marlow has been extended by determining the regions of the
initial state space from which optimal paths lead to each of the
terminal states of combat. The solution process has involved
determining the domain of controllability for each of the terminal
states of combat and the determination of dispersal surfaces. This
solution process suggests a solution procedure applicable to a wider
class of tactical allocation problems, terminal control attrition
differential games. The structure of optimal target engagement
policies in "fights to the finish" is discussed.
An underdeveloped area [6] of the Lanchester theory of combat
is target selection for combat among heterogeneous forces. This type
of problem has been studied by Isbell and Marlow, who considered both
a truncated stochastic (Lanchester) process by game theoretic means
[12] and a terminal control (one-sided) differential game [11]. An
attrition differential game is an idealized combat situation described
by Lanchester-type equations [5], [18] over a period of time with
choices of tactics available to both sides and subject to change with
time. Terminal control attrition games only end when the course of
combat has been steered to a prescribed state.
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In developing a theory of target selection it is important
to understand the dependence of allocation rules on the type of model
chosen. Tactical allocation problems may be studied in two types of
scenarios: (1) the prescribed duration battle and (2) the terminal
control battle (a particular case of which is the "fight to the
finish"). All the attrition examples in Isaacs' book [14] are of the
first type (his "War of Attrition and Attack" is the continuous
version of the tactical air war game [3], [4], [9] studied at RAND).
Only Isbell and Marlow [11] and Weiss [19] have studied the terminal
control problem. Unfortunately, Isbell and Marlow did not obtain
a complete solution to their problem. They could not dete -nine when
certain terminal states of combat were reached. Weiss studied a problem
which may be considered to be a generalization (two-sided version) of
their problem. Writing many years before results were known beyond
a small number of researchers, he did not use the subsequently well-
known necessary conditions [1]. That his solution procedure [19] was
heuristic is not surprising, since the simpler problem* [11] which
he referenced in his paper had not been completely solved.
Since the original version of this paper, this problem has also been
recently studied by S. Sternberg [17]. He employed a more geometric
approach closely following that of R. Isaacs [14] and originally
employed by Isbell and Marlow [11]. Sternberg obtained different
results than those presented here.
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Thus the obtaining of a complete solution to the Isbell and
Marlow problem is viewed as a first step leading to the solution of
more general tactical allocation problems. In this present appendix, we
shall derive its solution by the Pontryagin maximum principle [16].
Generalizations of this procedure to differential games are indicated,
and solution properties are discussed. In view of the close connec-
tion [1], [10] between optimal control and differential games (Isaacs),
the terminology of these two fields is used somewhat interchangeably.
2. The Fire Distribution Problem .
The situation considered by Isbell and Marlow [11] is the
simplest problem of fire distribution: combat betwee an X-force at
two force types (for example, riflemen and grenadiers) and a homo-
geneous Y-force (for example, riflemen only) . This situation is
shown diagrammatically below.
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It is the objective of the Y-force commander to maximize his survi-
vors at the end of battle and minimize those of his opponent (consid-
ering the utilities assigned survivors) . This is accomplished through
his choice of the fraction for fire, <P, directed at X . The battle
terminates when one side or the other has been annihilated.
Mathematically the problem may be stated as
maximize ry(T) - px.. (T) - qx (T) with T unspecified
dx
l
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where all symbols are defined in the next section and with terminal
states defined by (1) x (T) = x
2
(T) - and (2) y(T) = 0.
The terminal surface of the "realistic" (one-sided) game is
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3. Notation .
The symbols which are used in this paper are defined as
follows
:
A = A(R,z) = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/(z-l) 2
,
B = B(R,z) = A(z-l) 2 /z 2 = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/z 2
,
a ,a ,b ,b = constant attrition rates,
C. for i = 1,2,3,4,5 = the i— part of the terminal surface
as defined in section 2.,
D(C.) = domain of controllability for C,
g(P ,R,z) = term in equation (57) of the locus of points for
which P = P,
,
h(P ,R,z) = term in equation (58) for boundary surface between
the regions from which optimal paths lead to C and C
,
p,q,r = utilities assigned to surviving X , X and Y
forces respectively,




(t) = y(t)), X
p. for i = 1,2,3 = boundary condition for dual variable at
1 t=0,
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P = (x ,x_,y_) = point in the initial state space,












t = time at which X is annihilated, i.e. x (t ) = 0,
t„ = first time at which 2b x (tJx + b_(x ) 2= a y 2 (t ? ) for
an extremal leading to C,
,
T = total time for the battle,





a, (b.p. + b_p)
= cosh /a b t- (C.) = —er 7—r 7—
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x ,x ,y = average force strengths; with initial values x , x
,
a, (biq -b 2p) R _ 6
z = cosh /a_b x (C_) = — -—













= fraction of Y-f ire directed at X..
,
t = "backwards time" from the end of the reduced game, i.e.
the time remaining before the end of the reduced game,
x (C
.
) = "backwards time" of the first switch in tactics for
extremals leading to C.,
t
1
= T - t = length of time that Y fires at X after X
has been annihilated for C. extremals.
4
.
Solution Procedure and Extensions .
Extremal paths (a path on which the necessary conditions for
optimality are almost everywhere satisfied) may be obtained by routine
application of Pontryagin's maximum principle [16] (the original
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authors used equivalent conditions independently developed by Isaacs
[13]). However, in a terminal control problem we would like to know
the domain of controllability [7] for each terminal state so that
tactics are determined in terms of the initial conditions of combat
(and also possibly time)
. We define the domain of controllability
for a given terminal state to be that subset of the initial state
space from which extremals lead to the terminal state. Furthermore,
additional considerations (as outlined below) are required when the
domains of controllability corresponding to different terminal states
overlap
.
The following procedure has been used to solve the above
problem:
(a) extremal control is determined by maximizing the Hamiltonian;
since the state variables (force strengths) are non-negative,
the control depends, in many cases, only on relationships between
the dual variables (marginal return from destroying target)
,
(b) from each separate terminal state, the time history of the dual
variables is obtained by a backward integration of the adjoint
system of differential equations; for a square law attrition
process, the adjoint equations are independent of the state
variables
,
(c) for each terminal state the domain of controllability is deter-
mined by forward integration of the state equations using the
time history of extremal control developed in (b) ; changes in
control with time (existence of transition surface) may have to
be considered in this step.
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(d) the solution is determined at this point for regions of the
initial state space which are covered by part of the domain of
controllability for only one terminal state; one must also
verify that the entire initial state space has been accounted
for, since otherwise one may have overlooked some type of
"singular" surface or even a terminal state,
(e) if domains of controllability overlap so that for a point of
the initial state space contained in their intersection there is
more than one extremal leading to the terminal surface, then one
computes the payoff associated with each extremal; the optimal
trajectory is selected from the extremals by comparing these
values
.
It is noted that Isbell and Marlow [11] stopped at step (b) above.
It seems appropriate to further discuss the situation when,
for example, the domains of controllability corresponding to two
different terminal states overlap. For points of the initial state
space contained in the intersection of the two domains, there are two
mutually exclusive possibilities: (1) for every point the payoff
associated with the extremal leading to one terminal state always
dominates that corresponding to the other, or (2) the payoff corre-
sponding to extremals of one family does not always dominate that of
the other. In the first case, the solution is simply determined:
the optimal trajectories are the extremals corresponding to the more
favorable payoff. In the second case, one must determine for what
A-
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parts of the region of intersection each alternative is better. For
the problem at hand, it will be seen that such a region of intersec-
tion may be divided into two subregions separated by a boundary surface.
In each subregion the payoff corresponding to one family of extremals
dominates that of the other. R. Isaacs (see pp. 132-141 of [14]) has
referred to such a singular surface as a dispersal surface, since when
the geometry of the optimal trajectories is considered, optimal paths
only lead away from a dispersal surface. For the problem at hand, it
will be seen that for a certain range of model parameters, two dis-
persal surfaces are present in its solution.
The complete solution to this problem is shown in Tables I
and II with supporting details presented in the next section. When
a p ^ a q, the domains of controllability do not overlap so that the
extremals are unique, and the extremal control turns out to be the
optimal control. Hence, the solution procedure terminates at step (d)
above. When a q > a p, the domains of controllability are shown
in Table I as Case (2). For R - /R(R-l) s: 6 < 1 where 6 = (a p)/(a q).
the domains of controllability don't overlap except for that corresponding
to part C, of the terminal surface, which overlaps several others.
In section 5.2 below it is shown how optimal trajectories are deter-
ined in the region of overlap and that extremals leading to C, can
only be optimal for a by 2 * s 2 + A(b x ) 2 . The resulting solution
is shown in Table II as Case (a). It should be noted that non-binding
constraints, which define the regions in the initial state space for
m
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TABLE I. Solution to Target Selection Problem - Fight to Finish
Nonrestrictive assumption: R > 1, i.e. a i b i > a ?b o
Terminal State Optimal Contro l Domain of Controllability
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TABLE II. Target Selection Problem - Fight to Finish
Solution for a.q > a p and Various Values of Parameters
A-ll
Nonrestrictive assumption: R > 1, i.e. a..b > a b
Terminal State Optimal Control
Case (a) : A £ 0, i.e. R - /r(r-1) £ 6 < 1
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Terminal State Optimal Control
;ase (b) : A > 0, i.e. £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
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Same as Case (a) Same as Case (a)
Same as Case (a)





















2 £ h(P°,R,z) for £ x° £ kb^x"^
a.b.y 2 < s 2 + (R-l)(b_x°) 2
1 1 o 2 I
a.b.y 2 < R{s 2 - (b.x°) 2 }
1 1 o 11
a.b.y 2 £ Rs 2 - R{b.x°[z 2 (R-l)+R]/(2R) + b x°} 2 /z 2
1 1 o 11 * <








(1) For t , t and t , see Table I.
(2) k = [z 2 - R(z-1) 2 ]/(2R).
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the various types of optimal control, have been deleted in constructing
Case (a) of Table II from Case (2) of Table I. For £ 6 < R - /R(R-l),
D(C ), the domain of controllability for the C part of the terminal
surface, and D(C ) have a non-empty intersection and similarly for
D(C.) and D (C ,) . Hence, step (e) in our above solution procedure
must be applied. In section 5.3 the determination of the two dispersal
surfaces is shown. The resulting solution is shown in Table II as
Case (b).
The above solution procedure may be easily extended to terminal
control differential games (such as [19] in which the subsequently
well-known necessary conditions [1] were not applied). Moreover, in
two-sided problems (both the X-force and the Y-force are heteroge
eous and each is faced with a fire distribution problem affected by
the other's choice) this author has noted that not only may domains
of controllability overlap with there being multiple extremals from a
given point in the initial state space, but also the corresponding
terminal states imply that the same player may either win or lose
depending upon which extremal path is followed. This is illusory,
however, since the player's opponent may block his steering the course
of battle to a winning end point by use of a non-extremal strategy.
Hence, the player must always lose.
We should note that in the existing theory of differential
games [2], [14] it is assumed that the optimal strategies are pure.
Since the Hamiltonian is separable (a function independent of the
X-force 's strategy variable(s) plus a function independent of the
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Y-force's strategy variable(s)) for two-sided fire distribution
problems in the Lanchester theory of combat as formulated by Isbell
and Marlow [11] and Weiss (see pp. 94-95 of [18]), it may be shown
that there do exist pure strategy solutions to such problems [8].
Thus, this paper's developments are applicable to this class of
problems
.
5. Development of Solution .
The solution is actually derived for a "reduced" game (that
portion of battle during which Y is faced with a choice problem)
.
We illustrate here for extremals to C . It suffices to trace extre-
mals up to t when x (t ) = 0, since <p* = from then until the
end of the game. The determination of the value, denoted by V(x ,x ,y),
of the reduced game, which is needed to determine the values of the
adjoint variables on the terminal surface, and part of the solution
originally obtained by Isbell and Marlow will not be repeated here
although we shall outline the general steps.
The Hamiltonian is
H(t,x.,p.,0) =
-{p^y + p 2 (l-0)a 2y + P 3 (b 1x1 + b^)}, (2)
and the adjoint equations are



























3 3y /bT ,/b - ,y 2
The extremal control 0* is determined by the maximum prin-
ciple, i.e. maximum H(t ,x
. ,p . ,0) , and we also have that
0*05:1
x 1
H(t,x.,p.,0*) = 0. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) may be combined to yield that for extremals

























) = lim p (t).
t^t
Obtaining a solution to this problem is simplified by the
following considerations. Let t = t.. - t and define





















and where (up until the first shift of tactics)
P 3

















sinh{/0a b + (1-0) a b t} . (11)
It is easily seen that p (t) > for all x, and thus
^- > for all t, (12)dx
when a b > a b by (9). As determined by the maximim principle and
use of (2) and (8) , the extremal control is given by
1 for v(x) >
for v(x) < 0. (13)
It is easy to show that it is impossible for v(x) = over any finite
interval of time, and hence the possibility for any singular solution
[15] to this problem is excluded. (The reader should note that the
term "singular surface" is used in a slightly different sense by
Isaacs (see pp. 132-134 and pp. 156-158 of [14]) and in the control
theory literature (see p. 502 of [10] or p. 4 of [15]).)
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By the symmetry of the problem it suffices to assume that
a b > a
?
b_, and then equations (7), (8), (12) and (13) imply that
extremals can actually lead to C . Furthermore, for a b > a_b
it is readily shown that no extremals lead to C (i.e. D (C ) is
void) and that extremals can only lead to C, when x (t) > for
t < T. We shall sketch the proof that no extremals for which x_(t) =
for t < T can lead to C , . By arguments similar to those used above
for C and using the value of the reduced game V(x ,x 9 ,y) and (2)
and (5) with t = and 0* = , it is readily shown that v(t=0 ) =
where t is the backwards time from the end of the reduce game, i.e.
x„(t=0) = 0, and v(i=0 ) is a one-sided limit through positive
values. Considering (12), this implies that v(t) > for t > 0,
and hence by (13) X is never fired at so that C, cannot be reached.
The special case in which C, is reached but x (t) > for t < T
is discussed in section 5.2.
In the next three subsections we present additional details
of solution development: (1) determination of domains of controlla-
bility, (2) entry to C , and (3) determination of dispersal surfaces.
This material represents the extension of the original work of Isbell
and Marlow [11]
.
5.1. Determination of Domains of Controllability .
One contribution of this note is to show how to determine the
domains of controllability. There are two cases to consider.
A-17
Case (1) a q £ a p
These determinations are routine and consist in combining the
time history of the extremal control, the non-negativity requirements
of the state variables, and the generalized square law















where 0(t) = const. in t. £ t £ t„ and u(t) = b x (t) + b x (t)
.
Case (2) a_q > a p
The condition for entry to C is as before. There are two
subcases for entry to C . First we consider the extremals for which
0*(t) =
for £ t £ T - t
for T - t- £ t £ T. (15)
Combining the above extremal control with the generalized square law
























)x° + a^y^ - s 2 + (l-RMb^) 2 = 0. (16)
A backwards integration of the state equations of £ t £ T -, with















)( z" 1 )» < 17 >
since x (t=T-i ) = x . It should be noted that in deriving (17) we








x°) 2 = ( aib iyo
2
-s 2 )/A, (18)
and hence we require that the right-hand side of (18) be non-negative
in order that C be reached. It may be shown that A > leads to
a contradiction to a result (32) derived below, and hence A a£ for
extremals corresponding to (15) to lead to C . This corresponds to
R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1, since A = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/z 2 and z = (R-6)/(R-l)
When A ri. , solution of (18) for x (T) and the requirement that
x (T) > leads to
a by 2 > s 2 + A(b.xV. (19)
1 1 o 2 2
Combination of the expression for x (T) with (17) and the require-










Next, we consider the extremals for which
<p*(t) = for £ t * T. (21)










y(t) = y cosh/a b t -—^ sinh/a b t, (22)
so that the boundary, which occurs when y(T) = for T = t
,
between this case and the previous one is easily seen to be given by
*
There is a flaw in this argument. The final solution, however, is not




(b x°+b x°) 2
y





where the T-time of the switch, determined from integration of the




Cb q - b 2 p)
z = cosh /a b T — -—-— —- . (24)





Noting that 0* = for the entire battle when T < x and re-arrang-
ing, we obtain the result shown in Table I. Combination of the extremal
control (21) with (14) also yields a quadratic equation for b x (T)












Thus, the payoff for extremals on which (21) holds is given by
P
5 " £ ' (Vl> -^T1 - ^ - ^V7)75}. (26)
The requirement that x_(T) > leads to the result shown in Table I.
When this latter condition or (19) is violated, then it is not possible
for x
?
(T) > when 0*(t) = for i x £ t, . Hence, we must
investigate the possibility that x (T) = (C, is entered), and
this is done in the next section.
Finally, we consider extremals leading to C . As done above,
we may combine the extremal control with (14) and the requirement that
x (T) > to obtain the first result shown in Table I. Similarly,












)2 + 2blVlV (27)
Also, the payoff for extremals leading to C is given by
P, .= ±~ Ss* + (R-l)(b_x;)^ - a by 2", (28)
1
^^
2 2 1 1 o
It remains to develop conditions which distinguish between
optimal paths leading to C and C . (Thus, strictly speaking the
result for C shown in Table I Case (2) is for the region where
extremals of D(C ) yield a larger payoff than extremals to C when
the two fields of extremals overlap.) We do this for A < 0, i.e.
z
2
< R/(R-1), since different arguments are required to determine
optimal trajectories when A > (see section 5.3). It will be shown
that optimal paths can only lead to C. when the time remaining in the
battle after destruction of the X forces exceeds the maximum time
to fire at X_ for extremals reaching C .
Let t = T - t denote the length of time that Y fires at
X after X has been annihilated. Then optimal paths can only
reach C when T ^ x (C ) = t , where t (C ) is the "backwards
time" of the switch in tactics for C_ extremals. First, we shall
show that extremals from P with x > leading to C yield a
better payoff than those leading to C for a
-,b-iy
2
* Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 }
and z < R/(R-1). Thus, optimal paths can only lead to C. from
initial points for which a.,b,y 2 > Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 }. However, for such
1 1 o
points the extremal strategy is to use 0*(t=O) = 1 and to continue
this until either the switching surface is encountered or X is
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annihilated, i.e. 0*(t) = 1 for £. t £ minimum (T-t
,
T-x ) .
Hence, optimal paths can only reach C when t ^ t .
Thus, it remains to sketch the proof that extremals from P
with x > leading to C yield a larger payoff than those leading
to C. for a.b.y 2 < Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 } and z 2 < R/(R-1). Setting
1 1 I o
a.b.y 2 = Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 } in the expressions for P r and P, (equa-1 1 o 5 1









that P_ > P, for all y such that a n b,y 2 £ Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 } whenj 1 o 1 1 o
A < 0.
that
Combining the extremal control for C with (14) , we have
y
2


















Also, since 0*(t) = for t
]
£ t £ T, integration of the state
equations (1) yields that
y(t) = y(t=t 1 )cosh/a2b 2 Ct-^) - ^/a sinh/a2b 2 (t_t l ) * (30)








Since the hyperbolic cosine is a strictly increasing function of its
argument, x ^ x implies that cosh/a b t.. ^ cosh/a b T- £ 1.
Combination of this with (29) and (31), use of well-known identities
for the hyperbolic functions, and some algebraic manipulation yields that
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3^2 * (blXJ+b2X°)2 + { ''< 8ff - R ] (b 2x°)2. (32)
For 1 £ z 2 £ R/(R-1), it is easily seen that (32) implies (27) so
that this latter condition need not be considered further.
5.2. Entry to Terminal State C, .
Terminal state C. is reached whenever X„ can be annihi-
4 2
lated by Y during the battle's last phase of length t. . The bound-
ary conditions on the terminal surface are
Xl (T) > p1
(t=0) - -p
x (T) = p o (x=0) = p_, unspecified
y(T) - p (t=0) = p° unspecified (33)
We also have that 0*(t=T) = 0*(t=O) = 0, and hence by (33) and the
transversality condition (5) it follows that p = 0. It should be
noted that p remains unspecified on the terminal surface. It will
be shown that p is determined by conditions for extremals to reach




Since v(t=0) < and -— > by (12), there will be a
dx
switch in tactics in "backwards time" at t = -^(C.) = t, . (In this14 1
section the notation t, refers to extremals leading to C. when it
1 4
is not denoted otherwise.) Thus, the extremal control is given by
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0*(t) =
for £ t £ t_
_0 for t * t £ T, (35)
where t = T - x and t is such that
2b lX;L (t 2
)x° + b
2





From a backwards integration of the adjoint equations and the maximum








w = cosh^ x± -




We observe that from what region of the initial state space extremals
lead to C, is determined by the value assigned to p_. In other
words, the value assigned to p_ determines what initial force levels
x are to be totally destroyed. It seems reasonable to argue that
(-p
9 )
cannot exceed q, since otherwise we would implicitly be valuing
X„ survivors greater than stated for the problem. A more precise
argument, of course, is to compare payoffs (i.e. P. and P , as
done in section 5.1) for extremals leading to C. and C r from the
same initial point P corresponding to p > q, but this has not






< (-p°) si q. (38)
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As done previously, we combine the extremal control (35) with
(14) to obtain










) + a^y^ - s 2 - (R-lMb^) 2 = 0, (39)









x°(R-l) + /s z + R(R-l)(b
2
xp z - a^y^, (40)
whence the result shown in Table I by requiring that the quantity under
the radical sign is non-negative. The other entries for C, in Table
I correspond to other parts of the terminal surface being impossible
to reach.
It remains to show that optimal paths can only lead to C.
from P when
wh





ere A = A(R,z) and z = cosh/aTbT" i-CC^). A backwards integration
of the state euqations (1) for £ t £ t, (C.) = t, with x n (t=0) =14 11









} = b7(Mr (42)
since x„(t=t
1





x°) 2 - a^^ 2 = 0. (43)
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For constant R, A may be considered to be a function of w. Con-
sidering the first two derivatives of A(w) and lim A(w) , it is
W-+00
readily seen that for 1 jS w sl +°°, A(w) has a global maximum at
w* = R/(R-1) with A(w*) = R(R-l) > 0. This latter result implies
that for P satisfying (41) the quantity under the radical sign in
(40) is non-negative (i.e. the corresponding entry in Table I is
satisfied) . It should be observed that w(-p ) is a strictly in-







= 1 and w(-p
2
=q) = z = ^- £ ^—j-. (44)
Since for 1 £ w £ w* , A(w) is a strictly increasing function; then
a p
for iQ. (-p 9 ) iC q, A(w(-p )) is a strictly increasing functiona„ z L
whence (41). Also, combination of (37), (40) and (42) yields that
a.p{b,x°(R-l) + /S(PU ,R)}





S(P°,R) = s 2 + R(R-l)(b
2
x°) 2 - a^y^. (46)
Equation (45) shows the dependence of dual variable values on
the terminal surface upon the initial force levels P of an extremal
It seems appropriate to observe that for a p/a £ (~P 9 (P ) ) ^ q we
have that £ T, (C.) £ x, (C r ) and also t-.(C.) = x, (P°) . The value
1 4 1 j 14 1
implicitly assigned to X survivors through p is adjusted so that
the X forces are just annihilated at t = T. Let us also note that
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by construction we have made v(x=x (P )) = in our determination
of (-p (P )). The above should make clear the reason that p must
be unspecified on C . : for extremals corresponding to a given value
of x
1
(T) and leading to C, there are an infinite number of different
values for x, (P ) for these extremals that result in this x (T)
.
5.3. Determination of Dispersal Surfaces .
It seems appropriate to note here some relationships between
the inequalities which define the domains of controllability in Table




x°) 2 s: s 2 + (R-l)(b
2
x°) 2 . (47)
For R - /R(R-l) £ 6 < 1, the following hold
s 2 + A(b
2













s 2 + A(b
2





Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 } £ s 2 + B(b
2
x°) 2 . (51)
In (51), there is strict inequality for x > and R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1
.
For n. 6 < R - /R(R-l) , we also have
s 2 + A(b
2








Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 } > s 2 + B(b
2
x°) 2 . (53)
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The proofs of the above are straight-forward and omitted.
When £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) , the above inequalities (52) and
(53) imply that D(C ) and D(C ) for extremals on which <p* (t) =
for i t iT overlap (i.e. there is a region in the initial state
space from which extremals lead to both C and C ) and similarly
for D(C.) and D(C.) when a.b.y 2 £ s 2 + A(b nx°) 2 in D(C,).1 4 llo 22 4
Hence, we must consider step (e) of section 4.'s solution procedure.
First, we consider the determination of the dispersal surface
which separates regions of the initial state space from which optimal
paths lead to C and C,.. Let us observe that for z 2 > R/ (R-l)




x°) 2 < a b y 2 £ Ks 2 {l - 1/z 2 }. (54)
Setting a
-ib,y 2 = s 2 + B(b x ) 2 in the expressions (26) and (28) for
P and P respectively, it is easily shown that it is optimal to
go to C from such an initial point. The dispersal surface is the
locus of points in the initial state space for whicb P equals P
and extremals lead to both C and C on both sides of this sur-
face. Equating (26) and (28), the locus of points for which P = P-
is given by
a-t^y 2 = Rs 2 - R{bx°[z 2 (R-l) + R]/(2R) + b x°} 2 /z 2 . (55)llo 1 i l i
Furthermore, a dispersal surface actually exists, since it is
readily shown that
A-28
Rs 2 - R{b x°[z 2 (R-l) + R]/(2R) + b
2
x°} 2 /z 2 < Rs 2 {l - 1/z 2 }, (56)
when z 2 > R/(R-1). (56) and an above result mean that on both sides








all P° such that a by ^ Rs 2 - R{b x [z 2 (R-l) + R]/(2R) + b x°} 2 /z 2
Since we also must have a^^ 2 < R{s 2 - (b-.x..) 2 } for extremals





[z 2 - R(z-l) 2 ]}.
Based on the above results there may also be a dispersal sur-
face which separates optimal paths leading to C and C, for
•£ x < b x [z 2 - R(z-l) 2 ] / (2Rb ). Its determination is similar to






= g(p°> R > z )> (57)
be the locus of points for which P = P . Then, the boundary, which
separates optimal paths leading to C, and C
,
, is given by














(P°,R,z) { g(P°,R,z) for s 2 + B(b
2






x°) 2 for g(P°,R,z) > s 2 + A(b
2
x°) 2 . (59)
It should be noted that this boundary surface is a dispersal surface
only when extremals to both C, and C. lie on both sides of a,b.,y214 1 1 o
= g(P°,R,z).
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6. Structure of the Optimal Allocation Policies .
For square-law attrition it may be shown that the allocation
of fraction of fire is always or 1. In section 5 we have dis-
cussed the fact that the coefficient of the control variable <p in
the Hamiltonian H(t,x.,p.,0) cannot be equal to zero over any finite
interval of time. This excludes the possibility of a singular control
[15], and maximization of the Hamiltonian, which is a linear function
of <p, yields that all fire is concentrated on one target type. This
is not surprising, since our model assumes complete and instantaneous
information [2] and that fire may be immediately shifted to a new
target once the old one has been destroyed [5], [18].
With reference to Tables I and II, the condition that a b >
a„b may be interpreted to mean that there is more long range return
for Y to engage X.., i.e. more Y's will survive if this is done.
Hence, when Y wins, he always engages X 's while they are available.
The condition a p < a q means that at the end of battle there is
greater payoff per unit time per Y soldier to engage X„ not con-
sidering X 's greater attrition effect against Y (short term gain
at end of battle)
.
By the maximum principle and the well-known interpretation of
the dual variables [1], Y always allocates his fire entirely to the
target type yielding the greatest marginal return. However, marginal
return evolves differently in winning or losing causes. When Y loses,
he may switch from firing at X entirely to firing at X entirely
A-30
to firing at X_ entirely before the X force has been annihilated.
This happens when Y assigns utility to survivors of force type X
in excess of their kill rate against Y as compared to force type
X
,
and X is abundant enough not to be destroyed before the battle
ends. Under these circumstances, whenever the X„ forces are annihi-
lated, this occurs at the very end of battle.
In this way, we see that tactics may depend on force levels.
Moreover, the time at which the ranking of target priorities switches
itself may depend upon force levels. We also see that Y's target
priorities only switch with time in a losing case. This has occurred
since a boundary condition at t = T on one of the dual variables is
dependent upon values of che state variables by a transversality con-
dition. It may be shown that the structure of optimal allocation
policies is different for the prescribed duration battle.
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Appendix B. Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare and Optimal Control.
1
. Introduction .
The optimization of the dynamics of combat is studied
through a sequence of idealized models by use of mathematical theory
of optimal control. The models are for combat over a period of
time described by Lanchester-type equations with a choice of tactics
available to one side and subject to change with time. A sequence
of models is examined for each of two types of choice situation:
selection of target type for engagement,
regulation of firing rate.
Optimal tactics are discussed with reference to the influence of
combatant objectives, termination conditions of conflict, type of
attrition process, variable attrition rates, and limited ammunition.
Implications for intelligence, command and control systems, and
human decision making are pointed out. The use of such optimal
control models for guiding extensions to differential games is
discussed.
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In this appendix we examine the structure of optimal allocation
policies for tactical situations describable by Lanchester-type
equations of warfare. We hope to provide insight into such questions
as
(1) How should targets be selected?
(2) Do target priorities change with time?
(3) Does the number of target types effect the selection?
(4) Do battle termination circumstances effect the op 'onal
allocation policies?
(5) How does the nature of the attrition process effect
target selection?
(6) What is the effect of ammunition constraints?
(7) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat effect
the optimal selection rules?
Our theory of tactical allocation is developed through the examination
of a sequence of simplified models. These combat models are too simple
to be taken literally but should be interpreted as indicating general
principles to serve as hypotheses for subsequent computer simulation
studies or field experimentation.
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In 1964 Dolansky [10] noted that the Lanchester theory of
combat was insufficiently developed in the area of target selection
for combat between heterogeneous forces (optimal control/differential
games). Even the two references cited by him, Weiss [32] and Isbell
and Marlow [ 16 ] , have been subsequently extended by this author [26],
[28]. Since Dolansky's article, no further examples have been published
in the literature except for the ones in Isaacs' book [15]. This pre-
vious work had never systematically investigated the dependence of
tactics upon model form.
We examine several idealized combat situations described by
Lanchester-type equations over a period of time with choices of tactics
available to one side and subject to change with time. We consider
models for two types of choice situations
(1) selection of target type,
(2) regulation of firing rate.
These problems are solved by the mathematical theory of optimal control.
A further elaboration on solution development is to be found in our
report [25].
In the first sequence of models we examine the effect on
optimal target selection of the following factors: objectives of the
combatants, termination conditions of the conflict, number of target
types, some special cases of time dependent attrition rates, and type
of attrition process. We then examine a sequence of models to see how
ammunition limitations effect firing rates. Next we discuss two-sided
extensions of such problems but point out the value of studying one-
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sided problems as considered in this appendix. Finally, various
implications of the models are discussed.
2. Target Selection .
We begin by considering the simplest situation of target
selection: combat between an X-force of two force types (for example,
riflemen and grenadiers) and a homogeneous Y-force (for example,
riflemen only) . This situation is shown diagrammatically below.
It is the objective of the Y-force commander to maximize his survi-
vors at the end of battle at time T and minimize those of his
opponent (considering weighting factors p, q and r) . This is
accomplished through his choice of the fraction of fire, 0, directed
at X . We may study this idealized tactical allocation problem in
two types of scenarios: (1) a battle lasting a specified time, T
or (2) a battle lasting until one side or the other is totally
annihilated.
2.1. Battle of Prescribed Duration .
Mathematically the problem may be stated as
B-5





subject to: -— = - a y
dx
" = - (l-0)a oydt v 1K/ 2'
ft = - b^ - b 2x2
i. ,x ,y ^ and £ £ 1,
where
p,q, and r are weighting factors assigned to surviving forces,
x i ,x_ and y are average force strengths,
a ,a ,b and b are constant attrition rates,
and is fraction of Y-f ire directed at X-
.
This problem may be solved by routine application of Pontryagin
maximum principle* [22]. The solution is shown in Table I. In this
present analysis we have not considered those subcases when a state
variable is reduced to zero. It may be shown that the structure of
the optimal allocation policies is not fundamentally altered by such
an occurrence.
With reference to Table I, we see that two characteristics of
the optimal allocation policies for this particular prescribed dura-
tion battle are:
(1) concentration of all fire on one target type,
(2) independence of allocation from force levels.
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We shall later see that when there are more than two target types in
this scenario, the solution possesses these same characteristics (even
when the attrition rates change over time) . Both these characteris-
tics, however, are consequences of the assumed model form.
The first characteristic, concentration of effort on one
alternative, is a consequence of the "square-law" attrition process
for the X-forces. (We shall refer to attrition as being a "square-law"
process when the casualty rate is proportional to the number of enemy firers
and as being a "linear-law" process when it is proportional to the
product of the number of enemy firers and remaining targets.) It may
be shown that this makes the existence of a singular control [18]
impossible, and hence the optimal allocation policies are extreme
points in the control variable space.
There is, however, a very simple principle which underlies the
above mathematical formalities: concentration of effort when constant
marginal returns are obtained from the alternatives and the total effort
is limited. Constant marginal effect over time per unit of weapon system
is a property of the "square-law" attrition process, for let us consider
the X -force attrition (when 0=1)
dx
i
dt [rate of casualties produced per
y
a
l [unit of Y-force weapon system
Thus there is a constant (or non-diminishing) marginal effect over
time. This should be contrasted with the situation for a "linear-law"




rate of casualties produced per
unit of Y-force weapon system
In this case we have diminishing effects over time from allocating a
unit of Y-force weapon system against X , and a division of total
effort (i.e., fraction of fire) may be called for. B. Koopman's 1953
article [21] contains an excellent discussion of such principles
which underlie such an optimization problem. Presently, we shall
verify these heuristic arguments in a mathematically precise fashion
when we consider a dynamic model, which considers the interaction of
forces over time, in which both X-force target types undergo "linear-
law" attrition. This fundamental difference in the structure of opti-
mal allocation policies based on the nature of target attrition makes
the determination of the appropriate attrition process an essential
task of analysis.
The second characteristic, target selection independent of
force levels, is due to the combination of the "square-law" attrition
process for the X-force types and the fixed battle length, T. It
is seen that for the battle of prescribed duration target selection
depends only on the attrition rates of the various force types and
relative weights assigned to surviving force types. This is not surprising*
since it is easily seen that the adjoint differential equations are independet
of the state variables, and the values of the dual variables at the
end of battle t = T are independent of force strengths. It is
recalled that a dual variable represents the rate of change of the
payoff (battle outcome as measured by the value of surviving forces
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at t = T) with respect to a particular state variable [3]. Thus,
if if V = ry(T) - p X;L (T) - qx 2 (T), then p^t) = ~ (t) , etc.
Hence, the boundary conditions are given for the dual variables at
the end of the battle t = T as p (t=T) = — (t=T) = -p,p (t=T) =
J- 'J X _ ^
-q,P 3
(t=T) = r.
It seems appropriate to discuss further the interpretation of






effect on outcome per kill rate of
unit time for engaging X J [Y against X J (unit of X destroyed^
effect on outcome per
Hence, the condition a. p < a„q means that at the end of the battle
(recall that p (t=T) = -p, etc.) there is greater effect on battle
outcome (as measured by value of survivors) per unit time per soldier
for Y to engage X (short term gain at the end of battle) . The
value of the dual variable, for example, P-, (t) reflects both the
value assigned X -force survivors and the dynamic interaction of
forces over time through the Lanchester-type equations. Hence, it
also accounts for the effectiveness of X against Y. The quantity
a..b may be interpreted as representing the instantaneous rate of
destruction of the X -force kill rate against the Y-force per unit
of Y-force. Then a b > a b means that there is greater strategic
value for engaging the X -force, i.e., more long range return. Thus,
case A of Table I corresponds to where there is both more long range
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and also short range return for engaging X . Case B corresponds to
more short term gain at the end of the battle for engaging X , but
more long range return for engaging X . It is easily shown that
case A results when Y values surviving X-forces in direct propor-
tion to their kill rate against the Y-force, i.e., p/q = b /b .
A switch in tactics (target priority) is seen to occur for this model
only when value is not assigned to survivors of a target-type in
proportion to their destructive capability (kill rate)
.
The maximum principle may be interpreted as saying that a
target type from several alternatives is engaged when such an engage-
ment yields the greatest favorable effect on battle outcome per unit time,
turns out, tho 1, that the evolution of target enga ement return is
dependent upon the scenario chosen for the study of the problem. This
is clearly seen when we examine the "fight to the finish." This is a
special case of a terminal control battle (the combat ends only when
the course of battle has been steered to a prescribed end state) and
is chosen for mathematical convenience.
2.2. Terminal Control Battle .
We consider the similar problem of
maximize ry(T) - px (T) - qx (T) with T unspecified
0(t)





" Vl " b 2X2
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x ,x ,y ^ 0, s£ « 1, and with terminal states
defined by (1) x (T) = x (T) = and (2) y(T) = 0.
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The above problem was first studied by Isbell and Marlow [16],
but a complete solution was first obtained by us in a previous paper
[26] . We have also extended the solution principles to terminal
control differential games, for which we have outlined a general
solution procedure and have used it to solve the supporting weapon
system game of H. K. Weiss [28]. The solution to this problem appears
complex (see Table I of [26]) but may be described in a particularly
simple fashion (for the nonrestrictive assumption that a b > a_b )
.
In contrast to the battle of prescribed duration, the optimal
target engagement may depend on initial force levels. When Y wins,
he engages X until depletion before X . When Y loses, he may
switch from firing at X entirely to firing at X entirely before
the X force has been annihilated. This happens when survivors of
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force-type X„ are assigned utility in excess of their kill rate as
compared with force-type X , and certain relationships hold between
initial force strengths. This dependence of the optimal allocation
on initial strengths has been caused by the fact that values of dual
variables at t = T are dependent upon values of the state variables.
This happens in terminal control attrition problems where a value of
a state variable is specified at the terminal surface (and hence the
value of the corresponding dual variable is unspecified but may be
determined from the transversality condition H(t = T,x,p,0) = 0,
where H(t,x,p,0) denotes the Hamiltonian).
2.3. Prescribed Duration Battle with Several Target Types .
We have considered th ^st two problems in ord*. Lo contrast
the effect of the battle termination conditions upon the structure of
the optimal allocation policies. Another factor that we can examine
is the number of target types. For the prescribed duration battle,
certain facets which tended to be obscured in the scenario with two
target types are brought into sharp focus. In a companion paper [30]
we present the supporting analysis details, and in this section we
summarize solution properties in order that they may be contrasted
with those of other scenarios in this first sequence of target selec-
tion problems.
We consider the following prescribed duration problem:
B-13
n




subject to: -— = - rt.a.y for i = l,...,n
dt *i 1
£ = - ! "ai=i
x-.y iO, £ 0, and I 0. 1,
i=l
n
where all symbols are used in the same sense as previously. The
solution to this problem turns out to be a generalization of that in
section 2.1. However, certain aspects receive greater emphasis to
provide us with a deeper understanding of the phenomena under study.
In particular, we considered two subcases, denoted as case A and case
B, in the solution to the previous problem of section 2.1. (see Table
I). When there are several target types, the generalization of the
subcases which we must distinguish is as follows:
Case A, enemy survivors valued in direct proportion to their
kill rate against Y-force,
Case B, enemy survivors not valued in direct proportion to
their kill rate against Y-force.
In the first instance, case A, it may be shown that target
priorities keep their same relative ranking over time. Assuming for
the moment that no force type is totally annihilated during the course
of battle, the optimal allocation policy is
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0*(t) = <S for < t £ T,
where 6.. is the Kronecker delta and is equal to 1 if i = i and
zero otherwise, and i is the index such that a.b. = max (a.. b n , . . . ,a b )
J J linn
If the highest priority target type is exterminated during such a battle,
then fire is merely shifted to the next highest priority target. Hence,
when one values enemy survivors in proportion to their kill rate against
you, i.e., w. = kb . for i = l,...,n, the optimal tactic is to con-
centrate all fire on a single target type until it is entirely destroyed.
The sole criterion for target selection in this instance is the quantity
a.b., which may be interpreted to be the rate of destruction of enemy
attrition capability for his i force type (see section 2.1.).
In case B, it may be shown that there will be at least one
switch of target priorities if the battle lasts long enough. Again
assuming that no force type is totally annihilated during the course
of battle, it may be shown that for t ^ T the optimal allocation
policy is given by
0*(t) =6. for £ t £ T,
l xn
where j is the index such that a.w. = a.[-p.(t=T)] = max (a n w , ...,a w )
3 3 3 3 11 nn
and we have arranged our indexing so that this is the last index, i.e.,
j = n, p.(t) is the dual variable corresponding to the state variable
x., and t. , the "backwards" time t = T - t (measured from the end
J 1
of battle) of the first switch in target selection, will be given below.
The battle must last longer than t for a switch in target priorities
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to occur. Assuming that it does, we now state what conditions are
necessary for a change in target selection and the "backwards" time
at which the change occurs, T .
In developing the solution to this problem we work backwards
from the end of battle, t = T. Let k be the index of the target
type to which fire is first shifted in "backwards" time, x. Then it








•k target type are that a. b, > a b and -— > — , i.e., we shift
k. K n n b w
n n
fire to a target type which causes attrition in a greater proportion
than the ratio of values placed upon survivor from the target type
which yields the greatest direct return at the end of battle. The
target type to which fire is shifted has index k determined by
R = min (R ,...,R ),k
R.>0 l n_1
a.b .>a b11 n n
where
a. (b .w -b w. )





for l = l,...,n-l.
l a.b .-a b11 n n




determined from the transcendental equation
/b a. (b. w -b w. )
u )—
v—
./ n • u 1—TT~ k k n n kw cosh/a b t, + v/ — smh/a b t, r r~
—
n nnl a nnl a.b-ab
n k k n n
This is seen to be a generalization from the problem with two X-force
target types.
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Barring the extinction of a force type, the optimal allocation
policy for x, < T but t « ^ T is given by
0*(t) = 6., for < t < T - t
0*(t) = 6. for T - T i t £ T,
where x is determined by (1) and a similar expression exists for
x^, the "backwards" time of the second change. A similar solution
with two changes in the optimal allocation policy exists when \ £ T
but x^> > T. The number of switches in target engagement depends on
the length of battle, T, and as the battle progresses forward in
time fire is always shifted to a target type for which both a.b.
b
.




the initial stages all fire is concentrated on the X-force type
b.
which both the quantities a.b. and — are larger than any other.
1 1 w.
l
Although the details differ, the optimal allocation policies
are seen to have the same structure as that for just two target types
(see section 2.1.) :
(1) concentration of all fire on one target type,
(2) independence of allocation from force levels.
The addition of more target types has not changed the nature of the
problem. This problem's explicit solution is a generalization of that
with two X-force target types.
It is of interest to ask whether the optimal tactic will always
be to concentrate fire on only one target type (bang-bang optimal
control) . The answer to this question turns out to be "no" as
B-17
consideration of a "linear-law" attrition process for the X-force
target types will show in section 2.5. An extensive heuristic dis-
cussion of the principles involved has been given in section 2.1.
2.4. Some Special Cases of Time Dependent Attrition Rates .
In the previous idealizations of combat that we have considered
above, we have assumed that all the Lanchester attrition-rate coeffi-
cients were constants. In reality, this coefficient depends on
numerous factors some of which are as follows: hit probabilities,
weapon system projectile-target lethality characteristics, rates of
fire, rate of target acquisition. These factors themselves may be
range dependent or change over time. S. Bonder [ 6 ], [ 7 ] has devel-
oped explicit formulas for relating the Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficient to weapon system performance characteristics such as those
mentioned above.
Thus, it seems appropriate to examine idealized combat situations
in which the attrition rates are time dependent. Solutions have been
obtained to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations for a square-
law attrition process between two homogeneous forces under very general
circumstances [29]. However, such solutions are, in most instances,
so complicated that they cannot be applied to corresponding optimal
control problems to yield easily interpretable analytic results which
provide insight into the structure of the optimal allocation policies.
There is a class of variable coefficient Lanchester-type equations
(combat between two homogeneous forces when the attrition rates are
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variable provided that their quotient is a constant) which possess a
solution no more complicated than the solution to the constant
coefficient case [27]. Hence, when one considers optimal control
problems for Lanchester combat between forces with time dependent
attrition rates, there are some special instances of practical
interest (reflecting the physical situation in which two weapon
systems cause attrition in a proportional fashion at all times) that
are not much more mathematically complicated than the idealized
situations we have considered in sections 2.1 and 2.3 above. Again,
we shall merely summarize results, leaving the details for a companion
paper [30]
.
We consider the following prescribed ation battle:









dT = -d-0) a 2 (t)y
£ =-b 1 (t)x 1 -b 2 (t)x2
x ,x ,y ^ and £ £ 1.
We assume that both X-force weapon systems are such that
b
x
(t) = 1^ h(t) and b 2 (t)
= 1^ h(t).
In the special case when the Y-force values surviving
X-force types in direct proportion to their kill rate against the
B-19

























In this instance target selection depends only on the product of
attrition rates which may be interpreted as the rate of destruction
of enemy kill rate. All fire is concentrated on one of the target
types depending on which target type has the larger attrition-rate
product. Target priority is subject to change over time as the rank-
ing of the target types on this decision criterion changes. It is
conceivable that the optimal tactic may be to shift fire from one
target type to the other several times over the course of battle with
the duration of battle not having any effect. Observe that no
assumptions at all have been made on the Y-force attrition rates
against X, and X
9 ,
i.e., a (t) and a (t)
.
At this point we further assume that a, (t) = k h(t) and
1 a
l
a„(t) = k h(t). This means that not only is the ratio of the X-force
I a
2
weapon system attrition rates against the Y-force constant but also
the ratio of the Y-force effectiveness against each of the two
X-force types. Furthermore, all four attrition rates have the same
time dependence except for constant factors. The solution is shown
in Table II. In this special case (under the assumptions noted above),
we see that the structure of the optimal allocation policies when the
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they are constant. Only the time scale has been transformed (in [27]
we first made this type of observation)
.
The extensions to more than two target types in each of the
two cases considered above possess essentially the same solution
details as those noted here. These extensions are similar to those
we considered in section 2.3.
2.5. Selection of Targets Undergoing "Linear-Law" Attrition .
So far the state equations have described combat according
to the Lanchester square law in which attrition of a target type is
proportional to the number of each force type firing at it. Weiss
[ 31] has given a thorough discussion of the conditions which lead to
this. These conditions include that "each unit is informed about the
location of the remaining opposing units so that when a target is
destroyed, fire may be immediately shifted to a new target." It is
noted that the control theory models which we have considered so far
have implicitly assumed perfect information.
Another model for attrition is the Lanchester linear law in
which the average decrease of a target type is proportional to the
product of the average number of targets remaining and the number of
each force type firing at it. Such a dependence can arise under two
general circumstances: (i) fire is uniformly distributed over a
constant target area ("area fire") or (2) the mean time of target
acquisition is much larger than target destruction time and is inversely
proportional to target density. The first circumstance corresponds
to the simplest case of partial information . Again quoting Weiss [31],
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we assume that units are informed about the general areas in which
opposing units are located, but are not informed about the consequences
of their own fire. Thus, we see that we may account for some changes
in the information set by modifying the description of combat. Brackney
[ 8 ] has shown that "aimed f ire 1 ' may lead to linear-law attrition when target
acquisition times are considered, and are as postulated above.
Thus, we consider the following problem in which the X-forces'
attrition obeys a linear-law process and the Y-forces' attrition obeys a
square-law process:
minimize ry(T) - px
1












& = - b lX;L - b 2x2
x ,x ,y ^ and £ £ 1.
In a future paper we shall present the analysis details upon
which our present summary is based (see also pp 91-105 of [25]). Since
the state and adjoint equations do not readily yield an analytic
solution, we have not been able to obtain explicit expressions for
certain model parameters. However, we can still discuss all the quali-





There is a fundamental difference between the solution to
this problem and those considered previously: the optimal allocation,
0* , may be other than or 1. In contrast to the previous
problems, the optimal allocation policy does not have to be an extreme
point of the control variable space at all times. We may have a
singular solution [18] for which the necessary condition of maximizing
the Hamiltonian (with respect to the control variable) does not pro-
vide us with a well-defined expression for the extremal control. We
shall call the part of an optimal trajectory on which the maximum
principle cannot be used to determine the control a singular subarc.
Then the term "singular solution" will be used to refer to any optimal
trajectory which contains one or more singular subarcs.
Singular solutions can only occur when the Hamiltonian
(denoted as H) is a linear function of the control variables. When
3H
this is so, then if — = for a finite interval of time (or,
00
another way to say this, the coefficient of vanishes identically
for a finite interval of time) , the maximum principle does not
3Hdetermine the control. Observe that when t— = and H is a linear
30
function of 0, all feasible values of are optimal. All problems,
however, for which the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control
variables do not have singular subarcs in their solution. For example,
it may be shown that such a singular control is impossible for the




for a finite interval of time when — = 0,
o0
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For the problem at hand, it may be shown that a necessary condition
for a singular subarc to yield the maximum return [20] is satisfied.
The optimal battle trajectories are constructed by working
backwards from all possible end points of this idealized battle. Con-
sideration is given to both the optimal control at the end of battle
and also how the variables upon which it depends vary over time.
Based upon such considerations, it may be shown that there are three
cases to be considered:
b










Case (c) £- < -— .
q b
2
We consider Case (a) first. The solution for this case is
shown in Figure 1. Even though explicit expressions have not been
obtained for certain model parameters, the dependence of the optimal
control upon these quantities can still be qualitatively discussed.
It may be shown that the optimal control depends on the state variables
x and x (and also the attrition coefficients) in each "decision
region." Above the line a b x = a b x , denoted as L, the optimal
control 0* = is used until this line is encountered. When L is
a
2
























































portion of an optimal trajectory which lies on L (for a finite
interval of time) is a singular subarc. The above type of solution
holds for arbitrary initial values of x and x : x (t=0) x
and x (t=0) = x . The time history of the optimal control is traced






2in Figure 1. At point D, —tt >
—
r— and <rt* = 1 is used until the
a b
X2 11
line L is encountered at point E.
The solution for Case (b) is shown diagrammatically in Figure
2. It is similar to the preceding case except that another line, L'
with equation a px = a_qx 9 , plays a central role besides the
singular "surface" denoted as L. The final segment of that part of
any optimal trajectory which lies below L' consists of the use of
the optimal control 0* = 1 for the final stages of battle. Such is
the case for the optimal trajectories denoted as (2), (3), and (4).
Any optimal trajectory which lies entirely above L', such as (1),
has a corresponding optimal control of 0*(t) = for £ t £ T,
whereas a similar remark holds for any one that lies entirely below
L, such as (5). Case (c) is symmetric to Case (b)
.
As has been noted previously (see sections 2.1 and 2.3), the
structure of the optimal allocation policies in these tactical alloca-
tion problems is dependent upon how the Y force values the surviving
X-force types relative to their kill rate against the Y force.
b
1Case (a) : *- = ;— above is when Y assigns utility to surviving
q b
2
X-force types in exact proportion to their destructive capability

















only upon the state of the system as is seen with reference to Figure
1. The optimal tactic is to use 0*(t) = above the line L with
equation a b x = a b x . The line L also represents an "equili-
brium" trajectory which the system follows whenever this line is
reached.
Case (b) : *- > — is when Y assigns a greater value to
q t>
2
surviving X ' s than in proportion to their kill rate against Y
relative to that of X . Again, the optimal tactic depends upon the
state of the system, only this dependence itself depends upon the
"time phase" of the fixed length battle. There is a x such that
for «£ t ^ t , where x is "backwards time" measured from the end
of v -"tle x = T - t, the optimal tactic depends upon the s ite of
the system relative to the line L' with equation a px = a.qx
?
(see Figure 2). Below L' the optimal tactic is to use 0*(t) = 1.
For t ^ t «£ T, the optimal tactic is to use 0*(x) = above the
line L with equation a b x = a_b x . We recall that the part of
an optimal battle trajectory that coincides with L is a singular
subarc. It may be shown that the "crossover time," x , depends
upon the particular battle trajectory under consideration.
Based on our examination of the above problem, we see that the
structure of the optimal allocation policies for targets which undergo
a linear-law attrition process has the following characteristics:
(1) possible division of fire between target types,
(2) dependence of allocation upon force levels.
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These characteristics should be contrasted to those previously observed
with respect to a square-law attrition process (see sections 2.1 and
2.3). When there is a linear-law attrition process for target types,
we may have other than or 1 as the optimal allocation policy.
Also, the allocation depends upon the force levels of target types.
We have attempted to explain this structure of the optimal allocation
policies in terms of the nature of the attrition process in section
2.1.
3. Regulation of Firing Rate .
In this section we will examine a sequence of models of
increasing complexity for which the effect of ammunition limitations
on firing rate(fire discipline) will be explored. In each case, we
consider two homogeneous forces engaged in combat described by a square
law. Our results for these problems are of a more preliminary nature
than those reported above for target selection.
3.1. Battle of Prescribed Duration with Constant Attrition Rates .
We consider the problem
maximize px(T) - qy(T) with T specified
0(t)
dx









,y £ 0, 0*0*1, z(t=0) = and z(t=T) £ A < vT = v dt,
^0
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where v is the maximum firing rate of each X unit. It should be
noted that the nature of the attrition coefficients a and a is
different, since a has incorporated in it a firing rate.
We have assumed that each X combatant has a limited supply
of ammunition (his "basic load") , denoted by A. There is no redis-
tribution of ammunition during the course of battle, i.e. when a
casualty occurs, his ammunition is lost to the other combatants. We
further assume that the ammunition supply is such that a combatant
could not fire at his maximum firing rate for the prescribed duration
of the battle, for when A ^ vT it is easily seen that the optimal
strategy is to fire at the maximum possible rate, 0*(t) = 1 for
£ t * T.
The optimal regulation of firing rate turns out to be
A
0*(t) = 1 for £ t £ T where T = -
,
0*(t) - for T £ t £ T.
This was determined as follows. The Hamiltonian is given by
H(t,x









where p.(t) is the dual variable corresponding to the i state
variable (we denote x as x
, y as x , z as x ). Maximization
of the Hamiltonian leads to the following control law






x > X* > 0,
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with P 1 (t=T)
= p
dT =
-f =alP l With P 2 (t=T)=-q
p (t) = constant with p (t=T) unspecified.
To develop the desired solution we work backwards from the end of
battle. Hence, we introduce the "backwards time" variable t = T - t
and consider a backwards integration of the state and adjoint differ-
ential equations from the fixed end of the battle, t = T. Thus,
dp,
-r— = - va p , etc. It is easy to show that p (x) , x(t), and
y(x) are non-decreasing functions of t (regardless of the value of
0) with p (x=0) = p, x(t=0) = x , and y(x=0) = y . Similarly,
p_(x) is a strictly decreasing function of x. Hence, Q(t) =
(-p„(x))a x is a strictly increasing function of x with an initial
value of Q(t=0) = qa x . Thus, p~ must be negative, and 0*(x)
never switches back to once it becomes 1.
The optimal tactic for this model is disturbing, since it is
not intuitively appealing to fire at one's maximum firing rate until
one runs out of ammunition and to spend the final stages of battle
without ammunition. However, after a little reflection we realize
that it is this model's assumption of constant attrition rates which
has negated the holding of one's fire as an optimal tactic. Hence,
we are led to consider other models for further insight.
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3.2. Battle of Prescribed Duration with Time Varying Kill Rates .
We consider the problem
maximize px(T) - qy(T) with T specified
0(t)
dx
subject to: — = - a
1
(t)y







x,y ^ 0, s: £ 1, z(t=0) = and z(t=T) £ A < vt.
The precise nature of a (t) and a (t) will depend upon the specific sJ
under consideration. It seems reasonable to assume that in many real
world situations a
1
(t) and a (t) would be monotonically increasing
functions of time, e.g., two forces closing with one another. All the
previous solution steps remain the same except for the effect of a (t)
and a (t) increasing with time. This may change the nature of the
solution markedly, although the optimal control is still bang-bang.
One can show, in fact, that a singular solution is impossible for this
problem. The quantity Q(t) = (-p~(x))a (t)x(t) is no longer guaranteed
to be a strictly increasing function of t, since a (t) is strictly
decreasing (but positive) . This allows the possiblity that the optimal
tactic may be to hold one's fire and conserve ammunition in the early
stages of battle so that 0*(t=T) = 1 at the end of battle.
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The way in which ammunition is conserved depends on the
specific nature of a (t) and a (t) . As we have pointed out above,
under special circumstances to solution to variable coefficient
Lanchester-type equations (and also the adjoint system of equations)





assume that 3—r = -. , then there are relatively simple expressions
a. v.t ) k.
a
lfor p ? (t) and x(t). For example, when 0=1 for s; t £ t ,
we have
(x) ~ p/~P_(t) = - q cosh 6(t - / r-— sinh 8(t)
a
2







h(t)dT. However, even such relatively
simple expressions for these quantities has not led to a general
statement about under what circumstances one holds his fire even
though this can be readily numerically determined for any particular
set of parameter values. A question of practical importance to be
answered by further investigation along these lines is, "For what types
of attrition-rate range dependencies is it the optimal tactic to hold
one's fire until an enemy gets closer due to an ammunition constraint."
R. Isaacs has studied some similar problems in his book
Differential Games [15] and has explored some aspects much deeper than
presented here. Isaacs tried to resolve the problem of shooting up all
of one's ammunition before the end of the battle by modifying the pay-
off. Another approach might be to consider a terminal control problem.
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3.3. Fight to the Finish with Limited Ammunition .
We consider briefly the constant coefficient problem of section
3.1 only with T unspecified and with terminal states defined by
(1) x(T) = and (2) y(T) = 0. In this case, the optimal tactic
is dependent upon the force levels, since the ammunition constraint
is not binding for





It should be noted that the above condition also guarantees that X
will win. Furthermore, the X forces in order to win are required
to have enough ammunition uo fire at their maximum rate during che
entire duration of the battle. Hence, we see that concentration of
forces reduces the ammunition requirement per man, since the length
of battle is determined by the initial numbers of forces committed
to battle.
3.4. A Two-Sided Extension .
It seems appropriate to contrast qualitatively the structure
of the optimal regulation of firing rate for the above problems with
a two-sided version, even though we do not attempt to solve
the latter at this time. Thus, we consider the problem





subject to: -— = - tf;a,v,y






















v(t=0) = 0, v(t=T) £ A < v-T.
Unlike the previous one-sided version of this problem, it is now
possible to have 0*(t=T) = 1 with limited ammunition. This possibility
has arisen since the Y forces may hold their fire during the early
stages of engagement. Questions now arise as to the advantage of
delivering the first shot, e.g., is there a time lag before fire is
returned?, and we move into the realm of games of timing studied at
RAND [19].
4. Extensions to Differential Games .
Even though it is certainly true that combat is an environ-
ment of conflicting interests in which the potential actions of both
friendly and enemy forces must be considered, there is much to be
learned from one-sided dynamic optimization models. We view these
simplified idealizations presented here as "building blocks"
for more sophisticated scenarios. We feel, however, that an under-
standing of the structure of optimal tactics for these initial models
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is essential before one continues his examination of a sequence of
models of greater and greater complexity. Hence, it seems appropriate
to review the intimate connection between optimal control theory and
differential games.
It has been stated that optimal control problems may be
viewed as one-sided differential games for which the roles of all but
one of the competing players have been suppressed [3], A concise dis-
cussion of the inter-relationships between these two subjects is
contained in Y. C. Ho's [14] excellent review of Isaacs book [15] (see
also Chapter 9 in [9]).
When one recalls the equivalence of variational problems and
partial differential equations of the first order (first pointed cut
by C. Jacobi nearly 140 years ago [17]), the relationship between
optimal control and differential games may be viewed as follows. In
an optimal control problems we are seeking the solution to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation for the optimal value function, denoted as S
(sometimes referred to as Hamilton's characteristic function in the
calculus of variations literature [23])
3S . ,T/ 3S ,
- 1- maximum H(t,x.,-
—
,<*; =
at , s i dx
.
0(t) 1
with appropriate boundary conditions. In a differential game we seek
the solution to the Bellman-Isaacs equation [13]
9 S 3 S
1- maximum minimum H(t,x.,- ;0,4>) - 0.
ot / _\
,
/ . \ 1 OX .0(t) l|>(t) 1
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Moreover, this approach may also be extended to when stochastic effects
are present as has been done by S. Dreyfus [12] and others [11], [33].
It also seems appropriate to mention the relationship of
dynamic programming to these techniques. Consideration of the equation
satisfied by the optimal value function points out clearly an important
aspect of dynamic programming, its being a discrete approximation
technique for solving variational problems [12]. It is, however, a
dual approach which generates an optimal trajectory as an envelope
of tangents rather than as a sequence of points [1]. The value of
these continuous models lies in their mathematical tractability which
many times allows us to develop "closed-form" solutions. This should
be contrasted with dynamic programming models for which general solu-
tions are rarely obtained, and one must be satisfied with generating
a numerical solution for a particular set of parameter values.
In this case, it is difficult (if not impossible) to see the structure
of optimal allocation policies and its dependence upon model form
without a parametric analysis of model output.
We have previously pointed out [26] that the existing theory of
differential games is only applicable to problems with pure strategy
solutions. The structure of two-sided fire distribution problems
in the Lanchester theory of combat as formulated by H. Weiss [31] leads
to such a result. However, when defensive capabilities were considered
in the attrition process in a tactical air war game extensively studied
at RAND, the resulting model did not possess a solution in pure
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strategies [2], [4], [5]. Thus, there are limits to the applicability
of such variational models.
We have, therefore, used these optimal control problems to
study many aspects of corresponding two-sided variational problems:
the effect of different boundary conditions, devising solution pro-
cedures, study of singular behavior, differences in the structure of
optimal allocation policies for various model forms. Most solution
aspects of the one-sided problem are present in the two-sided one.
There are some significant differences, however. In solving the support-
ing weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [32], we have encountered solu-
tion behavior unique to terminal control attrition games: there may
exist a domain of controllability for a given terminal state but entry
to this state may be "blockable" by the "losing" player [28] . In other
words, there is a path determined by the necessary conditions leading
from each point in a region of the initial state space to a terminal
state, but the "losing" player may use a strategy other than his
extremal strategy for this path to actually win. We made use of our
knowledge of a related optimal control problem [26] to solve this
differential game.
5 . Implications of Models .
It seems appropriate to briefly discuss the general implica-
tions in the following areas of the models examined in this appendix:
(1) optimal tactical allocation,
(2) intelligence,
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(3) command and control systems,
(4) human decision making.
Our discussion of these areas is not mutually exclusive.
Of interest to the military tactician is whether target
selection rules evolve dynamically during the course of battle. Are
target priorities static or do they evolve dynamically with the course
of battle? With respect to optimal control models, this may be
mathematically stated as whether there are transition (switching)
surfaces in the solution. We have seen in the idealized and simplified
models studied here that target priorities do change. This is related
to the evolution of marginal return of target destruction (value of dual
variable) . We have seen that this evolution depends on the goals of
the combatants (utility assigned to surviving force types at the end
of the battle) and also the conditions which terminate the battle. In
the terminal control problem studied here, a shift in target priorities
is present only in a losing case, whereas in a fixed duration battle
such a switch is independent of winning or losing but depends only on
weapon system capabilities and the prescribed duration of battle.
Even though these models assume complete and instantaneous
information, it appears that some inferences may be made for cases
where uncertainty is present. In the terminal control case, we saw
that selection of tactics depends on a knowledge of the enemy's strength
and capabilities, since the terminal state of combat must be determined
before optimal strategies can be. For a battle of prescribed duration,
e.g., fighting a delaying action in a regrograde movement to protect
the withdrawal of troops, tactics depend only on enemy and friendly
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capabilities and length of combat, not the initial force levels. For
such cases the estimate of combat length is critical, since changes in
target priorities are determined relative to the end of the engagement.
Schreiber [24] has proposed an idealized and simple, but yet
illuminating, way of quantitatively showing the value of intelligence
and command control capabilities. He introduces the concept of "command
efficiency," which is measured by the fraction of the enemy's destroyed
units from which fire has been redirected. The effect of poor intelli-
gence and poor capabilities for redirecting fire from destroyed targets
is to produce "overkill." Schreiber' s equations for combat involved
this fraction called "command efficiency," and they reduce to Lanchester-
type equations for area fire when the fraction is and aimed fire
for a value of 1. We have seen that the optimal tactics are quite
different for these two cases. When intelligence and command control
systems are very efficient, the optimal tactic is seen always to be
concentration of fire on a specific target type. When capability for
redirection of fire from destroyed targets is poor (either through damage
assessment or constraints on new target acquisition) , the optimal tactic
may be to allocate fire in a proportional fashion over target types in
a way that holds the ratios of target density in each target area to
be constant. Another implication is that supporting weapon systems
(e.g., artillery) concentrate fire on selected point targets, but that it
sometimes is best to allocate fire proportionately over various area targets
these models suggest that the tactics of target engagement may vary
with command and control capabilities.
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These models also show the importance of intelligence in de-
vising the "best" tactics in combat. Intelligence on enemy weapon
system capabilities (kill rates including target acquisition rates)
and potential length of engagement play a central part. We also have
seen that for fights to the finish and linear law attrition cases
intelligence on enemy force levels is also required. For artillery
fire support missions against various troop concentrations, knowledge
of troop densities is essential in the assignment of target priorities.
Particularly dense concentrations where the initial kill potential is
high are seen to be cases where the optimal tactic is to concentrate
fire on one target for awhile.
Another argument for the concentration of forces is seen to
emerge from the study of these simplified models. When ammunition is
limited, a concentration of forces has the effect of counter-balancing
this constraint. For example, in a fire fight numerical superiority
could mean that the enemy force level would be reduced such that he
would disengage in time before the friendly ammunition restriction
became critical.
These models may be interpreted to show the value of human
judgment in combat. They indicate, as does common sense and experience
that in battle a commander must use his judgment to ascertain to what
end can the course of battle be steered so that he may devise his
strategy accordingly. The demonstrated sensitivity of these models to
many factors shows the importance of human assessment of a situation
and the importance of good judgment in assigning utility to forces
surviving the battle at hand.
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6. Summary .
The results of this appendix may be summarized as follows:
(1) a sequence of one-sided models has been presented which shows
that the tactics of target selection may be sensitive to
force strengths, target acquisition process, the type of
attrition process, and/or the termination conditions of
combat,
(2) a sequence of models have been presented which shows some
preliminary results about the effect of resource constraints
on firing discipline and concentration of forces,
(3) tactics for target selection are heavily dependent upon
"command efficiency,"
(4) concentration of fire always on one target type among many
occurs as an optimal tactic only when target acquisition
is not subject to diminishing returns,
(5) target priorities don't change over time when one assigns
a worth to surviving target types in direct proportion to their
kill rate against you.
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Appendix C. Target Selection in Lanchester Combat: Heterogeneous
Forces and Time Dependent Attrition Rates.
1. Introduction .
In this appendix we develop solutions to a sequence of models
for optimal target selection in combat against heterogeneous enemy
forces. The combat continues over a period of time with a choice
of tactics available to one side and subject to change with time.
Optimal target selection rules are developed through the combina-
tion of Lanchester-type equations for combat attrition and
deterministic optimal control theory (Pontryagin maximum principle)
.
Both constant attrition-rate coefficients and some special cases of
variable attrition rates are considered. The synthesis of optimal
target engagement policies was facilitated by exploiting special
mathematical structures in these problems.
Many years ago, Karl von Clausewitz said that if theory
caused a more critical study of war, then it had achieved its
purpose. In Appendix B we studied the structure of the optimal
allocation policies for some basic elementary tactical situations
described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. We did this by,
among other things, contrasting the "best" target selection policies
for a sequence of scenarios: prescribed-duration battle, terminal-
control battle, two enemy target types, many enemy target types, etc.
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In Appendix B we frequently summarized results and promised the
details of solution development (for the non-trival cases) to be
available elsewhere.
Thus, the purpose of this appendix is to provide supporting
analysis details for target selection in Lanchester combat against
heterogeneous enemy force types and/or combat in which the attri-
tion rates may change over time. All battle scenarios that we
consider here are for a prescribed duration of time. We also
present some more general results than those reported in Appendix B:
target selection for combat against several enemy force types with
all attrition rates subject to change over time.
Again, the purpose of this appendix is to provide analysis
details. The interested reader will find an extensive discussion
of the structure of optimal allocation policies and model implications
in Appendix B. Our presentation in this present appendix follows
the historical order in which we attacked these problems. We
could have merely reported the solution of the problem in section 4.
This would have been more concise. We feel, however, that it is more
valuable to show the reader how we have used insight gained from
simpler problems to provide guidance for solving more complex ones
and generalizing results.
In this appendix we develop the solutions to all problems by
the mathematical theory of optimal control. For the problems at
hand we need only make use of the Pontryagin maximum principle [8]
.
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The reader should note that there is a sign difference between
developments in this country (see p. 108 of [6] or pp. 12-14 of [7])
and those in the Soviet Union [1], [8], although both approaches
yield exactly the same results in applications.
We wish to impart to the reader through our examination of
these problems our experience that some ingenuity is required to
solve applied problems. By taking advantage of the structure to
some problems, we have found that one can frequently synthesize
the optimal control to a problem which at first sight appears to
be too complex to allow this. By the synthesis of the optimal
control, we mean the explicit determination of the time history of
the optimal control from initial to terminal time. For the prob-
lems at hand, this is accomplished by determining a control law by
the maximum principle and then working backwards from the end of
the problem by a backwards integration of the adjoint system of
differential equations for the dual variables which have a boundary
condition there.
The organization of this appendix is as follows. First, we
consider the problem of optimal selection of a target type from among
two alternatives for some special cases of variable attrition rates.
Then, we treat the more general case of several target types for
some special instances of variable attrition rates. Finally, we
make some observations on the results presented in this appendix.
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2. Two Target Types, Some Special Cases of Variable Attrition
Rates .
We consider the following prescribed duration battle:




subject to: -r—- = -0a (t)y,
dx









x ,x y :> and tf £ 1, (1)
where




x and y are average force strengths,
a (t) , a (t) , b (t) and b (t) are attrition rates which
are allowed to change over time,
and is the fraction of Y-f ire directed at X .
The physical interpretation of this idealized military
situation is as follows : combat for a known length of time between
an X force composed of two types of weapon systems (for example,
infantry riflemen and machine gunners) and a homogeneous Y force
(for example, riflemen only). The objective of the Y-force
commander is to maximize the military worth of his surviving forces
at the end of a battle lasting a known length of time T and to
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minimize that of the enemy's. This is accomplished by his choice
of the fraction of fire, 0, directed at the X forces. A
schematic of this scenario is shown below. It is assumed that a
military worth can be assigned to survivors of each force-type and
that this utility is additive. We denote this utility per unit of
weapon system as p, q and r for the X , X and Y forces,
respectively.
Our state equations, i.e., the differential equation con-
straints, represent the attrition process in this idealized battle,
We shall refer to attrition as being a "square-law" process when
the casualty rate is proportional to only the number of enemy
firers and as being a "linear-law" process when it is proportional
to the product of the number of enemy firers and remaining targets.
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For the problems in this paper we assume a "square-law" process.
The interested reader can find discussions of the physical assump-
tions which lead to this type of attrition in articles by H. Weiss
[12] and H. Brackney [5]. The essential points are that new targets
are acquired at a rate independent of force levels and that fire
is aimed at point targets. More recently S. Bonder [3], [4] has
developed formulas for estimating the Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficient, the rate at which one unit of weapon system destroys
enemy targets, as a synthesis of the following factors: hit pro-
babilities, rates of fire, target acquisition rate, weapon system
projectile-target lethality characteristics, adjustment process.
In general, the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient is
range dependent, and the above formulation (1) takes this into
account by having the attrition coefficients depend upon time. S.
Bonder [2] has done the pioneering work on analyzing dynamic combat
situations with Lanchester-type equations and variable attrition
rates (also see [9], [10] for more background). For example, consider
a mobile attack on a static defensive position. The effectiveness
(Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) of weapons systems depends
upon force separation, and this is, in turn, related to time via
the attack velocity. In [9] we showed how to develop Lanchester-
type equations with either time or range as the independent variable
and noted the equivalence of the two formulations (see [10] for
more extensive results with variable attrition rates). Hence, the
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above was our motivation for studying scenarios with time-dependent
attrition rates.
We finally note that when fire is uniformly distributed over
a target area [12] or the rate of target destruction is constrained
by the rate of acquisition of new targets and this is inversely
proportional to target density [5], a "linear-law" attrition process
results. We have elsewhere [11] pointed out that this type of
attrition structure leads to a fundamentally different structure
for the optimal target-type selection policies.
We now develop the solution to the above problem (1) . In
all cases we consider the special instance when both X-force
weapon systems are such that
b
1
(t) = k^ h(t) and b
2
(t) = k^ h(t). (2)
This physically means that both weapon systems have the same type
of range capability (for example, quadratic dependence of kill
rate on range) and the same effective range, although one weapon
system dominates the other in exactly the same manner at all ranges.
It seems appropriate to point out that there is a special
instance when the optimal allocation policy takes a particularly
simple form. This is when the Y force values surviving X-force





































This was obtained by application of optimal control theory [6] as
follows
.
The Hamiltonian is given by
H(t,x

















where the dual variables, p.(t) for i = 1,2,3, are the effect
on the total value of survivors at the end of battle when an optimal
policy is followed from time t until time T of having an addi-
tional unit of x.(t) [here we have let y(t) = x (t) ] . Another
way to state this is that
P ±
(t) =
-^ (t) where S = SCtjX^x^y) is
i
the optimal value function. According to the maximum principle,
the optimal control is determined by







and this leads to
1 for v(t) > 0,
{
0*(t) =















dt 9x 1 3
















(t) Pi + (l-0)a2 (t)p2 with p 3 (t=T) = r. (8)















(t) = ^— (p
2
(t) + q} - p. (9)






(t)> + k, , {£ - ^} al(t )12 2 b_ (10)
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Assuming that p/q = d / c> 9> we see that the optimal target selec-
tion rule as given by (3) is an immediate consequence of (6) , (7)
and (10). We have also made use of the fact that p 9 (t) < 0, which
is easily shown.
We now consider the case when







This means that all four attrition rates are proportional to the
same basic time dependence. As we have pointed out elsewhere, both
the solution to Lanchester-type equations [9] and the solution to
the fire distribution problem [11] in this instance are essentially
the same as for constant coefficients, only with a transformation
of the time scale. The solution is shown in Table I.
We develop the solution shown in Table I for the nonrestric-
tive assumption that k k > k k as follows. Consider the
al^l a2 b 2
quantity v(t)/h(t) which by (7) is seen to be given by
1
Differentiation of (12) leads to
d rv(th _
TM - "Pl (t)ka, + "2 (t)ka • (12)
ttim) - -^\\-\\^3- (13)
where we have made use of both the adjoint equations (8) and also
assumption (2). Observing that h(t) > 0, it is clear that the
































E > IH p"
cu S~\ H
rH x: 4-1
,0 u ^^ rH
O •H CN M





3 o 4-J 4-J
o •H N^ »w^ --~»
•H •U iH * COU CO X «L V—'
O y>
CU 3
rH Q »> CN
CU CN JD
CO T3 CO •M
OJ ^ CNU X> •• cO
CU •H iH M
60 S-i CO
1-1 o ^ A
CO CO






3 O CN & a4 a-
o CO CN
•H CD "> CO c
•u rH /""
s
• • M ^
3 4-1 u 3
iH 4J ^^ o AJ V
O CO H •H









W •H co • • • •J •u <! CQ
PQ cu CU5 > CD cuH 3 •H CO CO
CO u CO CO




























































































1 fo r ||> 0,
(14)
for ^} < 0,
Since we develop the solution to this problem by working backwards
from the end t = T, it is convenient to introduce the "backwards
time" variable t defined by x = T - t. Observing that — = - -j—.
dt dx
we have that





d xth(x7 " ° for a11 T ' (16)
since h(t) > and we have assumed that k k, > k k, .
al\ a2^2
To solve this problem, we work backwards from the end of
battle at t = T, or equivalently x = 0. At this point we have





Thus, we have two cases to consider.





(17) . Consideration of (16) immediately yields that , ! > for
all x > and thus 0*(t) = 1 for a t < T by (14).





(17) and the assumption that h(t=T) > (the battle ends with




-rSH) > for alldx ^h(x) ;
v(t)
Thus, . \ must change from a negative quantity to a positive one
at some time. Let t, denote the time when this happens. Then
for £ x < t, we have that 0*(x) =0. We can easily determine
p„(x) during this interval by considering the adjoint equations



















(x=0) = r. (18)
These variable coefficient adjoint equations are readily integrated,
however, by consideration of (2) and (11), i.e., a_(x)/b (x) =
constant, and the observations elaborated upon in [10], i.e.,
from (18) we can obtain the following linear second order differ-
ential equation for P 9 (x)
























-cl cosh e ( T )t) - r /t-^"
2




e(x) = /k K
a2^2
h(x)dx (20)
Substituting (19) into (10) , we obtain that
v(t) = h(x)
h
















al\ 1 ^ , (21)
where 0(x) is given above by (20). Observing that x is deter-
mined by the transcendental equation v(x ) = 0, we see that we
have obtained all the results presented in Table I.
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3. Several Target Types, Constant Attrition Rates .
We consider the following prescribed duration battle:
n
maximize vy(T) - J w.x.(T) with T specified,
0.(t) i=l X X
dx.







x.,y ?> 0, 0.2:0 for i = l,...,n and £ 0. = 1,11
i=l
1
where v and w. for i = l,...,n are values placed on surviving
specific force types and all other symbols are used in the same
sense as above. We now present the details behind the solution
which we stated in a companion paper [11].
The Hamiltonian to the above problem is given by
H(t,x.,p.,0.) = -y J a.p.UXP. - pn+1 ? b.x.. (22)
x=l x=l
According to the maximum principle, the optimal control (there is





























bject to: I 0. = 1,
i=l
X
<P. £ o. (23)
By inspection the solution to (23) is easily seen to be
0*<t) -J
lj(t) , (24)
where 6.. is the Kronecker delta and is equal to 1 for i j
and zero otherwise and j(t) is the index such that




To trace the history of <p . over time, we must consider
l
the adjoint system of differential equations given by
dp
i 3H
dT = " k. = Pn+lb i W±th P t (t=T) = -w. for i=l,...,n,
x
S2^ " - If = J, iVi with "„+ i (t=T > v - . (25)
x=l
and





















Substituting (26) into (23) , we obtain after some manipulation

















w. f b w "\
(28)
Hence, we see that if w. = kb. for i = l,...,n, i.e., Y
values enemy survivors in direct proportion to their kill rate













where we have made use of the easily verified fact that p (t) <
for all time. Thus the optimal control is given by
0. (t) = 6. . for OitiT, (29)
where j is the index such that
C-18
a.b. = maximum (a.b. a b ).
J J 11 n n
Hence, for this problem when one values enemy survivors in direct
proportion to their kill rate against you, the optimal tactic is
to concentrate all fire on a single target type until it is entirely
destroyed.
We now consider the more complex case where one does not
value enemy survivors in direct proportion to their kill rate
against you. We shall see that if the battle lasts long enough
there will be one or more switches in the ranking of target prior-
ities. As before, since we develop the solution to this problem by
working backwards from the end t = T, it is convenient to intro-
duce the "backwards time" variable t defined by T = T = t. At
the end of battle t = T, we arrange the enemy target types so
that n is the index such that
aw = a (-p (x=0)) = maximum (a n w, ,...,a w ). (30)nnnn 11 nn
By (23) it is easily seen that
0*(t=T) = 6. . (31)l in
By straightforward continuity arguments, it is readily seen that
0*(t) = 6. for t <E [0,t..), (32)
l in i
where x is the "backwards time" of the first switch in target
selection. Giving consideration to (32) and observing that
C-19
-7— = -
~r~, we see that for t 6 [0,t,] we need only consider thedt dx 1 J






-b p , n with p (x=0) - -w ,dx nrn+l *n n
dPn+l
=
-a p with p ( T=0) = v, (33)dx n^n *n+l
and we recall that (re-writing (26))
b.
p.(x) = — {p (x) + w } - w. for i = l,...,n. (34)
x b n n i
n
The above initial value problem (33) is routinely solved to yield
yr
p (x) = -w cosh /a b x - v/— sinh /a b x. (35)
n n n n a n n
n
We will now determine what conditions are necessary for a
change in target selection and the time at which the change occurs,





subject to: \ 0. = 1,
i=l
X
0. ^ 0, (36)
where
b.
e.(x) = a.w [1 +—*- ((-Pn (x)) -w }]. (37)l 11 w . d n
l n
We switch at the smallest x for which
C-20
a .w.




where i = l,...,n-l and certain other conditions (to be deter-
mined presently) are met. Let k be the index of the target type
to which fire is first shifted in "backwards time." Observe that
at t = 0, we have
a .w. < aw
,
r l n n
(39)
for i l,...,n-l, since the index n has been defined by (30).
Then for t < t < t where x is the "backwards time" of the
second switch in target selection, we have that 0.(t) = <S , and
1 X K.







^rt~ h-p(t))- w }w. b m nk n
> a (-p (t»,














We now show that a necessary condition for fire to be shifted
from target type n to target type k when one works backwards
from the end is that a. b, > a b . The proof is as follows. We
k k n n
shall show that a. b, ri, a b leads to a contradiction. First, wek k n n






w. b, a 'k k n
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or
aw < a, w, .
n n k k
But this is a contradiction to (39) which must hold with i = k.
In the case when a b > a. b.
, then using the fact that (-p (x))
n n k k ° rn
> w for t > 0, we may write (40) as
(b w. -b, w )
n k k n , . NNa
1
—- — > (-p (t)) > w
,k a b - a. b. rn n
n n k k
but this leads to a, w, > a w which is a contradiction to (39)k k n n
as before.










*k al -ab = <-P»<"l» >°> «»
k k n n







In other words, we switch to fire at earlier times in the battle
on the target type which causes attrition proportionally more than
the ratio of values placed on survivors from the target which
yields the greatest direct return at the end of battle.
To recapitulate the above, the target to which fire is first
shifted (working backwards from the end of battle) has index k
determined by
C- 22
R_ = minimum (R. ,...,R n ), (42)
* R.>0 X n_1
a.b .>a b11 n n
where
(b.w -b w.)
R, = a, u
n n
u f ° r i=l,...,n-l. (43)i l a.b . - a bli n n
t" v»
The time of switch, t of fire to the k target type is
determined by the transcendental equation
T, + V/
a. (b. w -b w )
w cosh /a b i n v — smh /a b T- = r r— • (44)
n nnl a nnl a, b.-ab
n k k n n
This is seen to be a generalization of the case for two target
types [11]
.
The general pattern of when and to which target types fire
is shifted as we work backwards from the end of battle does not
emerge until we have considered the second shift in target selec-
tion. Since this is dependent upon the evolution of target worth,
we must further consider the backwards integration of the adjoint










where x is the "backwards time" of the second switch in target
selection. Giving consideration to (45), we see that for t £ [t_ ,T«]







"Vn+l With «'k<Wl) = "V
dPn+l
= ~a i,P,, with P^C^O = V., (46)
where
di krk rn+l v 1' k
a. (b. w -b w, )
k k n n
=^V / -^ (W.2 -w2 ) + v2 . (48)k b k n
n
Equation (47) is merely (43) re-written with a chnage in notation.
Equation (48) is readily deduced when we observe that according to
(33) a "square law" relates the dual variables p (x) and p , , (x)
n n+1
for si x £ x
a {p 2 (x) - w2 } = b {p 2 (x) - v 2 }. (49)
n n n n n+1
We further observe that all the dual variables may be expressed in
terms of Pk (
T ) (let n = k in (26))
b.
P i





f ° r i
"
1 *'"'n ' (50)
k
Again, the equations (46) are routinely solved to yield for
t
€
[x 1> x 2 ]
[t-t, ) - V, /— siip, (x) = -W cosh/a,b ( ) nh/a, b (x-x,). (51)
k
Subsequent arguments are now similar to those given for the
first switch in tactics. Let j be the index of the target type
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to which fire is shifted secondly in "backwards time." Then, it
may be shown by similar arguments to above that necessary conditions
for fire to be shifted to the j target type are that
a.b. > a.b. > a b
,
(52)
j j k k n n
and
b . w.
r1 > -1- (53)bk wk
However, we gain more insight by considering (53) slightly
differently, for it may be shown that
b. b. b
-L > -± > -A (54)
w. w, w
J k n
It also seems appropriate to consider the military interpretation
b.
of the ratio — . We recall that
w.
w. = value per unit of X. surviving at t = T,
b. = kill rate per unit of X. against Y.
x 1
Then
b. kill rate per unit of X.
w. value per unit of X. survivors'
i r 1
Thus, we see that as we progress backwards from the end of battle
that fire is always shifted to target types with larger ratios of
kill rate per unit of weapon system per unit value of survivors.
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By a similar argument as for the first shift in fire using
(42) and (43) , it may be shown that the target to which fire is
shifted secondly (working backwards from the end of battle) has
index j determined by
S. = minimum (S 15 ...,S ), (55)
J S.>0 l n
a .b
.
a. b,lr k k
i^k
where
a. (b .w -b,w.)
S. = r r— for i = l,...,n. (56)1 a
i
b
i " \bk ±k
The time of switch, t , of fire to the j target type is







) + v/ — sinh/a^ (t^ )
a. (b .w, -b. w.)
= _J J k k J .
a.b . - a. b.
J J k k
(57)
i
Further shifts in fire follow the pattern established above.
Based on our above development, we now trace the course of
battle forward in time. We assume that no force type is ever
reduced to zero. (If thiG does happen, though, it may be shown
that fire is merely shifted to the surviving target type of highest
priority.) Then, we have that
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(a) when x > T
0.(t) =6. for OitiT,
1 in
(b) when x £ T > x
0. (t) = 6., for £ t £ T - t. ,i lk 1
0.(t) = 6. for T - t. £ t £ T - T„,
x in 1 2
(c) when x £ T > t„





for T - x
2
£ t £ T - T
± ,
*
0. (t) = 6. for T - T- £ t £ T,l in 1
and so forth. t
1
and x„ are determined by (44) and (57),
respectively, and a similar expression exists for x . The number
of switches in target engagement depends upon the scheduled length
of battle, T. As the battle progresses forward in time, fire is
b.
always shifted to a target type for which both a.b. and — are
i
smaller than the target type previously engaged. If the battle is
scheduled to last long enough, then during the initial stages of
all fire is concentrated on the target type for which both the
b.
quantities a.b. and — are larger than any other target type.
i
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4. Several Target Types, Some Special Cases of Variable Attrition
Rates .
We consider the following prescribed duration battle:
imize {vy(T) - £ w.x.(T)} with T specified,
0.(t) i=l 1 L
dx.




& - - 1 b^>v
n
x.,y ;> 0, 0. ^ for i = l,...,n and £ 0. = 1,11
i=l
X
where all symbols are used in the same sense as above. We shall
omit some details in the development of the solution to this pro-
blem, since the development is a direct synthesis of details from
the two previous problems. In fact, an extensive elaboration on
the nature of the optimal engagement rules will not be necessary,
since we shall consider some special cases of variable attrition
rates for which the solution is similar to the constant attrition-
rate case considered in section 3.
In all cases, we assume that the X-force weapon systems
have performance characteristics sich that
b (t) = k^ h(t) for i = l,...,n. (58)
i
As before, we first consider the special case when X-force types
are valued in direct proportion to their kill rate against the
Y forces at the end of battle
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w. = cb.(t=T) = ck. h(t=T). (59)
i
The optimal allocation rule consequently takes a particularly
simple form for m t £ T
<(t) - «1)j(t) , (60)
where j (t) is the index such that
a.(t)b.(t) = maximum (a. (t)b- (t)
,
. . . ,a (t)b (t)).
J 3 11 n n
Similar to our previous developments, the above solution is
developed as follows. The adjoint system of differential equations
is given by
dp.
= b.(t)p . with p.(t=T) = -w. for i = l,...,n,
dt i x /l n+l ri' ' i
dp
., n
~J^= I ia.(t)p. with pn+i ( t=T)=v. (61)i-1
It is readily seen that assumption (58) leads to the result that
V
P,(t) = t-+ {p(t) + w } - w (62)i R, n n l
n















w. ( b w )
(64)
The special assumption (59) that force types are valued in propor-
tion to their kill rate leads to simplification of (64) , namely
(-P(t)) (-P(t))
c (t) = —j-S a (t)k = n a (t)b. (t)
,i k x n . b (,t; l id in
n
whence our result (60), since it is readily shown that p (t) < 0.
We now consider the more complex case when enemy force
types are not valued in proportion to their kill rates. Again,
we consider a special case when relatively simple analytic results
are still possible. Thus, we assume that
a.(t) = k h(t) for i = l,...,n. (65)
i
In the case of a mobile attack against a static defensive position,
assumptions (58) and (65) have the physical interpretation that
all weapon systems and weapon system combinations have the same
effective range and the same type of range dependency for their
kill rate against any target type. As always, we develop the
solution by working backwards from the end of battle; so it is
convenient to introduce the "backwards time" x = T - t. Let n
be the index of the target type fired on at the end of battle.
Then
a (t=0)w = a (x=0)(-p (t=0))
n n n n
C- 30
= maximum (a (x=0)w , . . . ,a (t=0)w ) (66)





is the "backwards time" of the first switch in target
type at which the Y forces fire. As before, the above "bang-
bang" optimal control leads to simplification of the adjoint system
of differential equations, and it readily follows that
p (x) = -w cosh 6 (x)
n n n







(x) - /TT^ h(x)dx
n n
(68)
In deriving the above we have used the same results for variable
coefficient differential equations used in section 2 and noted
in [9].
Let k be the index of the target type to which fire is
first shifted in "backwards time." Then for t. < x < x 9 we have













where e.(x) is given by
e. (x) = a. (t)w.
k
b.
1 + —rM(-p (t)) - w \w.k, I n n;lb
(70)
The condition that e
n
(t) > e (x) for x > x n leads tok n i
k k n k k n n
(71)
which, in turn, yields that necessary conditions for fire to be
shifted as we work backwards from the end to the k target type
are
c k > k k
a. d. a b







Thus , it follows that the index k is determined by
R, = minimum (R , .
k
R.>0 l
k k Sk k














R. = . \ X . ? • (75)
x k k - k k
a. b
.
a b11 n n
The "backwards time" of switch, t , of fire to the k target
type is seen to be given by the transcendental equation
/xjj + v/ -. sinh 6 (tw cosh 6 (t.) —- tJ = R. , (76)
n n 1 k n 1 k.
a
n
where 6 (t) is given by (68). This is seen to be a generalization
of corresponding results in the two previous sections.
Further details and results are similar to those presented
in section 3. However, they differ in the same fashion as the
earlier developments in this section differ from corresponding ones
in section 3. We finally observe that the optimal target engage-
ment policies are the same as those given at the very end of
section 3. Changes in target priority are similarly determined
(compare (42) and (43) with (74) and (75)). As noted elsewhere
[9], [11], however, the time scale of battle has been transformed




In a companion paper [11], the interested reader can find
an extensive discussion of the structure of the optimal target
engagement policies for the problems whose solutions have been
developed in this paper. We have contrasted there the structures
of the optimal allocation policies for both these problems and
also other tactical allocation problems. Here, we will make some
further comments, however, about the optimal target engagement
policies.
Let us first note, however, that for the problems considered
in this paper the optimal control was always "bang-bang," i.e.,
an extreme point of the constrained control variable space. Thus,
we saw that the optimal tactic was always to concentrate all fire
on the appropriate target type. It may be shown that there are
no singular extremals (see pp. 246-247 of [6]) on which the optimal
control is an interior point of the control variable space. This
happens, for example in the problem of section 2, because although
the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the control variable, the
9H
coefficient of the control variable, i.e., — , cannot vanish over
a finite interval of time. In other words, it is impossible that
dt l 90;
Let us now consider the most general case of target selection
in combat against heterogeneous forces, the problem of section 4.
We did not include this problem in a companion paper for reasons
C- 34
of brevity. For this problem, our basic assumption was that
b.(t) = k h(t). Then, when survivors were valued in proportion
i
to their effectiveness (i.e., kill rate against the Y forces),
the optimal tactic took a remarkably simple form: always concen-
trate all fire on the target type for which a.(t)b.(t) is the
largest.
To obtain simple analytic results when X-force types were
not valued in proportion to their kill rate, we further assumed




time, the concentration of all fire on one target type was always
shifted to a new target type for which both quantities a.(t)b.(t)
b.(t) X X





In this paper we have attempted to show how some seemingly
complex optimal control problems may readily yield relatively simple
analytic solutions when special mathematical structures of the pro-
blem are exploited. We first pointed out such possibilities in a
recent note [9] (where we inadvertently rediscovered some results
apparently first observed by R. Isaacs). Although the solution to
matrix differential equations (such as those encountered in sections
3 and 4) is, in general, messy at best when specific solutions are
required, the occurrence of a "bang-bang" optimal control in these
optimization problems reduced the complexity of the solution appre-
ciably. We have purposely presented a sequence of problems to
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show the reader how we set about to exploit such structural pro-
perties. Our personal opinion is that this could be done more
frequently in applied areas like operations research where phenomena
(here military operations) is to be studied.
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6. Summary .
In this appendix we have presented the solution details for
two problems discussed in a companion paper [11] and then consid-
ered a more general problem. We have shown how optimal controls
may be synthesized in a simple fashion when special mathematical
structures of the problems at hand are exploited. By considering
a sequence of simplified, yet increasingly complex specific pro-
blems, we have hopefully laid the groundwork for studying more
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In this appendix we develop the solution to a simple problem
of target selection in Lanchester combat against two enemy force
types which undergo "linear-law" attrition. In addition to the
Pontryagin maximum principle, the theory of singular extremals
is required to solve this problem. Our major contribution is to
show how to synthesize the optimal target selection policies from
the basic optimality conditions. This solution synthesis method-
ology is applicable to more general dynamic (tactical) allocation
problems. For constant attrition rates we show that whether or
not changes can occur in target priorities depends solely on how
survivors are valued and is independent of the type of attrition
process
.
In Appendix B we have presented some elements of a mathe-
matical theory of target selection in dynamic combat situations.
We did this through the examination of the structure of the
optimal allocation policies for some tactical situations described
D-2
by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. The purpose of this
previous appendix was to contrast the structures of the optimal
allocation policies for various scenarios without cluttering the
discourse with the mathematical details of solution development.
In the present appendix we develop results for a prescribed dura-
tion battle in which enemy target types undergo a "linear-law"
attrition process (see section 3 below) . We had previously [8]
just stated these results without justification.
The problem under study is solved by the mathematical
theory of optimal control. Its solution, however, requires more
than the well-known Pontryagin maximum principle [7]: the theory
of singular extremals (see Chapter 8 of [2]) must be used to solve
it. A brief discussion of the required theory of singular extremals
is included in this appendix. By an extremal we mean a battle
trajectory on which the necessary conditions for optimality are
almost everywhere in time satisfied.
The major contribution of this appendix is to show how to
synthesize the optimal control in combat against target types which
undergo a "linear-law" attrition process. In this case, singular
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subarcs (see section 2. below) may be present in the battle trajec-
tory. By the synthesis of optimal control, we mean the explicit
determination of the time history of the optimal control from
initial to terminal time as a function of the initial state of
the system. There is no general method for the synthesis of optimal
controls in singular problems [6] ; each class of problems possesses
its own peculiarities. Hence, an understanding of how to synthesize
the optimal control in this elementary problem is particularly
important, since it provides insight for more complex extensions
that we have considered in our subsequent researches.
The body of this appendix is organized in the following fashion,
First, we review that part of the theory of singular extremals
which is required for the solution of the problem under study.
Next, we present our model and develop the basic necessary condi-
tions of optimality. Then, we show how to synthesize the solution
to our problem. This is done for the two cases of import. Finally,
we make some comments about the structure of the optimal target
selection policies and extensions.
2. The Theory of Singular Extremals .
In an optimal control problem, the maximum principle may fail
to determine an optimal trajectory, since the maximization of the
Hamiltonian may not lead to a well-defined expression for optimal
control [5], [4] (also see Chapter 8 of [2]). Singular solutions
usually occur when the Hamiltonian is a linear function of the
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control variables. However, all problems for which the Hamiltonian
is a linear function of the control variables do not have singular
subarcs in their solution.
The problem that we shall consider has one control variable,
and it appears linearly in the Hamiltonian. By a singular sub arc
we denote that part of an optimal trajectory on which the maximum
principle cannot be used to determine the control because the
coefficient of the control variable in the Hamiltonian is zero (see
pp. 226-227 of [4]). Then the term "singular soltuion" will be used
to refer to any optimal trajectory which contains one or more
singular subarcs.
To elaborate further, when the Hamiltonian H is a linear
3H
function of the control variable 0, then if ttt =0 for a finite
interval of time (or, another way to say this, the coefficient of
vanishes identically for a finite interval of time) , then the
maximum principle does not determine the control. Observe that in
this case all feasible values of maximize the Hamiltonian. When
this happens we determine the singular control by requiring that
SH SH
we remain on the singular subarc, i.e. -jt-t- remains zero. If -zrr is
to be identically equal to zero for a finite interval of time, then
all its derivatives with respect to time must also be equal to zero.
We determine the singular control, which keeps the system on the
singular subarc, by considering as many of the time derivatives of
3H
— as are required for the control variable to appear explicitly
30
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so that it may be determined from an algebraic equation. Thus,
in general we consider




For the problem at hand, the equation —^("^7*) = and the canonical
dt
2 ^
equations (i.e. both state and adjoint system) lead to an explicit
expression for the singular control.
We must further check to make sure that we can get a maximum
return (in the case when we wish to maximize the criterion functional)
from use of the candidate singular subarc. The following condition
(generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition) is necessary for a singular
subarc to yield a maximum return
2k
dt
It is obtained by examining the negative semidefiniteness of the
second variation for a special class of explicitly defined control
variations [6]. For the problem at hand, it suffices to consider
the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition with k = 1. Recently,
Jacobson [3] has discovered a new necessary condition for optimality
on singular subarcs. This condition is not readily checked, how-
ever, for the problem at hand, since the details of application are
extremely messy.
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3. The Model and Development of Basic Optimality Conditions .
We consider the following prescribed duration battle













,y £ and £ 9> *. 1, (3)
where
p, q and r are values placed on surviving force types,
x..
,
x_ and y are average force strengths,
a.. , a ? ,
b
1
and b_ are constant attrition rates,
(observe that the a's and b's are different in nature),
is the fraction of Y-f ire directed X .
In previous papers [8] , [9] we have described the basic scenario
under consideration and also the circumstances which lead to a "linear-
law" attrition process. As before [8], we refer to attrition as
being a "linear-law" process when the casualty rate is proportional
to the product of the number of enemy firers and remaining targets.
We have also discussed at length the structure of the optimal target
selection policies and its implications for military tactics
previously [8] .
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We now develop the basic optimality conditions which hold on




















where p. (t) for i = 1,2,3 are the dual variables corresponding to
the state variables x ,x„,x„ = y (see [8], [9] for a discussion of
the military significance of these variables). The maximum principle











[ 1 for p 2a x > p-a.x-
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= T) = r. (6)
























Differentiation of (8) and combination with the state equations










Checking the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition for this singular
subarc, we find after a rather laborious computation which requires






















since it is readily shown that p~(t) > for all t. Hence, the
necessary condition is met for the singular path to be optimal.
In synthesizing the optimal course of battle (backwards from









By (5) and (9) the optimal control may be expressed in terms of
v(t) as
1 for v(t) > 0,
At) = ^ —
|





for v(t) < 0. (11)
We recall that (8) must also hold on a singular subarc.
Since we develop the solution to this problem by working
backwards from the end t = T, it is convenient to introduce the
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"backwards time" variable T defined by T = T - t. Observing that
A A
— =
- -pr and using both the state equations (3) and the adjoint
















Thus, we see that on a singular subarc on which v(T) = we also





















At the end of battle t = T, we have








(t = T) . (14)
Taking (13) into consideration, we see that a point on the singular
"surface" a b x- = a«b-x_ yields a positive, zero, or negative value
for v(t) at t = depending upon whether *- is greater than, equal to,
b
l
or less than —. Hence, by (11) a battle trajectory which has reached
b
2
the singular surface can, in general, only remain on it at the end of
b
lbattle when *- = r—. Thus, in synthesizing optimal trajectories we











Case (c) £ < —
.
q b
The solution for Cases (a) and (b) has been described by us in a
previous paper [8].





= a.qx., then it would appear above, on, or below the line L
defined by a,b x.. = a b~x„ depending on whether ^ were greater than
' b
i
equal to, or less than —. This is evident from considering the
2






























*- > •— implies that
q b
2
The significance of the line L' and its relationship to the
line L is as follows. The battle is divided into two time phases:
Phase I for < t < t. =T-T and Phase II for T-T=t£t£T.
During Phase I the optimal target engagement policy at a point in
time is determined by the location of the point on the battle
trajectory with respect to the line L, which is also the singular
"surfaces." Above L, (t) = 0; while below L, <P (t) = 1. When






















































































the optimal target engagement policy is to use (t) = 1 below
L 1 . It may be shown that it is impossible for a battle trajectory
to cross L' during Phase II.
The above results will be developed in the next two sections
on the synthesis of optimal control. The following relationships
readily follow from previously developed results and are required





for P(T) below L',
for P(T) above L', (16)
where P(t=T) = (x (t=T) ,x (t=T) ) . We also note that by (12)
/ > below L,
^ (x)< = on L,
^ < above L. (17)
4. Solution Synthesis When Survivors Valued in Proportion to Kill
Rates .
b
1For Case (a): •*- = — , optimal battle trajectories are shown
in Figure 1. Above the line L with equation a.b x = a-b-x. the
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*
optimal control is to use (t) = until this line is encoun-
*
tered. When a trajectory reaches L, the singular control =
a
2
— (which keeps the trajectory on L) is used until the end of
a
l 2
battle at t = T. Below L, (t) =1 is used in a similar fashion.
To establish these results, we work backwards from each possible
type of end point of battle.
At the end of battle t = equation (13) reduces to















since we have assumed -*- = t— . By (18) we see that there are three
q t>
2
cases to consider depending on the sign of the term in square
brackets.







This corresponds to when the system ends up on the singular
subarc. In this case (t=T) = a_/(a
1
+a
9 ), and for £ x £ x,
=
the "backwards time" of the first switch, we use the singular
control (t) = a9 /(a +a ). Let us note that use of the singular
control for £ x £ x n results in — =0 so that v(x) = v(x=0)1 dx
-x
,




x° or x_(t ) = x°. This yields three further subcases.
Subcase (1A) a-b-xf < a b_x°
At t = t
1
> we have that a b x° = a„b x (t
n
) < a b x° so
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that we cannot destroy anymore x . Then we use (t) = for
t.. £ t £ T. This is consistent since v(t=t ) = and
-j— = p 3
(a b x°-a b x
2
) < for t. £ x £ T.
dx
2(Observe that for t < t < T , -:— = a ?x ? y so tnat x 9 (t) > x 9 (t,).)
*













A similar argument readily yields that (t) = 1 for
£ t £ t .




We use (t) = a /(a +a ) from the beginning.







Since v(t=0) = (-^-) [a b x - a b x ] < 0, at the end of battle
X- X X J- ^- £. £»
*
l
we have (t=T) = 0. Hence, for £ x £ t
1
= the "backwards time"
*
of the first switch, we use (r) =0. We work backwards from the
end. Since we are above the line L, — = p (a b x -a_b x ) < 0.
Hence, v(t) < for all t £ [0,T], and we never do switch. Thus,
we have that (t) = for i t i T.







A similar argument to that used for Case (2) readily yields that
*
(t) = 1 for £ t * T.
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The above cases are shown in Figure 1. It should be noted that
the above development depends upon the easily proven fact that p.(t) >
for all t. It should further be noted that, in general, trajectories
(1A)
,
(IB) and (1C) will not all terminate in the same point as shown
in Figure 1, which was drawn this way for simplicity.
5. Solution Synthesis when Survivors Not Valued in Proportion to Kill
Rates.




each possible type of end point of battle. There are two cases to be
considered.
Case (1) : never on singular subarc for finite interval of time.
Again there are two subcases to consider, depending upon whether





























we see that v(t=0) > and hence by (11) (=T) = 1. Hence for
i t $; t = the "backwards time" of the first switch, we use

















when we are below L and we stay there by using (t) = 1, we have
that v(t) > for all t £ [0,T], and hence we never switch. Thus,
0*(t) =1 for £ t £ T.







Again there are two further subcases to consider, depending upon
whether the system winds up above or below L'.











In this case we wind up above L and hence by (16) (t=T) = 0,
Since we are above L, — < for all x by (17). Combining this
with (15), it readily follows that v(t) < for all T
€
[0,T].
Thus, (t) = for £ t £ T.
Subcase (lbll) a b x (t=T) < a b x (t=T) and
alPX;L (t=T) > a2qx2 (t=T)
In this case we wind up below L' at the end. By (15) and (16),
we have that v(t=0) > and (t=0) = 1. We work backwards from the
end. Since we are above L, -r- < by (17) while we remain above
L. Thus v(t) decreases as x increases. There are two further
subcases depending upon whether v(t) decreases to zero before the
line L is encountered. Let x, be such that v(x,) = 0. If L
has not been reached at x, , then v(x) for x > x.. is negative and
(x) = for t s: x £ T. It is also possible to just reach L
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when v(t ) = 0. In this case (assuming that we don't remain on the
singular subarc) v(t) > for t > T. , since we pass below L and
then p- > 0.
dt
Case (2) : on singular subarc for finite interval of time
Considering (15) and (17) , it is readily seen that this can only
happen when a b x (t=T) < a b x (t=T) and a px (t=T) > a qx (t=T)
.
As usual, we work backwards from the end of battle. By previous
arguments it is readily seen that we use (x) = 1 for £ T £ T_
,
and at t = t we must have a b x (t ) = a b x (t ) . We use the
singular control (t) = a /(a +a„) for t £ t aC t . There are
three further subcases.
(1) x














) = x° , X2
( T 2^
= x2 '
We omit the trivial discussion of these cases.
Thus we see from the above that there are six possible cases for
the history of combatant force strengths in this prescribed duration
battle:
(1) started below L and never reached L,
(2) always above L
'
,
(3) started above L ? and end up above L but below L
'
without ever reaching L,
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(4) end up above L but started below L and did not remain
on L for finite interval of time,
(5) started above (or on) L and were on L for finite interval
of time,
(6) started below L and were on L for finite interval of
time.
b
i .These six cases are shown in Figure 2. Case (c) : •*- < :— is
q 2
similar to Case (b)
.
6. Comments .
Elsewhere [8] we have contrasted the structure of the optimal
target engagement policies in Lanchester combat when the engaged tar-
get types undergo a "linear-law" attrition process with that for other
tactical scenarios. An important question to be answered in such studies
is whether target priorities change over time. We have discovered that
for the scenarios which we have so far studied the answer to this
question is determined solely by whether or not surviving target
types are valued in direct proportion to their kill-rate capabilities.
For the case of constant attrition rates, changes in target priorities
over time can only occur when survivors are valued in excess of their
kill-rate capabilities. This is true when the engaged target types
are undergoing either a "linear-law" attrition process or a "square-
law" one (see [9] for a discussion of the "square-law" case).
We now discuss how the above principle applies to the problem
at hand. When a linear utility is assigned to enemy survivors at the











































against friendly forces, then the optimal target selection policy
depends only upon the location of the battle trajectory with respect
to the singular "surface" L (see Figure 1). Thus, target priorities
don't change over time (they can become equal, however). When one
target type is assigned utility in excess of its effectiveness (i.e.,
p/q > b
1
/b_), then at time t.. there will be a switch from tactics
being determined by the location of the battle trajectory with respect
to the singular "surface" L to being determined by location with
respect to the line L' (see Figure 2). It may be shown that t.
depends on the particular battle trajectory under consideration and
no trajectory can "penetrate" L'.
The methodology for solution synthesis developed in this paper
is applicable to more complex tactical situations of greater military
significance. Our work here lays the foundations for the study of
the optimal allocation of supporting weapon systems (e.g., artillery,
tactical air support, etc.) against "area targets" (e.g., troop
concentrations). Typical questions of interest to be answered are,
"Considering several infantry companies individually engaging enemy
units of like size, what is the 'best' utilization of supporting
artillery fires?" or, "What is the 'best' utilization of Naval fire
support in amphibious assaults?"
In a previous paper [8] , we have pointed out that the structure
of the optimal allocation policies in Lanchester combat is basically
determined by whether there are constant attrition returns over time
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per unit of weapon system employed or diminishing returns. In the
present paper we have studied target selection with diminishing
returns over time, i.e., "linear-law" attrition process. It should
be noted that there is a problem in the literature with similar solu-
tion structures, the continuous version of Bellman's stochastic gold-
mining process (see pp. 222-233 of [1]). When there are diminishing
returns over time from the use of a device subject to breakdown, then
the problem of maximizing the return from use of one device in either
of two potential locations has a similar structure to the optimization
problem in Lanchester combat studied here. The interested reader
should compare the solution as shown in our Figure 1 with that of
Theorem 1 on p. 231 of [1] and also our Figure 2 with Figure 4 on
p. 232 of [1]. When the stochastic gold-mining problem is re-examined
by modern optimal control theory, new insights are gained into the
operation of maximizing the return from a resource subject to break-
down or loss, and we shall discuss this in the future.
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Appendix E. The Theory of State Variable Inequality Constraints.
1. Introduction .
Optimal control problems involving inequality constraints
on a function of the state variables with no explicit dependence
on the control variables have been treated only in recent years.
The pioneering work of the Russian R. Gamkrelidze in 1959 (see
Chapter VI in [22]) was followed in the U.S.A. by that of L. Berko-
vitz [3], S. Dreyfus [12], and Bryson, Denham, and Dreyfus [9].
Berkovitz and Dreyfus [5] subsequently have shown the equivalence
of the results of Gamkrelidze and Berkovitz with those of Dreyfus.
Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [20] have written an excellent survey ar-
ticle on the theory of state variable inequality constraints (SVIC)
and summarize theoretical results through 1966.
Furthermore, in 1967 Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [20] remarked
that "the optimal control problem with state space constraints
does not appear to be well understood." Our own experience bears
this out. We have recently pointed out [27] that certain theoret-
ical results cited in the literature are inadequate by themselves
to determine optimal trajectories in a certain non-autonomous
class of problems but must be supplemented by a result due to
Gambrelidze [22].
Even more incredible is the fact that for two-sided varia-
tional problems (i.e. two-person zero-sum deterministic differen-
tial games) we are not aware of any adequate treatment of inequality
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constraints of functions of the state variables only (the control
variables not explicitly appearing). Although R. Isaacs does con-
sider such a problem (the "War of Attrition and Attack" [16]), we
will show that his solution is unsupported by proper analysis, and
we will indicate a similar problem for which his approach fails to
yield optimal strategies. L. Berkovitz does not consider problems
with state variable inequality constraints (SVIC) in [4] ; and al-
though A. Friedman claims to treat such problems [13] (see also
Chapter 6 in [14]), he fails to develop the appropriate necessary
conditions of optimality which must hold when such a constraint is
active (i.e. on a constrained subarc)
.
In this appendix we shall review some necessary conditions
of optimality which must hold on a constrained subarc in a one-
sided problem with a SVIC. Following the approach of L. Berkovitz
14], we may readily extend these conditions to differential games.
We propose this to ONR as a future research task.
2 . Basic Approaches .
There are two basic approaches to treating a SVIC in an
optimal control problem. The first and more direct approach con-
sists in adjoining the state-variable constraint directly to the
criterion functional with an additional Lagrange multiplier. This
approach has been considered by Chang [10] and Speyer and Bryson
[23] (see also [18]). We will not consider this method of direct
adjoining further in this appendix.
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The second method consists in adjoining the time derivative
of the state-variable constraint to the criterion functional with
an additional Lagrange multiplier. We say [9] that the problem
has a k order state variable inequality constraint (SVIC) when
the first time (total) derivative of the state-variable constraint
which explicitly contains the control variable(s) is the k
This is the approach originally considered by Gamkrelidze [22] for
a first order SVIC and further extended to higher order SVIC by
Bryson et al. [9]. Furthermore, this is the approach that we shall
take in this appendix.
3. Necessary Conditions of Optimality When Time Derivative of
Constraint Is Adjoined to Return Functional .
It suffices to consider a problem with a single control
variable and a single inequality constraint on the state variables.
Without loss of generality we may assume that the problem's plan-
ning horizon is for a fixed period of time. We further consider
a (possibly different) inequality constraint on the state variables
at the end of the planning horizon.
Let us therefore consider the problem
T




subject to: -r— = f.(t,x.,u) for i = l,...,n, (1)
u(t) e U (u(t) is scalar control variable
suitably restricted)
,
C(t,x.) ^ (scalar inequality constraint on
state variables)
,
iJ;(x.(T)) £ (scalar inequality constraint on
state variables at terminal
time)
,
where we assume that all functions are smooth enough to insure the
existence of all partial derivatives required in the following
analysis. We shall consider separately the cases of a first order
SVIC and a k
th (k > 1) order SVIC.
a. First Order SVIC .
Adjoining the first time derivative of the state-variable
constraint to the return functional, we have that the Hamiltonian
is given by [8], [9], [11], [22]
n




= for C(t,x.) < ,
^ for C(t,x.) = .
l
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•>^ {t + Z gr fi<»-*i.»» (3 >i=l 1
The adjoint equations for the dual variables are given by
dp
i BH 3L r ^± ,, 3 /dC \ ,..dT = " ^7 = " ^xT " I ^T P j + y(t) 3xT U) ' (A)
l l 3 = 1 l l
where p.(t) is the dual variable corresponding to the state var-
iable x.. Let us assume (as is invariably) that all state variables
are specified at t = 0, i.e. we are given x.(t=0) = x. for
i = l,...,n. Hence, p.(t=0) is unspecified, and we have the fol-
lowing boundary conditions for the dual variables at t = T
l x
for i = l,...,n where
= for tKx.(T)) < ,
^ for iJ;(x.(T)) = .
Conditions (5) were apparently first observed by Funk and Gilbert
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[15]. (A special case of conditions (5) was earlier observed by
Arrow and Kurz [2] although their derivation is only heuristic.)
Its proof readily follows along the lines of L. Neustadt's develop-
ment in {21], (It should be noted that (5) has been stated for
the prescribed duration problem. It need not hold in other cases
(for example, in the case when the planning horizon ends when a
target set (exclusive of time) is reached).)
On a constrained subarc on which C(t,x.(t)) = for




(t)) =0 for t
±
< t < t
2 ,




J, t: £ i< c-v u > = ° • (6 >3- i=l i






^T + I Pi Iu~ " ^ (t) ^ Idl) * (7)i=l
Bryson, Denham, and Dreyfus [9] derived that on a constrained sub-
arc (of finite length in time) a necessary condition of optimality
is




For this problem (1) Gamkrelidze (see Chapter VI in [22]) (who did
not observe (8)) developed the following additional necessary con-
dition
;co-£*o for t £ t £ t (9)
We have recently pointed out [27 J that many workers [1] , [8] , [9]
,
[11] have overlooked the importance of (9). It should be noted
that results corresponding to (8) and (9) have not been developed
for differential games (see, in particular, [4], [14], [16]).
Furthermore, there are corner conditions (for a discussion
of corner conditions within the framework of the classical calculus
of variations see p. 38 of [6] or p. 367 and p. 571 of [7]) that
must be satisfied upon entering to and exiting from a constrained
subarc. (These important conditions are never mentioned in [1] or
[2].) Let t.. denote the entry time to the constrained subarc and
t„ denote the exit time. This situation is depicted in Figure 1.
C=0 t=T
time, t
Figure 1. Entry to and Exit from Constrained Subarc.
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Furthermore, let t, denote a left-hand limit, i.e. t = lim t
**!
^1
It has been established [9] that the total discontinuity in the
adjoint variables can be taken at the entry corner (i.e. t = t,).
Thus , we have at entrance corner




) = p i
(t
1









) = H( tl
+





A similar result was first given by Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [20].
However, there is a sign error in their equation (52). Furthermore,
the dual variables can be taken to be continuous at an exit corner.
















It is readily shown that (12) and (13) imply that
y(t
2
) = . (14)
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b. Higher Order SVIC .
In the case of a k (k>l) order SVIC, the first time
derivative of the state-variable constraint which explicitly con-
tains the control variable is the k . Thus, on a constrained
subarc on which C(t,x.(t)) = for £ t £ t £ t„ £ T the
control is determined by
^ = for t < t < t 2 , (15)
dt
and we further have
for t
n





for n = l,...,k - 1 . (16)










= for C(t,x.) < ,
;> for C(t,x.) = ,




l l j=l l1 1 i J i *dt '
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for i = l,...,n. Again, we assume that initial conditions are
given for all the state variables (i.e. x.(t=0) = x. for
i = l,...,n). Then the boundary conditions at t = T for the
dual variables are again given by (5)
.
On a constrained subarc, the control is determined by (15),
As derived by Bryson, Denham, and Dreyfus 19], a necessary condi-
tion of optimality on a constrained subarc is
y(t) :> for t
1
<; t <; x.
, (19)










^ + .? t ± J^T ~ M(t)^- [~^ • (20)i=l % dt '
It remains to discuss the corner conditions (see [9], [20]).
At an entrance corner we have that
P.( tl ) - p (t ) + vQ
— (t ) + I * —l—\
i n=l i x dt '
and
H( tl-) - H( tl
+





where . for j = 0,1,..., k-2 are undetermined constants
(multipliers) . (Again, our results (21) and (22) differ in sign
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with the corresponding results given by Mclntyre and Paiewonsky




















) = . (25)
4. Application of Theory to Tactical Allocation Problems .
In this section we apply the theory discussed above to two
tactical allocation problems. Both these problems have first order
state variable inequality constraints. The first problem (tactical
air-war campaign) is a one-sided version of R. Isaacs 's "War of
Attrition and Attack [16]." However, we shall consider versions
for which previous analysis [16] does not lead to an optimal policy.
The second problem is the fire programming problem studied by
Isbell and Marlow [17]. (See also [25], in this report as Appendix
A, where results are obtained in a heuristic fashion (the determi-
nation of boundary conditions for the dual variables following [17])
without the appropriate theory of SVIC.) We shall consider several
versions of both these problems. We will not develop complete solu-
tions (including synthesis of optimal policies as a function of
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initial conditions) to these problems but concentrate on developing
the basic necessary conditions of optimality.
a. Tactical Air-War Campaign .
We consider a one-sided version of R. Isaacs' s "War of Attri-
tion and Attack [16]." We consider the case when one of the com-
batant forces always flys ground support missions.
(1) Original Version of Isaacs .
We consider the problem facing the X-force commander
T


















x and y are the number of X and Y aircraft, respectively,
c is the rate at which one X aircraft shoots down Y air-
craft (Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient)
,
m , and m are replacement rates,
<j) is the fraction of total X aircraft which fly counter-air
missions (and hence shoot down aircraft)
.
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Clearly, the constraint x ^ can never be binding. The Hamil-
tonian is given by







and p.. is the dual variable corresponding to x. The adjoint












with boundary conditions at t = T
Pl (t=T) = , (30)







for y(T) > ,
V
2
(^ for y(T) - .
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When y > 0, the control law is determined by the maximum
principle. This leads to




(t)) < — . (32)
z c
2
The possibility of a singular solution (see Appendix D for a further
dp
2
discussion is excluded by the fact that since
, ^ 0, it is im-
possible to have -7—It—) = when — = 0. Hence, the extremal
at\d<p / 9 9
control (it is also optimal, since we shall see that there is only
one extremal) is well-defined by the control law (32) almost every-
where in time (i.e. the extremal control is determined by (32)










(and $ (t) consequently changes from 1 to as an extremal
"penetrates" this surface) may be referred to as a "switching" or
"transition" surface. The discontinuity in the control at such a
locus implies that the trajectory in the state space has a corner
(without any path constraint) , i.e. a discontinuous change in the
slope of the state variable trajectory. There is no tangent to
the path at the switching time, although both the left-hand and
right-hand derivatives do exist. It is well-known (see, for example,
p. 125 of [8] and also references to the classical calculus of
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variations in Section 3. above) that the following conditions must
hold at such a corner
P±
(t ) = p
±
(t ) for i = l,...,n ,
H(t ) = H(t
+
) ,
where t is the time just before the corner (left-hand limit).
It should be noted that these vital corner conditions are never
mentioned in [1], [2], [16], or [24]. However, in all these refer-
ences they are always implicitly assumed. As we will presently
see below, the corner conditions may take a different form at the
entrance to a constrained subarc (i.e. problem with SVIC when
Gamkrelidze's approach (see pp. 265-267 of [22]) is used), and this
implicit assumption is then no longer valid.
On a constrained subarc on which y(t) = for t ^ t £ t„








for h < * < C2 ' (33)
3H
The multiplier u(t) is determined by the condition — and
dtp
hence
u(t) = - — - p (t) . (34)
c
2
The condition that u(t) ^ yields that on a constrained subarc
we must have
E-16
(-p (t)) ^ -^ . (35)
2
Differentiating (34) and combining with (29) , we find that
dP 2
u(t) - - -j—- -1 < , (36)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition is always satisfied on a constrained
sub arc.
Denoting the time of an entrance corner by t and that of
an exit corner by t„ , the corner conditions (10), (11), (12), and
(13) yield that
P2
( tl-) = - ^ , (37)
?2 (t i
+
















When there is an exit from a constrained subarc at t = t , then








Having developed the basic necessary conditions of optimality,
let us now consider the synthesis of the optimal control. By the
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synthesis of optimal control, we mean the explicit determination
of the time history of the optimal control from initial to terminal
time as a function of the initial state of the system. In synthe-
sizing an optimal trajectory there are two cases to be considered:
Case (a) y(T) =0
,
Case (b) y(T) > .
We now show that an optimal trajectory cannot end at t = T with
y(T) = 0.
For Case (a): y(T) = 0, there are two further subcases,
corresponding to whether or not the trajectory was on a constrained
subarc for a finite period of time immediately before the end at
t = T. Thus, we consider
Subcase (i) y(T) = with y(t) =0 for t <: t £
where t . < T .
In this case




since we are on a constrained subarc. However, it is readily shown










Hence, Subcase (i) is impossible by the inconsistency of (Al) and
(A2) , both of which are necessary conditions of optimality.
Subcase (ii) y(T) = with y(t) > for T - 6 £ t < T
where 6 > .
Since y(T) = with y(t) > for T - 6 <; t < T where
6 > 0, we must have (considering the state equations (26))
4» (t) = 1 for T - 6 <; t < T . (A3)















and hence considering the control law (32) , we are led to a contra-
diction of (A3). Thus, Subcase (ii) is similarly impossible. Hence,
optimal trajectories are only possible in Case (b) . It had not been
shown previously [16] that Case (a) is not consistent with an optimal
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policy. (In fact, the possibility of Case (a) is not even considered
in [163, [24].)
For Case (b) : y(T) > 0, we have by (31) that
P 2
(t=T) = . (46)







where, for convenience, we have introduced the backwards time t
defined by x = T-t. Hence, in the case when y(t) > for all
t, it is easily seen that






where we have considered (32) and (47). Thus, in this special case
(when y(t) > for O^t^T ) the solution shown in Table I
C
2
readily follows. Combining the solution shown in Table I with a
forward integration of the state equations (26) , it is easy to show
that this solution applies under the following conditions:











i 1 1VT<,-^ t <'A^?' (50>
Table I. Optimal Policy in
Tactical Air-War Campaign
When y(t) > for all t.





(t) = for <; t <; T
(Always fly ground support.)




(l for £ t





It remains to develop the solution in Case (b) when neither
(49) nor (50) holds. Thus when
cm
^0 *— (T" ^
+ < c 2
X(Tm2)(T- i> • (51)
we have y(t
n ) = where t, < T . In this case y(t) >1 1 c„
_i
for <; t < t and recalling (37) that p (t ) = , it is
*
2




















- h> • <53)
Clearly (35) is satisfied. Thus, both (8) and (9) are satisfied so
that it is optimal "in the small" to remain on the constrained sub-
arc. Finally, it is readily shown that (39) and (46) are consistent
The final solution (the extremal trajectory is optimal, since it is
unique) may be expressed in a particularly simple form and is shown
in Table II.
(2) A Time -Dependent Attrition-Rate Coefficient .
If the approach used by Isaacs [16] is applied to the above
problem, then it is assumed that it is optimal to drive y(t) to
zero and keep it there for t £ T whenever possible. However,
c
2
Table II. Optimal Policy in
Tactical Air-War Campaign
Case (1) : T <: —
C
2
> (t) = for O^t^T
(Always fly ground support.)
Case (2): T > —
C
2
For £ t :£ T
C
2
when y > ,
1 *





this need not be true and, indeed, is not true in general as the
following example shows. We consider the case when the attrition-










subject to: -r- = m








x,y ^ and 8 £ $ £ i . (54)
We will consider only the development of the basic necessary
conditions of optimality. The analysis of the preceeding section
applied through (35). However, c~ is now a function of time.
Re-writing (34) as
* (t) =





* (t) = (c^dt1 - 1 (56)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition (9) is only satisfied on a con-




r ,..„ 2£ [c (t)] . (57)dt " L 2
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The corner conditions (10) through (13) now take the form
p2














) = - ^-y . (60)
Considering (14) and (56) , it is easily seen that
and hence for t, ^ t ^ t_
n(t) = t 9 - t + ) . -
—
~y • (61)
2 c 2 T 2
Considering (61) , we see that when there is an exit from a con-





> " " ^T - (t2-<l> • <«>
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(3) Linearly Increasing Attrition-Rate Coefficient .
It seems appropriate to consider a special case of a time-
dependent attrition-rate coefficient in order to more clearly illus-
trate that there are restrictions on when it is optimal to keep
y(t) equal to zero for a finite interval of time. Let us therefore




(t) = kt . (63)
In this case, (57) holds (this implies that Gamkrelidze's necessary
condition (9) is satisfied on a constrained subarc) only for
t ^ — . (64)
Furthermore, (58) now becomes
»2<*r> - - ^ •
(65>
so that by using (29) we find that for <: t <. t.
P2< C > =-^ +t " h • (66)
Considering the control law (32) , the above expression (66) yields
that
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1 for j~ < t < t-
Let us denote the time of switch in tactics by t so that we have
s
Cs=k^ • (68)
Integration of the state equations (54) using (67) then yields
for t <. t ^ t..
s 1
y(t) = y +V - -2- (t*-l*) - -i- (t»-tj) . (69)




) = , (70)
where y(t) is given by (69) and t is given by (68) . We have
not worked out further details.
Furthermore, if we are never on a constrained subarc then
1
11 tor T-t > -
f"(t) =





4> (t=0) = ,
$ (t«T) = .
If there is a switch in tactics, then (ignoring the pathological









- kT • (72)
S
2
Consequently, for T £ — we have
<J>*(t) =0 for O^t^T. (73)
2






for <; t <
for t < t
s
l
























It seems appropriate to briefly discuss what this partial
analysis has yielded. First of all, we (the X-forces) don't begin
the campaign by shooting down Y aircraft but wait until our ef-
fectiveness rises enough over time. Intuitively we may think of
this as manifesting that we should not shoot down planes today
(initially) because we can do so much better tomorrow. Secondly,
we adjust our tactics so that (64) holds when we keep the number
of Y aircraft at the zero level. We note that we don't always
drive y(t) to zero whenever we can, but we wait so that (64) can
hold. We have not worked out the conditions on the initial force
levels under which a constrained subarc occurs.
(4) Time Variations in Integrand of Payoff .
Let us further consider an example in which the payoff from
allocating aircraft to ground support missions can change over time,
In other words, we try to take account of changing effectiveness of
the supporting weapon system (here aircraft) . The model is
T











x,y ^ and <;
<f> ^ 1 , (77)
where c„ is again assumed to be constant.
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Again, we shall focus on the development of basic necessary
conditions of optimality and an interpretation of the parameters
on which the optimal policy depends. The Hamiltonian is given by
H(t,x
i ,pi







and the adjoint equations for the dual variables are
dp
l







with boundary conditions at t = T again given by (30) and (31)
.
When y > , the control law is determined by the maximum
principle. This leads to
1 for <-p (t)) > 4^ ,
2
(t) =




The probability of a singular solution, however, is not as easily
excluded as before. Although it is readily shown to be possible
to have —(— 1 = when —- = 0, complete details as to whether
dt\3(j)/ dq>
there can be a singular subarc haven't been worked out at this
time.
Again, on a constrained subarc on which y(t) = for
t, £ t •£ t. the control to keep y(t) =0 is given by (33) . The
multiplier y(t) is determined by the condition — = and
dcp
hence
y(t) = -'^i£l- p ( t ) . (82)
c
2
The condition that u(t) ^ yields that on a constrained subarc
we must have
(-p„(t)) ^ ^P- (83)
2
Differentiating (82) and combining with (80), we find that
U(t) = - — ^ - b(t) , (84)
c_ dt









































) = - — . (88)




u(t) = — {a(t ) - a(t)} + / b(s) ds , (89)C
2 t






p (t ) = — - j b(s) ds . (90)
°2 t
From the above analysis we see that the "weight" of the
ground support missions, i.e. a(t) and b(t), are determining
factors in ascertaining optimal allocation tactics. From this we
conclude that another type of model (one that considers the conse-
quence of allocating aircraft to ground support missions) may be
more appropriate. In particular, the model (26) (due to A. Mengel)
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ignores the dynamics of ground combat (i.e. the interaction of the
supporting X and Y weapon systems with the battle of ground
forces) . We propose this to ONR as a future research task.
b . The Isbell-Marlow Fire Programming Problem .
We consider a problem about the optimal distribution of fire
over enemy target types. This problem was first studied by Isbell
and Marlow [17J (the same analysis is apparently given in [24]).
However, we have shown that the solution given in [17] is not valid
for all ranges of model parameters [25] (reproduced in this report
as Appendix A) . (There are some gaps in our solution development
that we rectify in Appendix F, although our previous solution [25]
is not modified.) Additionally, we developed in [25] a purely
algebraic method for constructing a solution to such problems, as
opposed to the geometric method (which failed to uncover a completely
correct solution) employed in [17J.
However, in [25] we still used the same heuristic method
introduced by Isbell and Marlow [17] to determine boundary condi-
tions for the dual variables. There are some other technical gaps
having to do with the treatment of the non-negativity of the force
levels (state variable inequality constraints) . We re-consider
the development of certain key necessary conditions of optimality
within the framework of the theory of SVIC . This is the first
such application of the theory of SVIC to such problems to the
best of our knowledge.
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(1) Original Version .
We consider the problem





subject to: -^- = - ^y ,
dx„


















(t), y(t) are force levels,
p, q, r are utilities assigned survivors,
a
,
a_ , b , b^ are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
and <j> is the fraction of Y fire directed at X, .
The battle terminates at t = T with either (a) x (T) = x (T) =
or (b) y(T) = (i.e. it is a "fight to the finish"). As in [25]
we shall denote the five terminal states of battle corresponding to
the above two conditions as C. for i = 1,...,5 (see [25] for
precise definitions)
.
We will focus on the development of necessary conditions of
optimality. The synthesis of optimal trajectories from these is
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y - p 2
(l-<}>)a
2



















= for x. > ,
l
k for x. =
x




IT " Vs • (93)
dp
IT - Va • (94 >
dp
— = <|)a
1 (p 1+y 1 )
+ (l-4>)a
2 (p 2+y 2 )
. (95)
Deferring the discussion of boundary conditions for the dual var-
iables until later, we note the transversality condition
H(t=T,x.,p*,<J>*) = . (96)
When x.. ,x_ > 0, the control law is determined by the max-
imum principle. This leads to
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II











As we showed in [25] , it is easily seen that it is impossible to
d/3H\ _ , 3H M . .have TtItt) = when — =0 so that it is impossible to have
a singular solution.
Without loss of generality, we may consider a constrained
subarc on which x,(t) = (and x
?
> 0) for t- £ t £ t„. The
control is clearly $ (t) = 0. The multiplier M.(t) is determined
by the condition — = and hence
U 1
















-^ (a2b 2-a 1b 1 ) , (100)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition (9) is only satisfied on a constrained











since it is readily shown that Po(0 ^ 0« The corner conditions




_) = P l
(t
l






















Pl (tP ' \ P2 (t l" ) • (105)
Let us now consider the boundary conditions on the dual var-
iables at t = T. We use the same notation for the terminal states
of battle as used in {25] (reproduced in this report as Appendix A).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a b_ > a b . The
n
Gamkrelidze's condition (101) implies that no extremals can lead to
C„, and it may be shown that there is no inconsistency with having
extremals lead to C . Terminal states C , C , and C,. are treated
in a common fashion, since for all of them the time of the end of
battles is determined by y(T) = 0. Hence, y(T) =0 is a specified
equality condition on a state variable at an unspecified terminal
time. Considering this fact (see p. 75 of [8]) and (5), we have
for states C , C , and C,.
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where
Pl (t=T) = -p + v i (106)






> for x = ,
P 2
(t=T) = -q + v
2
(107)
= for x„ > ,





where v„ is unrestricted.
Furthermore, the transversality condition (96) yields in all these
cases (i.e. for C , C,, and C,.)
P3
(t=T) = . (109)
In particular for C, : x (T) > , x (T) = 0, y(T) =0, it
is readily seen by (101) that this terminal state cannot be reached
by being on a constrained subarc with x_ = for a finite interval
of time. Thus, C, can only be reached when x_(T) = but
x»(t) > for t < T. The boundary conditions (106) and (107) on
the dual variables now take the form
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Pl (t=T) = -p , (110)
and
P 2
(t=T) = -q + v
2 ,
(111)
where v ^ .
The latter condition (111) was conjectured to hold in [25] , but we
could not at that time justify it. Since x„(T) = but x~(t) >
for t < T, we must have tf) (T) = 0, and hence by (97) we have
a
lP(-p(t=T)) > -~- . (112)
a
2
Then, combination of (111) and (112) yields that




which was a result used in [25] that we could not justify (due to
our, at that time, lack of knowledge of the theory of SVIC)
.
(2) A Case of Time-Dependent Attri tion-Rate Coefficients .
As we discussed in [27] , for problems with autonomous dynamics
(8) may well imply that Gamkrelidze's condition (9) is satisfied. In
non-autonomous cases this need not be the case and highlights the
importance of Gamkrelidze's condition. This work here complements
our results presented in [26] (reproduced in this report as Appendix C)
,
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where we omitted considerations pertaining to the non-negativity of
the force levels. Let us therefore consider the problem






























,y ^ and <: <f> ^ 1 , (114)
where r (t) , r„(t)
,
s(t) are replacement rates. Again, we focus
on the development of some necessary conditions of optimality.
The Hamiltonian is given by
H(t,x
i ,p i




















= for x. > ,
l
£ for x. = .
l
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Equations (93) through (97) still hold with a , a~ , b , and b
now being functions of time.
On a constrained subarc on which x.. (t) = (and x_ > 0)
dx
l







a7C07 f °r Cl * ' * *2 " (116)






^-^y {a 2 (t)p 2 (t) - ai (t) Pl (t)} . (117)
The condition that u,(t) ^ yields that on a constrained subarc
we must have
ai (t)(-Pl (t)) ^ a2 (t)(-P2 (t)) . (118)
Similar to what we did in [26] , let us now consider the s Pecial case








Differentiating (119) with resPect to time and combining with (93)
















since again p^(t) ^ 0. The corner conditions (102) through (105)
still hold only with a.. and a„ being functions of time.
(3) Several Target Types .
In [26] (reproduced in this report as Appendix C) we first
considered a scenario with one weapon system in battle against n
target types. Our previous treatment ignored the non-negativity
restrictions on the force levels. To rectify this gap we consider
n




subject to: -— = -<b .a.y for i = 1 , . . . ,n ,J dt l l
% - - l Vi •i=l
x, , . . . ,x ,y k , ()) . ^ for i = 1 , . . . ,n ,
n
and I d>' = 1 . (122)
i-1
X
We focus on the development of necessary conditions of opti-
mality. To avoid being encumbered by too many symbols, we will con-
sider the case when the X - force is driven to zero and assume
that x„,..., x > 0. In this case, however, we must consider a
I n
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slightly different form for the Hamiltonian. (See pp. 108-109 in
[8] for a discussion of the difference between Hamiltonians denoted
there as H and H ; the Hamiltonian given by (123) is H in the
notation of [8]. As pointed out in [8], whether one uses a Hamil-
tonian of the form (92) or (123) is a matter of taste.)
n n
H(t,x
i , P .^ i )
= y{ I a^-p.)^.} - pn+1 I b.x.i-1 i=l
ii n






= for x >
^ for x. = ,
= for <{>. > ,
l
for <j>. = .
i







-,-P^i for i - l,...,n , (124)
dp
n+l n
"dT" = *lal (pl"V + I ViP i * (125)
i=2
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On a constrained subarc on which x
n
(t) = (and x~,...,x
i I n
*
> 0) for t, <> t £ t_, part of the control is clearly
<J>
(t) = 0.
To determine the multiplier u(t), we must take a slightly differ-
ent approach than previously used above. This development will show
the reader the origin of the form of the Hamiltonian (123).
Following Gamkrelidze (see pp. 265-267 of [22]), on a con-
strained subarc the maximum principle takes the following form
maximize h(t ,x
. ,p. ,<f> .)










-^ = -^y ^ , (126)
n n
h(t,x. ,p. ,<j>.) = y{ T a. (-p. )<|>.} - p V b x .
x l l .^, x x x n+1 . t* 1 x x
x=l x=l (127)
We re-write (126) in a more convenient form to apply the well-known
Kuhn-Tucker conditions [19]. (Since the constraints are linear, it
is well-known that the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification [19] is





subject to: £ <j> . = 1 ,
i=l 1




y <: , (128)
Then the Lagrangian for the optimization problem (128) on the con-

























Applying the well-known Kuhn-Tucker conditions [19] to (128), we
have that necessary and sufficient conditions for the maximum to













r i~i y ' i
=





y) = , (132)
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y,Y. ^ 0. (134)
Let us assume that there is an isolated maximum to (128)
(thereby ignoring the troublesome case of alternate optima, which
merely presents inessential complexities; it is readily shown that
(128) cannot have alternate optima except at isolated points in time)
Then we let i = J be the index such that <j) =1. By the comple-
mentary slackness relationship (133), we have y = so that (131)
yields
X = ("PJ )aJ y. (135)
Using (135) we may re-write the n equations (130) and (131) as







Y. = y{a T (-p T (t)-a.(-p.(t))} for i = 2,...,n. (137)
Assuming that y > (otherwise there is no allocation problem) , the
Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition y. ^ for i = l,...,n yields
a (-p (t)) £ a (-p (t)) for i=2,...,n. (138)
In fact, for the maximum to be isolated, we must have
a (-p (t)) > a (-p (t)) for i = 2,...,n and i + J. (139)
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We are therefore left with one equation for the two remaining
under termined multipliers u and y
M a
x
y - Y-l y^jPj -3!?!) ( 14 °)





x (t) remains equal to zero for t.. S t S t. s T, since the model
(122) does not allow for replacements. Thus by Gamkrelidze's device
the constraint | a y ^ is active for t.. < t ^ T. Observing that
the constraint fay ^ being active guarantees that the constraint
<(>.. ^ is satisfied (we note that a > and y > 0) , we set
Y-. = to obtain
" (t)
" ^ <Vj-Vi> (1A1)





(t)) ^ aj (-Pj (t)), (142)
on the constrained subarc. Differentiating (141) and combining the
result with the adjoint equations (124) , we obtain
P
n+l (t)
p(t> . -E±L_ (a^-a^)
,
(143)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition (9) is only satisfied on a constrained





ajbj. < 144 >
since it is readily shown that p . (t) > for £ t < T.
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Thus, we have proved the following theorem:
Theorem E.l : For the problem (122) , an optimal
policy has the property that if we annihilate









where J is the index of any target type upon
which fire is later concentrated.
Although the above does not complete the analysis of this
problem, we end our discussion here. We propose to ONR that the
complete discussion of the conditions under which it is optimal to
drive a force level to zero be a future research task.
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Appendix F. The Isbell-Marlow Problem Revisited.
1. Introduction .
We have included in this report as Appendix A some of our
previous work [9] on the Isbell-Marlow fire programming problem [6]
(the same results are apparently given in [7]). This work [9] revises
some even earlier work (see Appendix A of [8]) that we had done on
this problem. Since the writing of [9] in June 1971, we have uncovered
a gap in our development of the synthesis of the optimal control (how-
ever, the solution presented in [9] remains valid). (By the synthesis
of optimal control, we mean using the basic necessary conditions of
optimality to explicitly determine the time history of the optimal
control from initial to terminal time as a function of the initial
state of the system.) Thus, it is the purpose of this appendix to
revise our earlier work [9] (repreduced in this report as Appendix A).
The results we obtain from this further examination of the Isbell-
Marlow problem are of considerable interest, since they provide an
understanding of solution phenomena (multiple extremals and a dominated
payoff) that we have encountered in a differential game [10]
.
In [9] we showed that extremals were not unique for a certain
range of model parameters and tried to develop necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for optimal paths to lead to all the terminal states
of combat. (By an extremal we mean a battle trajectory on which the
necessary conditions of optimality are almost everywhere satisfied in
time.) In the pioneering 1956 work of Isbell and Marlow [6] (the
Pontryagin maximum principle was only announced in 1956 [1], although
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Professor Magnus Hestenes of the USA had apparently first given the
now standard control formulation (as well as developed optimality
conditions) and urged others to follow his approach in 1949 [3]) one
can find several gaps (boundary conditions for dual variables, treat-
ment of state variable inequality constraints (SVIC)) in the light
of subsequent control theory developments. In [9] we followed Isbell
and Marlow's heuristic treatment of the determination of boundary
conditions for the dual variables and did not consider the theory of
SVIC. We rectify these gaps here.
Furthermore, we feel that one of our major contributions in
[9] was the development of a purely algebraic method for the deter-
mination of the optimal control, as opposed to the geometric method
employed in [6] . The reader should note the difficulty of applying
their geometric approach to a similar problem with a state space of
dimension greater than three. We feel that this is essentially
impossible, whereas our algebraic method (like algebraic geometry in
n-dimensional space) appears to be readily applicable to such problems
2. Statement of the Isbell-Marlow Fire Programming Problem .
For the reader's convenience we re-state the problem originally
studied by Isbell and Marlow [6]
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subject to: ^— = - (fra^y,
dx
=









x ,x ,y £ and £ <j> ^ 1,
where all symbols are defined in the next section.
The battle terminates upon reaching the terminal states defined
by (1) x (T) = x (T) = and (2) y(T) = 0. Upon further analysis,
it has been convenient to consider that there are the following five
"target sets" for this problem:
C
±
: Xl (T) = 0, x2




: X;L (T) = before x2 (T)
= 0, y(T) > 0,
C
3
: X;L (T) = after x2





(T) > 0, x
2





(T) > 0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0.
The reader should note that in the above problem statement T is
referred to as being undetermined. This is because T is determined
by entry to one of the above five target sets. This is a function of




The symbols which are used in this appendix are defined as
follows:
A = A(R,z) = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/(z-l) 2
,
B = B(R,z) = A(z-l) 2 /z 2 = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/z 2
,
a ,a ,b ,b = constant attrition-rate coefficients,
C. for i = 1,2,3,4,5 = the i— part of the terminal surface
as defined in section 2,
D(C.) = domain of controllability for C,
i J i
g(P ,R,z) = term in equation of the locus of points for
which P = P
,
h(P ,R,z) = term in equation for boundary surface between the
regions from which optimal paths lead to C. and C
, ,






































t = time at which X is annihilated, i.e. x (t ) = 0,
t„ = first time at which 2b x (tjx. + b_(x ) 2 = a y 2 (t~) for an
extremal leading to C,
,
T = total time for the battle,




w = cosh /a b t (C ) = .
2 2 14 P (t=
a, (b lP2 (t=T)+b 2p)
2
,.T) (a^-a^) •
x ,x ,y = average force strengths; with initial values x , x ,




2P) R - 6







4> = fraction of Y-f ire directed at X
,
x = "backwards time" from the end of the battle defined by
= T - t, i.e. the time remaining before the end of the battle,
t..(C.) = "backwards time" of the first switch in tactics for
extremals leading to C .
.
Additionally:
C refers to C (the 5— part of the terminal surface) which
is reached by extremals with a switch in tactics,
S S
P. = payoff associated with an extremal leading to C-.
4. Summary of Solution .
There are four cases to be considered
(1) 6 £ 1,
(2) R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1,
(3) 6 = R - /R(R-l)
,
(4) s; 6 < R - /R(R-l) ,
where 6 = a p/(a q). For Case (1): 6^1, the solution is given
in Table I of Appendix A. Our re-esamination here changes no details
of the analysis presented there.
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The results of our additional analysis (which includes use of
the theory of SVIC) are presented in Tables I through V. Supporting
details will be presented in subsequent sections only when they differ
from our previous analysis (see Appendix A)
.
For Case (2) : R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1, the solution is shown in
Table I. Although this solution presented in Table I (Appendix F) is
identical to that presented in Table II of Appendix A, there is a
subtle difference in how it was obtained: our newer analysis (which
invokes some new results from the theory of SVIC about the boundary
conditions for the dual variables) has revealed that the domains of
controllability do not "overlap" so that the extremals are unique.
Hence, the extremal control turns out to be the optimal control, since
it may be shown that the problem does indeed possess a solution.
Previously (see Appendix A) , we thought that the domain of control-
ability for C, , denoted by D(C,), had an intersection of positive
area (to be more precise, positive measure) with other domains of
controllability
.
It seems appropriate at this time to point out to the reader
that the optimal control has been expressed as an open-loop control.
For an open-loop control u = u(t;x , t„) one specifies the control
as a function of time t during the length of the planning horizon
:£ t £ T. Such a control only depends on the parameter t and the
initial conditions x
n
,t„. This control is not directly influenced
by the current state of the system. On the other hand, one can
consider a closed-loop (or feedback) control u = k(x,t) which depends
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Table I. Solution to Isbell-Marlow Problem for
R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1,
Nonrestrictive Assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (2): R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1 where 6 = a p/(a q)
Terminal State Optimal Control Domain of Controllability
*,(t













(T) > <j,*(t) =
j
y(T) =0 \ for t < t £ T a
i
biyn
!x (t ) =0 (1 for OstSL
x
2
(T) = <J>*(t) = a^y 2 > s 2 + (R-l)(b
2
x°) 2















(T) = <|>*(t) =
|
y(T) =0 ' for t
2
< t <; T ^^Q ^ s2 + A <b 2x2 )2
/x (T) > a lb iy * Rs2{1 " 1/z}











VT > >0 (1 for 0£t£T-Tl alVo > Rs2{1 " 1/z2}
C^|x
2












,m > ^0 for T-T n < t £ T u2 2 uru °\2y(T) =0 1 alb iy S B(Vr
Definition of Times
(a) t.. is first t such that x (t,) = 0.






— R — fi
(c) t- is determined by cosh /a„b x, = r r •
1 Z Z 1 K — ±
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upon the current state of the system. The results presented in [7]
(see also [6]) are in the form of a closed-loop control. For deter-
ministic systems (one-sided problems) , it is well known that open-
loop control and closed-loop control yield identical results in
trajectory and payoff [4]. It is, of course, a simple matter to
convert the optimal control presented, for example, in Table I into
a closed-loop control. However, for optimal control of stochastic
systems it is well known that open-loop and closed-loop controls do
not yield the same return. In Appendix I we consider a stochastic
version of (1) and consider there a closed-loop control.
It also seems appropriate to note the following for the
quantities A and B which appear in inequalities defining various
domains of controllability:
(a) for <: 6 < R - /R(R-l)
,
we have A > B > 0, (2)
(b) for 6 = R - /R(R-l)
,
we have A = B = 0, (3)
(c) for R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1,
we have A < B < 0. (4)
Furthermore, let us recall that A and B are defined by (see also
Section 3)
.
A A^D \ R(Z 2 -1) - Z 2 ,,vA = A(R,z) = y_^2 , (5)
B = B(R,z) = R(z21> - z2 . (6)
z
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The quantity z, defined by z = -, relates A and B to 6
K — J.
For Case (3) : 6 = R - /R(R-l) , the solution is shown in
Table II. The reader should note the reduction in dimension (from
S S
three to two) for the domain of controllability or C , D(C ).
Case (3) is an important case for understanding the solution to the
Isbell-Marlow problem. For R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1, both extremals and
the optimal control are unique. In other words, the domains of
controllability do not "overlap." For £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
,
extremals are no longer unique (i.e. for a point P in the initial
state space there may be more than one extremal path leading to the terminal
surface) . In Case (3) : 6 = R - /R(R-l) , extremals are unique for
S S
all terminal states except C . Moreover, for C,., the optimal control
is no longer unique: for any P £ D(C,.) any policy as shown in
Table II with t„ < t.. leads to the same payoff, P = -qx /—r—
.
Furthermore, any initial point P £ D(C.) or D(C.) or D(C ) with
a by 2 = s 2 also leads to exactly the same payoff when an optimal
control is used, i.e. for such P we have P n = P. = P c = P c .14 5 5
For Case (4) : £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) , the domains of controlla-
bility and corresponding extremal controls are shown in Table III.





all "overlap'' each other (as careful study of this table will show) .
(Inequalities such as A(R
s
z) > B(R,z) for <; 6 < R - /R(R-l)
(which are essential in such considerations) are given in Appendix A.)
Hence, step (e) of the general solution procedure presented in
Appendix A must be applied. The resulting solution after this has
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Table II. Solution to Isbell-Marlow Problem for
6 = R - /R(R-l)
.







Case (3): 6 = R - /R(R-l) where 6 = a p/(a q)









(T) > <j,*(t) =
J







) =0 / 1 for s£ t £ t
x
2
(T) = o*( t ) = aibiy2 > s
2 + (R-i)(b2X°)2











° ** (t) =
I
y(T) =0 ' for t
2










(T) > ° <t»*(t) = for <; t £ T















(T) > <}>*(t) = |
y(T) =0 ( for t
3
< t £ T b
2




(a) t is any time such that £ t„ < t ,
(b) For t., t , and t , see Table I.
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Table III. Extremals for Isbell-Marlow Problem for
<: 6 < R - /R(R-l)
Nonrestricitve assumption: R > 1, i.e. a. b > a b
Case (4): £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) where 6 = a p/(a q)



















y(T) =0 for t. < t £ T a.-b-.y2 > s 2 + B(b„x") 2(o 2'V














(y(T) > 0- ' for t < t :£ T






















y(T) = ° ( for t
2
< t ^ T
a^y
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T) >0 W0 <S2+(R"1)(V2 )2
C
]




S Rs2{1 " 1/z2}
' y(T) = ° a^y 2 < R{s 2 - (b^) 2 }
x
n
(T) > / 1 for £ t £ T-t.











< Rs2{1 " 1/z2}




' y(T) = ° ' ° f°r T" T 1
< C
^












Definition of Times: for t
1
, t„, and t , see Table I
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been done is presented in Table IV. A major difference between the
results presented here and those of Appendix A is that (we have
S
discovered since June 1971 that) extremals do lead to C,.. However,
this gap in our earlier analysis (see Appendix A) has had no effect
upon the solution which we presented earlier, since it may be shown
that for an initial point P°
€
D(C ) f] D(C ) we have P :> P when
the corresponding extremal controls are used. Hence, extremals lead-
S
ing to C^ may be dropped (as they were previously inadvertently
omitted) from further consideration.
For Case (4) : ^ 6 < R - /R(R-l) , the solution is shown in
Table IV. It is of interest to note that the solutions contain a dis-
persal surface (see pp. 134-141 in [5]), a solution aspect rarely
encountered in optimal control problems (see [2] for the only example
of which we are aware, other than those given in Isaacs' book [5]).
The reader should note that the solution shown in Table IV is identical
with that given earlier (see Table II of Appendix A)
.
A considerable amount of effort has gone into the study of
extremals for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) . In Table V we show event (such
as annihilation of X , end of battle, etc.) times and payoffs for
Case (4): ^ 6 < R - /R(R-l) . We omit derivation of these times,
which is readily done using elementary considerations (such as combi-
nation of the extremal control with the solution to the force level
equations)
. The solution to the force level equations is consequently
shown in Table VI. Additionally, the reader should note that if we
have c{>(t) constant for all t
€
[t..,t ], then the following
"generalized square law" holds
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Table IV. Solution to Isbell-Marlow Problem for
£ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
.
Nonrestrictive assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (4): <; 6 < R - /R(R-l) where 6 = a p/(a q)










Rs2 " R { b
1







C { x (T) >































































^Vo < R{s2 " (b ixi> 2}
' Y(T) = ° a^y 2 <; Rs 2 - R{blX°[z 2 (R-l)+R]/(2R) + b 2x°}
2 /z :










and T-, see Table I
(b) k = [z 2 - R(z-1) 2 ]/(2R).
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Table V. Event Times and Payoffs for Isbell-Marlow Problem
when £ 6 < R - R(R-l)
.
Terminal State C : x-jCt-,) = °» x (T) > 0, y(T) =
h =
1 , r
/alVo - S " + (b 2X2 )Z ' b 2X2 ,
ln{ === }
*Yi /a^y - s
1 1
/a
iVn - s^ + (b 9x")*
T = t, + - tanh" !
1 1 ° ^—
}
^Fi b 2x° vfc
P, = —3— /s z + (R-l)(b xp* - a by*
b/R xxu



























Terminal State C^ : x^t^ = x^T) > 0, x (T) = 0, y(T) =







) -yg + .^/(«b
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t = ———- £nj
2 ^ y - s/v^"






) - yg * s2/(a1b1 ) - y(t 2 )
Ant }
^ s/v^- yQ
for a^y 2 = s,
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b^R ^ b 2
x
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Terminal State C : x (T) > 0, x (T) > 0, y(T) =
(no switch: ^>*(t) = for <; t £ T)
T = tanh i z
—
o u—O J
/I^ - blX + b 2
x
Terminal State C : x
±
(T) > 0, x^T) > 0, y(T) =
switch in tactics: <£*(t)
1 for <; t £ T - t.
for T - x < t £ T
1 , -1 (R-6^
T
i





T = T, +
x (
(/R(z z-1) -z) (/a^ yQ+s)
—• £n < —









x°) £=t) + | /(z z (R-l)-R)(a1b 1y-sO }
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C(t) = blXl (t) + b 2x2 (t).
This generalized square law has been used (along with the extremal
control to C.) to express P. = ry(T) - px (T) - qx_(T) in the form
shown in Table V.
As a final check on our theoretical developments, we had some
numerical computations done for Case (4) . The results shown in Table
V have been used in this work. We would like to thank a M.S. thesis
student, Robert L. Powers, LT , USN, for his efforts in this area.
All Powers' computations have supported the solution shown in Table
IV. For example, let us examine the results of computations for typical
data such as that shown in Table VII. For this data, we have 6=0
and R = 2. Extremals lead to C. , C , and C,. from P . For the
extremal to C. , we have t.. =4.26 minutes while T = 18.99 minutes
and P = -217.72. For the extremal to C , we have T = 9.96
S
minutes and P = -149.92. For the extremal to C , we have T - x =
S
3.64 minutes while T = 16.81 minutes and P = -221.43. Considering
Table IV, it is readily shown that P° = (100,100,152) is such that
the optimal path leads to C , as these numerical computations bear
out. Notice that for the optimization problem (1) which we are con-
sidering and the input data shown in Table VII, making the battle last
longer (by firing more at X.. ) does not result in more value for
survivors (from Y's standpoint). Finally, because in our earlier
F-18
Table VII. Time History of Force Levels
g
for Extremal Leading to C,.
x° = 100, x° = 100, yQ
= 152
a.. = 0.2 X - cas./(min. x Y unit)
a =0.1 X - cas./(min. x Y unit)
b = 0.1 Y - cas./(min. x x unit)
b_ = 0.2 Y - cas./(min. x x unit)











0.36 89.19 100.00 144.91
0.73 78.88 100.00 138.21
1.09 69.04 100.00 131.88
1.46 59.65 100.00 125.89
1.82 50.69 100.00 120.24
2.19 42.12 100.00 114.91
2.55 33.94 100.00 109.88
2.91 26.11 100.00 105.14
3.28 18.61 100.00 100.69
3.64 11.43 100.00 96.50
4.96 11.43 88.22 82.62
6.28 11.43 78.18 70.18
7.59 11.43 69.69 58.95
8.91 11.43 62.60 48.75
10.23 11.43 56.81 39.40
11.54 11.43 52.20 30.73
12.86 11.43 48.69 22.59
14.18 11.43 46.23 14.85
15.50 11.43 44.77 7.36
16.81 11.43 44.29 0.00
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work (which is reported in Appendix A) we had erroneously concluded
o
that no extremals led to C for a: 6 < R - /R(R-l)
,
we also have
verified that extremals do lead to C by examining the time history
of the force levels computed according to the extremal control. An
example of the results of such computations is shown in Table VII.
5. Necessary Conditions of Optimality .
The solution shown in Tables I, II, and IV has been developed
according to the solution procedure which we outlined in Appendix A.
This procedure is based upon synthesizing extremal trajectories from
the basic necessary conditions of optimality. Thus, it seems appro-
priate to say a few words about these.
Since we have developed in Section 4.b.(l) of Appendix E
the basic necessary conditions of optimality for (1) , we will not
repeat details again but refer the reader there for all the details.
As we saw in Appendix E, the Isbell-Marlow problem requires use of
results (boundary conditions for the dual variables, necessary con-
ditions for it to be optimal to have x (t) = for a finite interval
of time, corner conditions) from the theory of SVIC. In the original
pioneering work of Isbell and Marlow [6] these results were not used,
since they had not yet been discovered and published in the mathe-
matics literature. In our earlier work (see Appendix A in this report
and also Appendix A of [8]) we had followed some heuristic reasoning
of Isbell and Marlow [6] on such points.
Let us now summarize the main results of Section 4.b.(l) of
Appendix E. We saw that in order for it to be optimal to have x (t) =
F-20








At entry at t.. to a constrained subarc on which a = 0, we have




") = P^t^) for i = 2,3, (10)
where t.. denotes a left-hand limit. Furthermore, for C, we have
that
< (-p (t=T)) <: q. (11)
The latter of these two inequalities was conjectured in Appendix A
(in June 1971) to be a property of an extremal. Our recent work using
the theory of SVIC has confirmed this conjecture.
S
6. Existence of Extremals Leading to C .
In our earlier work [9] we erroneously concluded that for
c
£ 6 < R - /R(R-l) there were no extremals leading to C . Let us
now retrace our earlier development in a correct manner.
There are two subcases for entry to C^. We consider the
extremals for which




( fo r T - x < t £ T. (12)
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For convenience, let us say that such an extremal leads to C .
Combining the above extremal control with the generalized square law




























+ a^y 2 - s 2 + (1-R)(b
2
x°) 2 = 0. (13)
A backwards integration of the state equations of £ t £ x with















-1 )» ( 1Zf )
since x
7
(t=T-T-) = x~ . It should be noted that in deriving (14) we
have assumed that x
.













and hence we require that the right-hand side of (15) be positive in
order that C_ be reached. Thus, for P £ 0(0,.) we" must have





= s2 for A = °' (17)
a by 2 > s 2 for A > 0, (18)
where the reader should keep (2) through (4) in mind.
Now when A < (corresponding to R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1) , (15)
may be solved to yield
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/s z - a..b y^
R - z4-l) • < 19 >b 2x2 (T) = b2x2 . ^ w /R . giS(IHL)












where we have made use of (5) . Combination of (14) and (19) yields
that
Vi (I-V " -V2 + z/r -\'(r-S • (21 >










where we have made use of (6) . Furthermore, the time T-x may be
determined by solving the following equation (see Table VI)
y(T-T.) = y. cosh/a, b n (T-x,) — sinh/aTbT (T-x,) to yield1 U i 1 1 i—r— 11 i
/a b y (T-x ) - a b yf. + s
z
- /a b y(T-x )
T - t = — in L X Z - ^^ — — (23)
/a^b- s - /a^ yQ





Now, the generalized square law (7) may be combined with the extremal
control (12) and (14) to yield
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^ ylT-j) - ^U^IT ]\ _'^° . (25)





> Rs2 {1 " 1/z2} - ( 26 )
Furthermore, (23) and (25) may be combined to yield
, ( (z-VR(z^-l)) (s+/aTb~ y ))
T - T « L— £n )
,
}• (27)
2/a^bY ( (s-/a^ y )(z+/R( Z2-l) )
SFinally, (19) may be used to show that the payoff P_ corresponding








x° + | /(R-z z (R-l))(s^-a1b 1y^)} . (28)
When A > (corresponding to £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)) , we must
have a-by 2 > s 2 by (18) so that analysis similar to the above
readily yields results similar to (20) , (22) , and (26) but with the
inequalities reversed (see Table III) . In our previous work, we had
erroneously concluded that this case was impossible.
Next, we consider the extremals for which
4>*(t) =0 for £ t £ T. (29)
Let us adopt the terminology that such an extremal leads to C with
payoff P . We omit discussion of results previously derived in
Appendix A. In that appendix we showed that










{z(^i)blX° - /s* -a^yg/R}. (31)
7 . Proof of a Dominance Theorem .
In this section we show that for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) we need
not consider extremals that lead to C
,
since the payoff associated
with such an extremal path is exceeded (or dominated) by the payoff
associated with an extremal leading to C . Hence, our previous over-
sight on extremals leading to C,. is of no consequence.
Our main result is stated below as Theorem 1. It is convenient,
however, to first explain our terminology in a precise fashion. To
be precise, then, we have
Definition 1: We say that an extremal leads to C
when we use the extremal control
4>*(t) =
1 for £ t s; T - t
,
for T - i
n
< t £ T
1
and reach the terminal state x (T) > 0,
x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0. (t- is given in
Table V.)








b- {- Z^ b 2x2 + I A^CR-D-RHajb^-s*) }. (32)
F-25





, is given by
for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
DCCj) = {P° = (x°,x°,y ) | ajb yg * Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ) and
s 2 < s 2 + B(b
2
x°) 2 < a^y 2 < s 2 + A(b
2
x°) 2 }. (33)
We also have
Definition 2: We say that an extremal leads to C when
we use the extremal control
$*(t) = for £ t £. T,
and reach the terminal state x (T) > 0,
x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0.
We denote the payoff associated with an extremal leading to C,. by
P . We have that for s; 6 < R - /R(R-l)
Furthermore, the domain of controllability for C , denoted by D(C ),
is given by
for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
D(C
5
) = {P° = (x°,x°,yQ ) | a^y
2 £ Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ) and
a^y2 < R{s 2 - (b^) 2 } }. (35)
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Since (36) does not enter into the proof of Theorem 1, we have (for
convenience) omitted it.
We now state the main result of this section as Theorem 1.
THEOREM 1: Assume that ^ 6 < R - /R(R-l) . (This is
equivalent to z > /R/(R-1) .) Then P° =






P ^ P with equality holding only when a b yjr
Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ).
PROOF
:
A. First we will show that









imply that P < P . For P
€
D(C ) fl D(C ) we have (postponing





< Rs2 ( 1~1 / z2s>> < 39 >
which implies that
R(z 2-l)s 2 - z 2a b y 2 > 0. (40)
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Squaring (38) , we may rearrange the result to obtain
(2Rsz/s z - a^y^R) 2 < {R(z 2+l)s 2 - z 2a b yg} 2 . (41)
By observing that 1 - 1/z 2 < 1 + 1/z 2 and considering (39) , it is
readily seen that






so that we may take square roots in (41) to obtain
2Rsz/s z - a-jb-jyg/R < R(z 2+l)s 2 - z 2a b y 2 . (43)






-s 2 ) < {z(R-l)s - R/s z - a^^/R} 2 . (44)






2 /R) < z 2 (R-l) 2 s 2 . (45)
Recalling that for P° £ D(C-) f) D(C
5
) we have a b yQ < Rs
2 (l-l/z 2 )
< Rs
,
we may extract square roots in (45) to obtain
z(R-l)s - R/s z - a b y 2 /R > 0. (46)
Considering (37) , (38) , and (46) , we may extract square roots in
(44) to obtain
| /(z z (R-l)-R)(a1b 1y z -s z ) < z (^) (b^+b^) - /s 2 - a^^g/R. (47)
F-28
Some additional manipulations on (47) now readily yield that (37) and
(38) imply that P > P .





= Rs^ 1"1 / 22 ). (48 )
S





y^-s ) = ^(z 2 (R-l)-R) . (49)
Now (32) and (49) may be combined to yield








- a^yg/R = s 2 /z 2
,
(51)
which may be combined with (34) to yield
s
Consideration of (50) and (52) shows that (48) implies that P_ = P_
By A. and B. above, Theorem 1 is proved. Q.E.D.
8. Development of Conditions for Extremals to Reach C .
.
Another topic for which our previous discussion [9] was
inadequate was the development of conditions for extremals to reach
C, . (Previously, we heuristically developed (66) and had not shown
that (70) was a necessary condition.)
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Let us define
a (b p (t=T)+b p)
w = w(p„(t=T)) =
Po (t=T)(a1b 1-a2b 2 )
'





Then recalling (11) (which was a necessary condition of optimality)
,
we have that
for 6 < Q <; 1,
we have 1 < w(Q) £ f^f = z, (55)
K.-i











z = cosh/a-b ? = cosh/a b T- (C ) .







Now, the extremal control is
4>*(t) =
1 for i t < t,,
for t £ t £ T, (58)
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x°) 2 - (b lX;L (t 2 ))
2 }. (59)
In [9] we showed that the extremal control (58) and the generalized
















Clearly we must have b x (t_) £ b x
,







A backwards integration of the state equations using (58) yields

























= blXl (t 2 )
{cosh/a^ (T-t
2
) - 1}. (63)
Then (60) and (63) may be combined to yield
T





+ /s z + R(R-l)(b
2




= xl^ = ~L~ MBh'1^) , (65)
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£ s + A(b
2
x°) 2 . (66)







1V2(t 2 ) = s2 " (b 1x1 (t 2)+b 2x°) 2 . (67)

















-s 2 } + R{(b
x
x°) 2 - (b lX;L (t 2 ))
2
}
+ R{s 2 - (blX°) 2 }. (68)
We will prove as Proposition 1 that
R{(b
x
x°) 2 - (blX;L (t 2 ))
2 } - (R-l){s 2 - (b lX;L (t 2)+b 2x°)
2
} ^ 0, (69)





R{s2 " (bixi )2} * (70)
It remains to prove the following proposition
PROPOSITION 1: A necessary and (with appropriate additional
assumptions) sufficient condition for (69)
to be true is that b_x„(R-l) £ b,x .




It is readily shown that (69) may be rearranged to yield
(b lX°)
2




X2{b lX° - b^Ct^)}. (71)
Now (71) may be factored and (assuming that b x > b x (t„)) a common
term cancelled on both sides to yield
blX
° + b lX;L (t 2 ) £ 2(R-l)b 2x2 (72)









x°(R-l) - b^J, (73)
and the necessity of the proposition is proved. Q.E.D.
The time t in (58) may be explicitly determined by solving





















Since the quantity in brackets must be k 1 (for all cases, i.e.
a.b.y 2 >
,




) > 0. (76)






) = ~ {(2R-l)b
2






- ^ xVp , (77)
so that when this is combined with (76) , we obtain






x°> :> 2/s* + R(R-l)(b
2
x°)^ - a^yg . (78)







x°) 2 . (79)
If (79) holds, then squaring both sides of (78) again leads to (70).
Moreover, (61) and (70) yield (79) as Proposition 2 shows.
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that




































<: R{s 2 - (blX°) 2 },
and whence the proposition. Q.E.D
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9 . Analysis of Dispersal Surface .
For £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) , the domains of controllability
for all the terminal states are shown in Table III. It is easily
seen that many of these domains overlap each other (the inequalities
(47) through (53) of Appendix A are useful in such considerations)
.
Hence, we must use "considerations in the large" to select the optimal
policy from among the candidate extremal policies. This is essentially
step (e) of our general solution procedure outlined in Section 4. of
Appendix A.
Our "considerations in the large" have led us to discover a
new aspect of the Isbell-Marlow problem [6] : the solution contains
dispersal surfaces for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l) . A dispersal surface (see
pp. 134-141 in [5]) is a surface only away from which optimal paths
lead. It is the locus of points such that the payoffs from two families
of extremals are equal.
Let us now show how the dispersal surface which separates
optimal paths leading to C and also C is explicitly determined.
We have previously summarized results in [9] (see Appendix A in this
report), but we present the details here.
It seems appropriate to firmly establish our notation first,
however. To be precise, then, we have
Definition 3: We say that an extremal leads to C when we
use the extremal control
4>*(t) =
1 for £ t si t
,
for t„ t as T,
"1





) = 0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0.
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We denote the payoff associated with an extremal leading to C. by
P . We have that
p
i 7^
/sZ + (R-1>(VP Z - aiVo • (80)
Furthermore, the domain of controllability for C , denoted by D(C.),
is given by
o o ^2DC^) = IP" = (x^,x^y ) | a^y2 < s 2 + (R-l) (b^)
and alVo ^ s2 + B (b 2x2 )2} - (81)
We refer the reader to Section 7 for the corresponding notation
S
and results for C^ and C^. However, let us be more precise in
(35) ; we now write this as
for £ 6 < R - /R(R-l)
D(C
5











aJj-y* s: Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ), and
aiVo < R{s2 " (b ixi> 2} - } • < 82 >
Considering (33) , (35) (or equivalently (82) , and (81) , we see
c
that D(C ) D(C ) D(C 5 ) is nonempty (see inequalities (47)
through (53) of Appendix A). However, Theorem 1 tells us that we need
not consider further extremals leading to C . Thus, we must determine
optimal paths from extremals for P 6 D(C ) f| D(C-) .
Now by (81) and (82) P° such that a b yg = s 2 + Btb^) 2
clearly belongs to D(C ) D(C ). (The reader should recall (2):
B > 0.) We begin by stating and proving Theorem 2.
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We may add the term (b~x ) 2 /z 2 to both sides of (84). This makes
the left-hand-side of (84) a perfect square so that extracting square
roots, we obtain
(¥Kxi + ^r > /s 2 -!< s2 + B (V2> 2 >> (85)
where we have made use of the definition (6) of B. Recalling that
we are considering the case when a by 2 = s 2 + B(b x ) 2 , we see



























whence the theorem follows. Q.E.D.




x°) 2 <Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ). (89)
Hence, P such that a by 2 = Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ) clearly belongs to
D(C ) D(C ) . We now state and prove Theorem 3.













A. Again we observe that 6 < R - /R(R-l) implies that
2 ' R
B. We may readily obtain from (90) that
z




which is easily further manipulated upon to yield




{s " + CR-D(V2)2 - R82 ^-1 / 22 )^- (92)
















<R{s2 " (b !xi)
2}
- < 94 )





= Rs^ 1 "1 / 22 ). ( 95 >
we may obtain from (94) that
so that (93) and (96) yield that
Considering (97) , we may extract square roots in (92) to obtain
\ = z(^)blX° > 4:^ + (R-l)(b 2x£)* - Rs (1-1/z*). (98)
/ R
Recalling the expression (80) for P , we readily see from (98)
that
C. Since we are assuming that (95) holds, it is readily shown
using (34) that P reduces to
p = -*-
5 b
2 M¥M-f}- <100 >
whence the theorem follows. Q.E.D
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Thus, by Theorems 2 and 3 we have shown that for s: 6 <R - /R(R-l)


























where we also assume that P 6 D(C.) f) D(C ) . We also note that
s 2 + B(b
2
x°) 2 <Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 ) for <; 6 <R -VR(R-l). The locus of
points for which P = P (or P - P = 0) is the dispersal surface .
It is uniquely determined, since we always have
at (Pi"P 5 ) > °' (101)
We now prove (101) as Theorem 4.
THEOREM 4: Assume that x > and R > 1. Then




A. Using (34) and (80) , it is easily computed that
aiVoq
-2












1 "/ Rs 2 - a,b v 2 (i"iy6
1





B. Now for x > 0, we have
(R-l)(bx°) 2 < (R-l)s 2 for R > 1 (103)




^ - Wo <1§ (104)
whence the theorem follows. Q.E.D.
Our results (Theorems 2, 3, and 4) are summarized in Table VIII
The dispersal surface is the locus of points such that P = P .







= Rs2 " R tb
1
x°[z 2 (R-l) + R]/(2R) + b
2







[z 2 - R(z-l) 2 ]}. (106)
Expression (106) must also be considered, since (94) must also hold
for extremals leading to C,.. Considering Theorem 4 and (105) (with
(106)), we readily obtain the corresponding results shown in Table IV.
For 0^6 <R - /R(R-l)
,
there may also be a dispersal surface
separating optimal paths which lead to C and C , . As noted in
Appendix A, the details are much messier than those for S , and
1-5
an explicit expression has not been obtained for S
1-4
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Table VIII. Summary of Results on Dispersal Surface
which Separates Optimal Paths Leading to C and C .
















) > for a^y 2 = Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 )
3. ~— (Pt-Pc) > for x° > and R > 1dy
Let us note that s 2 + B(b x°) 2 < Rs 2 (l-l/z 2 )
.
Then 1, 2, and 3 imply that there exists a uniquely determined surface
such that P = P . Denote this surface as S
1 3 Dl-5
Clearly S C {D(C ) D(C )}.
1-5
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10. Proof of a Useful Inequality .
The following lemma has been useful in developing the domains
of controllability for C and C^.
LEMMA 1: Assume that £ y ^ 1 and x ^ 1. Then a necessary
and sufficient condition for








J =\ An(£3 , (107)
cosh -1" x = £n(x+/xz-l) . (108)
A. Proof of necessity:
-1
-1
Assuming that tanh y ^ cosh x, we may use (107) and
(108) to obtain
*n (3?) * JUUx+v'x2^!) 2 . (109)
Since the logarighm is a strictly increasing function, (109) yields
that
1 + y^- ;> 2x2 + Ixv^T. (110)





Since the right-hand-side of (111) is ^ 0, we may square both sides
to obtain
1 2x2 O fS 1 o\
-p. r-j- - = ^ -xz . (112)(l-y) z 1-y
Now since 1 - y ^ 0, we may multiply both sides of (112) without




* 4^ • (ii3)
Thus, tanh y ^ cosh x implies that (113) holds.
B. Proof of sufficiency:
x2 -l
Assuming that y ^ —j— and recalling that £ y £ 1, we
readily see that
y > y2 :>^ . (114)
x'
Writing this as
a straightforward chain of manipulations leads us to
(t^- - x2 ) :> {xv^I} 2 . (116)
Combining (114) and (115) , we see that
-±-
- x2 :> 0, (117)1-y
so that we may extract square roots in (116) to obtain
-^-
- x2 ^ xv/x^T. (118)
i-y
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Straightforward manipulations upon (118) lead us to
/P^ * x + /^l,v 1-y
whence by (107) and (108) we obtain
(119)
tanh y ^ cosh x. (120)
x 2-l
Thus, y 2 :> —J— implies that (120) holds. Q.E.D,
Let us now illustrate the use of Lemma 1. Consideration of (29)




T = —-^— tanh {
Z Z U
> . (121)
/qq ( s J
s
We also have that t, = t, (C,.) is given by
T, = cosh z. (122)
Now C is reached from P when T(C ) £ t (C ) , since in both
cases we use <j>*(t) = for the final portion of the battle. Applying
Lemma 1, we readily find that
a-^y2 £ Rs (1-1/z 2 ). (123)















For a discussion of the structure of the optimal allocation
policies, the reader is directed to Section 6 of Appendix A. Here we
will try to put into perspective what we have learned from this, our
latest, examination of the Isbell-Marlow problem.
First of all, we have concluded that the theory of SVIC is
absolutely essential for solving such problems. Many of the results
in the pioneering 1956 work of Isbell and Marlow [6] (see also [7])
are unsupported by such analysis (which uses theory developed since
1956). When more than two target types are considered (i.e. n versus
one combat) , the theory of SVIC must be used to determine the order
in which it is optimal to annihilate target types. This was not
essential for the simplest case of n = 2.
Secondly, the algebraic method (see Section 4 of Appendix A)
that we have developed for the synthesis of optimal policies appears
to us as the only way to treat such problems. It should suffice for
us to point out that Isbell and Marlow [6] (see also [7]) failed to
discover the dispersal surfaces in the fire programming problem's
solution when they used their geometric approach. Additionally, we
do not feel that this geometric approach can be readily extended to
problems with n target types (n > 2) , whereas our algebraic approach
apparently can.
Our re-examination of the Isbell-Marlow problem has been
particularly fruitful, since it revealed the dominated payoff for
<: 5 < R - /R(R-l) , i.e. P° € D(C ) fl D(C ) implies that P 5 > P 5<
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We had previously observed such a phenomenon in the supporting weapon
system game of H. K. Weiss [11] (see [10] and also Appendix B of [8]).
At that time, we could not relate such a dominated payoff in a differ-
ential game to any corresponding phenomenon in the simpler one-sided
(optimal control) case. (It should be noted that Weiss did not use
the subsequently well-known "in the small" necessary conditions of
optimality from generalized control theory [4] (i.e. optimal control/
differential game theory) to develop his solution in [11] (it was
erroneously reported that he did by S. Sternberg in [7]).)
Finally, we would like to point out that our work here lays a
firm foundation for considering two-sided problems. We propose this
to ONR as a future research task. It should be noted that Sternberg's
work [7] does not cite any of the essential theory of SVIC. In
Appendix E we have pointed out that lack of consideration of the theory
of SVIC is a gap in the current theory of differential games (particu-
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Appendix G. The Prescribed Duration Battle.
1. Introduction .
One of the objectives of this research sponsored by ONR is to
investigate the sensitivity of the optimal target selection policy to
the form of the combat attrition model. Of particular interest is
whether for the simplest target selection problem the structure of the
optimal policy is sensitive to whether combat attrition is modelled
as a deterministic or a stochastic process. In Appendix I we consider
the optimal control of the Lanchester stochastic process for a pre-
scribed duration battle between a homogeneous Y-force and a heteroge-
neous enemy, X and X . In order to compare the structures of the
optimal target selection policy for deterministic and stochastic attri-
tion processes, it is, of course, necessary to develop a solution to
the deterministic problem. We do that in this appendix.
We have previously considered (several versions of) the pre-
scribed duration battle [3], [4] (reproduced in this report as
Appendices B and C) . Our subsequent examination here has led to a
revision of one of our earlier tentative conclusions about the
structure of the optimal target selection policy: we now conclude
that when target types undergo a "square-law" attrition process
(as we consider here) the optimal allocation may depend (indirectly)
upon the force levels. We have reached this conclusion after a
careful study of the problem at hand.
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Also of interest as regards the sensitivity of the struc-
ture of the optimal policy is whether the nature of the scenario
(i.e. planning horizon) affects the structure. In [3] we compare
the optimal target selection policy for the prescribed duration
battle with that for a terminal control battle (a battle which
only ends when force levels have reached some specified terminal
state). After our re-examination here, we again will do this.
In view of the extensive details on basic necessary condi-
tions of optimality and synthesis of the optimal policy for simi-
lar problems available elsewhere in this report (see, in particular,
Appendices A, E, and F) , we will take the liberty of outlining some
results here. As it is, our documentation of the problem's solution
is fairly lengthy. We may possibly present complete details in a
future report.
Finally, we note that a key aspect in our obtaining these
new results has been our use of the theory of state variable in-
equality constraints (SVIC) . The reader can find a fairly extensive
discussion of this theory and its application to target selection
problems in the Lanchester theory of combat in Appendix E.
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2. The Optimal Contro l Problem.
We consider the problem
maximize {ry(T) - px^T) - qx
2







-(l-<j>)a y,dt v T/ 2
^ =
-Vr b 2x2' (1)
x
1
,x2> y ^ 0, Os^l, and T £ T ,
where all symbols are defined in the next section.
The battle lasts for ^ t £ T unless, of course, one
side or the other is annihilated before T.. . To be more precise,
the battle terminates under one of the following three conditions:
(1) X;L (T) = x2
(T) = and T <; T
] _
,
(2) y(T) = and T £ T
±
,
(3) T = T1>
where T denotes the time at which the battle ends. Upon further
analysis, it has been convenient to consider that there are eight
"terminal states," or "target sets." These are shown in Table I.
The reader should note that for S, through S
R
the battle ends
when the force levels reach given terminal conditions. For these
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: Xl (T) > 0, x2
(T) > 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
S
2
: X;L (T) = x1
(t
1
) = 0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
±









) > 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0, T « T
±
where t < T
S
4
: X;L (T) > 0, x2




: Xl (T) = x1
(t
1
) = 0, X2 (T) > 0, y(T) =0, T £ T
±
where t < T
S
6
: Xl (T) = X;L (t 2 )
> 0, X2 (T) = 0, y(T) =0, T £ T
±
where t < T
S
?
: X]L (T) = x1
(t
1
) = 0, X2 (T) = 0, y(T) > 0, T <; T
±
where t < T
S
8
: Xl (T) = 0, x2
(T) = X2 (t
4
) = 0, y(T) > T
±
where t < T
4
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terminal states, T is undetermined, since it is determined by entry
to the terminal state, and this depends upon the control used. For
these cases, the well-known transversality condition must hold.
3. Notation .
The symbols which are used in this appendix are defined as
follows:
A = A(R,z) = [z 2 (R-l) - R]/(z-l) 2
,
B = B(R,z) = A(z-l) 2 /z2 = [z2 (R-l) - R]/z2 ,
a ,a_,b ,b = constant attrition-rate coefficients,
D(S.) = domain of controllability for S^
p,q,r = utilities assigned to surviving 3L, X2 and
Y
forces respectively,




















S for i = 1,..
.
,8 = the i— part of the terminal
i
surface as defined in Table I,
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s = s(x°,x°) = b
x
x° + b x°,
t = time at which X is annihilated, i.e. x-(t-) = °>
t
?







an extremal leading to S ,
,
D
t = last time at which fire is directed at X. for an
extremal leading to S„,
t, = time at which X is annihilated (before X ), i.e.
x (t.) = 0, for an extremal leading to S Q ,
2. 4 o
T = time at which battle ends,
T = Maximum possible duration for bat Lie, i.e. T ^ T
,
T = lower bound on T (developed from condition x~ (T) = 0)
for an extremal leading to S„,
v = v(t) = a
2 p 2 (





,x„,y = average force strengths; with initial values x°,x°,y ,
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= fraction of Y-f ire directed at X
,
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x = "backwards time" from the end of the battle defined by
t = T-t, i.e. the time remaining before the end of the
battle,
t.CS.) = "backwards time" of the first switch in tactics for
extremals leading to S.,
Additionally, remarks similar to those for t
1








4. Outline of Solution Procedure .
Before giving our solution algoritm which is based upon
Pontryagin's maximum principle* [2], it seems appropriate to define
some terms. We have then
Definition 1: By an extremal path we mean a path
on which the necessary conditions of
optimality are everywhere satisfied
(we use the word everywhere , since we
assume that the class of admissible
control functions is the class of
piecewise-continuous functions).
Definition 2: By extremal control we mean the con-
trol used in order that the system
follow an extremal path.
Definition 3: By the domain of controllability of a
given terminal state we mean that sub-
set of the initial state space from
which extremals lead to the terminal
state.
We use the form commonly used in this country. There is a sign
difference between developments in the United States and those in the
Soviet Union (see p. 108 of [1]).
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Definition 4: By the synthesis of the optimal
control , we mean the explicit deter-
mination of the time history of the
optimal control from initial to ter-
minal time (possibly as a function of
initial conditions)
.
Our solution algorithm then is as follows:
(a) extremal control is determined by maximizing the Hamiltonian;
since the state variables (force strengths) are non-negative,
the control depends, in many cases, only on relationships
between the dual variables (marginal return from destroying
targets)
,
(b) from each separate terminal state, the time history of the
dual variables is obtained by a backward integration of the
adjoint system of differential equations combined with the
extremal control; for a square law attrition process, the
adjoint equations are independent of the state variables;
the corner conditions must be considered in this step,
(c) for each terminal state the domain of controllability is
determined by forward integration of the state equations
using the time history of extremal control developed in
(b) ; changes in control with time (existence of transition
surface) may have to be considered in this step.
(d) the solution is determined at this point for regions of
the initial state space which are covered by part of the
domain of controllability for only one terminal state;
one must also verify that the entire initial state space
has been accounted for, since otherwise one may have over-
looked some type of "singular" surface or even a terminal
state,
(e) if domains of controllability overlap so that for a point
of £he initial state space contained in their intersection
there is more than one extremal leading to the terminal
surface, then one computes the payoff associated with each
extremal; the optimal trajectory is selected from the ex-
tremals by comparing these values.
The above solution algorithm is essentially the same as that
presented in Section 4 of Appendix A. Let us make a few remarks
about the application of this procedure to the prescribed duration
battle. In this case, we may think of time as being an additional
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state variable. On the other hand, in the Isbell-Marlow terminal
control problem, time may be considered to be a parameter and con-
sequently was eliminated from the determinations in step (c) above.
In other words, in the Isbell-Marlow problem a domain of controlla-
bility was determined by inequalities involving the three state
variables; in the prescribed duration battle such a determination
as in step (c) above involves the four variables T, x , x , and y~ .
For the prescribed duration battle we have not obtained (relatively)
simple analytic expressions in step (c) of the above procedure.
Consequently, we could not use analytic methods to accomplish steps
(d) and (e). In other words, we have not been able to analytically
determine when the domains of controllability corresponding to dif-
ferent terminal states "overlap." Hence, in many cases we have ana-
lytically only been able to determine in extremal control.
However, we can use computational methods to determine the
optimal control. We have expressed our "solution" to this problem
(presented in the next section) so that we can readily to the follow-
ing: given a point P° = (x , x , yQ )
in the initial state space
and T we can determine which terminal states are reached by ex-
1 f
tremals. In other words, we can determine to which terminal states
are reached by extremals. In other words, we can determine to
which domains of controllability P° belongs. Then, using the
extremal control, we can compute numerically the payoff associated
with each extremal and select the optimal policy from a finite
number of possibilities. A M.S. thesis student (Robert L. Powers,
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Lt., USN) is developing a digital computer program to use the
"solution" of Tables II and III to determine the optimal target
selection policy. Using this computer program, we plan to examine
how much difference there is between payoffs from using optimal
and non-optimal policies.
5 . Summary of Solution.
We have applied our solution procedure of Section 4 to
develop a "solution" in the sense discussed there. Without loss of




b i.e. R > 1. Then,
there are two cases to be considered
(1) ;> 1,
and (2) <; 6 < 1,
where 5 = a p/(a
2 q).
For Case (1): 6 2: 1> the solution is shown in Tables II.
In these tables, the domain of controllability and optimal policy
is given for each terminal state. Since the domains of controlla-
bility don't overlap, the extremals are unique. Since it may be
shown that a solution exists for this optimization problem, the
unique extremal control is consequently the optimal control. More-
over, the optimal policy may be expressed in a particularly simple
form: always concentrate all fire on X
1
while x > 0. We have
presented complete details on the domain of controllability for each
terminal state and given all "event" time for two reasons: (1) to be
G-ll
Table II. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for 6^1.
Nonrestrictive assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (1): 6^1 where 6 = a-p/(a q)1 2
S
1
: X;L (T) > 0, x2
(T) > 0, y(T) > 0, T = 1
Optimal Control: <J)*(t) = 1 for £ t £ T







"^ + (V°2 ) 2 " V°2
/*?! ( J*K yo ' s




















1 \ "2 2 \ 1T0
J*K \ S " S*^ y
Subcase B. a b y 2 < s 2 - /b»x ) 2
T < tanh
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Table II. Solution to Prescribed












(T) > 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
±
where t < T
Optimal Control: <J>* (t) =
1 for <£ t £ t where x (t ) =
for t < t <; T
2 °Always must have a by > s 2 - (b„x )2
Case 1. a b yQ
2




t, <; T„ < t, + tanh
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Table II. Solution to Prescribed
5_ : (concluded)
Duration Battle for 6 ;> 1.
(cont.) - 2
(3) for a^y 2 - s 2
1 ( s









: Xl (T) - Xl (t 3 )
> 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
±
where t_ < T





(T) > 0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) - 0, T as ^
ptimal Control: <)>*(t) = 1 for <. t <. T














Table II. Solution to Prescribed




: X;L (T) - J^O^) = 0, x2 (T) > 0, y(T) = 0, T £ T
where t < T
Optimal Control: <}>*(t) =
1 for s£ t £ t- where x (t ) =
for t < t £ T





















where t is given by
(1) for a^y 2 > s 2
t, = in \—
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Table II. Solution to Prescribed










) > 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) = 0, T"* T
where t„ < T
NO EXTREMALS LEAD TO THIS END STATE
S
?
: X;L (T) = x 1
(t
1
) = 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0, T £ T
where t < T
( 1 for £ t £ t- where x (t ) =
Optimal Control: <J>*(t) =
( for "1
Domain of Controllability: a b y 2 > s 2 + (R-l)(b x°)2
b2*2
*"




ViV - ' + M) 2 ) 1
where t.. is given by




^A ^?1 yo " s
S
g





) = 0, y(T) > 0, T £ T
±
where t, < T
4
NO EXTREMALS LEAD TO THIS END STATE
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able to make numerical comparisons with the stochastic control prob-
lem considered in Appendix I, and (2) to be able to perform a sensi-
tivity analysis on target selection policies.
For Case (2): 0^5 < 1, the solution is shown in Tables III.
It is expressed in the same format as for Case (1) with the exception
that the controls are extremal (with two exceptions noted below)
.
It should be recalled that for the Isbell-Marlow terminal con-
trol problem (see Appendix F) when ^ 6 < R -VR(R-l) some domains
of controllability overlapped. Hence, extremals were not unique and
considerations "in the large" had to be used to determine the optimal
policy. We suspect that similar behavior happens in the prescribed
duration battle, since we may consider the Isbell-Marlow problem to
be imbedded in the prescribed duration battle (i.e. when T < T
,
the solution to the Isbell-Marlow problem is applicable). Moreover,
lack of explicit analytic expressions for two domains of controlla-
bility (that for S when there is a switch in tactics and S„)
has prevented explicit determination as to which overlap. Further-
more, the computation of the payoff associated with each (overlap-
ping) extremal has not been analytically tractable. Hence, (except
for two instances) extremal controls and (either implicit or ex-
plicit) expressions for the corresponding domains of controllabil-
ity are given in Tables III. However, as discussed in Section 4
above, one can use the information presented in Tables III to
numerically determine an optimal target selection policy for any
specific set of input values.
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for 0^6 < 1,
Nonrestrictive assumption: R > 1, i.e. a b > a b
Case (2): <i 6 < 1 where 6 = a p/(a q)
S
±
: Xl (T) > 0, x2 (T)
> 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
±








where z = — ;— and a = —
„
R - 1 q \ a,
Case 1. t 2: T
Extremal Control: <f>* (t) = for <; t <; T
Subcase A. a b ,y
n





Subcase B. a^.y. 2 ^ R



















Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for £ <$ < 1.
(cont.)-l
S. : (continued)

























Case 2. t < T
Extremal Control: <f>*(t) =
1 for <. t £ T -t.
for T - x < t £ T
Require that bjX (T - T.) > 0, b x (T) > 0, y(T) > 0.
where
b-jX (T-t) = s cosh/a-jb-LCT—r,) - /a-jb., yQ sinh/a^. (T-t ) - ^> 2X2
b x (T) ={s cosh/a b (T-t ) - /a b yQ sinh/a b (T-t ) } (cosh/a^ T^-l)
-/a b {y cosh/a b (T-t,) sinh/a b (T-T^lsinh/a^ Tj + ^ 2 X2'
^57
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
S.. : (concluded)
Duration Battle for 0^6 < 1.
(cont.)~2
y(T) = {yQ cosh a1b1 (T-T1 ) -
—
- sinh ^X"(T-t^} cosh v£7b7 r
^A
-| s cosh /a^bY (T-T
x
) - v^b^ yQ sinh /^(T-tA 5








Extremal Control: <t>*(t) =
0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) > 0, T = T
where t < T
1 for £ t £ t. where x-(t-) =
for t < t £ T
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Case 2. a^y^ < s 2 + (R-l)(b
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1














R-l ' a " q/
Duration Battle for <; <$ < 1,
(cont.)-3
and where t.. = t (S ) is given by
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: X;L (T) = X;L (t 3
) > 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) > 0, T = ^
1 for <; t <; t,
Extremal Control: <j>* (t) =
where t < T
where explicit expression
for t„ is given below.
for t < t <; T
Always must have a by 2 ^ R {s 2 - (b x ) 2 }
t„ ^ T - T- (see below)









Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for <; 5 < 1
(cont. )-4
S_: (continued)
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(2) for a b y 2 < s 2
W^ £n
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for £ 6 < 1.
(cont.)-5
S_: (continued)




























In both the above Cases 1. and 2. we have T given by
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
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- ^YQ sinhjv^ (Tl - t 3 ) + ^t 3 j]
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+ /^ yQ sinh j^ (Ti - *3 > - ^A ^j]
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- s /a b sinh /a b t + a b y
fl
cosh /a b t»<
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for < 6 < 1.
(cont.) - 7
S : (concluded)
There are two cases to consider for starting value for Newton-Raphson
method, t :














where t_(S,) and T(S-) are given above.lb b
Case b. a by 2 ^ s 2 + (R _ 1)^^)2
<o)
"W " { I(V - Ti}>C3
where t (S
7 )
and T(S_) and given above.
NOTE: No extremal leads to S if:
(1) there is no root to the equation F(t-) = 0,
or
(2) we do not have £ t_ £ T ,
or













Table III. Solution to Prescribed




: Xl (T) > 0, x2 (T)
> 0, y(T) - 0, T * T
Since y(T) = 0, the switching time T, = x (S, ) is given by
T
l
=W = ~/a_b_ vaTbcosh"1 (|=£-)- -i- In (z + ^P-rr),





Case 1. t ^ T
Extremal Control: 4>*(t) = for £ t £ T,
Domain of Controllability: a.b y 2 £ Rs 2 <l - l/z 2 l,
albly






2 < s2 + (K-DCV^ 2 '
i -i iSSM TT = ———- tanh \ >£ T. .
^bj I s ) 1
Note: for
€. 6 < R - /R(R - 1) optimal pathes also
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RS " M Vl 2R + b 2X2
]
where k is given by k = -jz 2 - R(z-1) 2 > /(2R)
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for <; 5 < 1.
(cont.) - 9
S, : (continued)
Case 2. x < T
Subcase A. R-/R(R-1) 1
Optimal Control: <J>*(t) =
1 for £ t ^ T-t, where t, = x n (S.)1 114
t
for T-t < t ^ T
is given above





















> Rs2 f 1 - i/z 2 !









(z + /R(z z -1)).
<. T.
Subcase B. 5 = R - /R(R-l)
Optimal Control: § *(t) =
1 for <. t £ t < t tl (s2 )
for t < t «£ T
where t
n
= t- (S_) =







and tc is any value such that S t, < t.,
Domain of Controllability: a b- y 2 = s 2
V2>vf(^" 1 )
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
Duration Battle for 0^5 < 1.
(cont.)- 10
S. : (concluded)
Note; In this case the optimal control is not unique. Consequently














: X]L (T) = x1
(t
1
) = 0, x
2
(T) > 0, y(T) = 0, T £ T
±
!1
for £ t £ t where x (t ) =
for t < t ^ T

















2 ( b 2
x° /r
where t = t (S ) = t (S.) is given by
(1) for a^yQ 2 > s 2
t, = ——— £n




l ( 1^-1 yo "
s
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed













= T1111 ) / (












NOTE: for £ 6 < R - ^(R-l) optimal paths also
satisfy (equality yielding the dispersal surface )
for ^ x_ <; kb^x /b
2





-^ )Vl 2R + b 2X2 | '
where k is given by k = { z 2 - R(z-l) 2 ( / (2R)
.
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed




: Xl (T) = x1
(t
2
) > 0, x
2
(T) = 0, y(T) =0, T <; T
where t~ < T
1 for as t as t.
Extremal Control: <t>*(t) - {
for t« < t 35 T
where t~ = t (S
fi
) is the smallest t such that
alV2(t 2» " R {(Vl<*2> + b2X2 ) 2 - (Vl (t2>)2 }
An explicit expression is given for t_ below.
Domain of Controllability: a. by. 2 £, s 2 + A(b„x
? )
2
a^ a R { s 2 - (blx°)2}
aiVo 2 * s2 + ^^'(Vp 2
i .-i (
RV2 +t/s2 + R(R-i)(yp z - w7~ | _
" cosh \ — > ^ T




(S,) is given below and y(t_) used in the computation








\/ a J(2R-l)bx° + 2/s* + R(R-l)(b x")^ - a^Q 22
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
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2
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(2) for a^^Q2 < s 2
,
/y z (t 2 )
- yQ
z + s^/Ca^) - y(t
2
)
to = "TZH ^n2
ZaTbT11





^ ^ y(t 2 )f
NOTE 1: We also have that b x°(R-l) <. b x°
NOTE 2: for «£ 6 < R - /R(R-l) optimal paths also satisfy
(there is a dispersal surface (whose equation hasn't been




where k is given by k = \z 2 - R(z-l) 2 }/ (2R)
.
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Table III. Solution to Prescribed
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for t < t <; T
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) = 0, y(T) > 0, T <; Tj
where t < T
4
NO EXTREMALS LEAD TO THIS END STATE
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S
For S, (which corresponds to C and C of the Isbell-
Marlow problem) the optimal control can be determined explicitly
when when there is a switch in tactics for R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1.
This is because the solution for S, is essentially the same as for
the corresponding part of the Isbell-Marlow problem. For the latter
problem (see Appendix F) we know that optimal paths lead to C,.
only for R - /R(R-l) < 6 < 1.
In Case (2) the optimal policy cannot be expressed in the
very simple form as in the first case. When Y wins in time less
than T (S for which the optimal policy is determined) the solu-
tion is precisely the same as when 5^1. However, for all other
cases (i.e. terminal states S.. through S.) the extremal policy is
I b
to finish the prescribed duration battle by firing at X , regard-
less of whether or not X has been annihilated. This differs
from that when 6 ^1. Thus, we see that the initial force levels
may (indirectly) affect the optimal target selection policy.
Finally, in considering Tables III the following may be use-
ful:
(a) for £ 6 < R -/R(R-l)
,
we have A > B > 0, (2)
(b) for 6 = R -/R(R-l),
we have A = B = 0, (3)
(c) for R - /R(R-l) < 5 < 1,
we have A < B < 0. (4)
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The quantities A and B appear in inequalities defining various
domains of controllability and are defined by (see also Section 3)
R(z 2 - 1) - z 2
A = A(R,z) = •
(z - D 2 (5)
and
R(z 2 - 1) - z 2
B = B(R,z) = *
z2 (6)
6. Development of Solution .
We will now discuss the application of our solution proce-
dure which we outlined in Section 4. Because many of the devel-
opments parallel those already given in detail for the Isbell-
Marlow problem (see Appendices A and F) , we will omit (or outline)
them. Possibly we may provide more details in the future. Several
novel (and new) aspects, however, are examined in detail below.
In applying our solution algorithm one must first consider
the basic necessary conditions of optimality. However, since we
have done this in detail in Section 4.b.(l) of Appendix E (only
the boundry conditions of the dual variables differ between the
prescribed duration battle and the terminal control case), we will
only summarize the main results here with the interested reader be-
ing directed to Appendix E for details.
We showed that in order for it to be optimal to have x. (t) =










At entry (when t = t ) to a constrained subarc on which x = 0,
we have (from the corner conditions)
Pi Ctr>
=
^ p 2 cv). (8)
p. (t,-) - P.(t.,+) for i = 2,3, (9)
where t - denotes a left-hand limit.
Additionally, we showed that when x > and x > the
extremal control (determined by the maximum principle) is given by
<J)*(t) =
(1 for v(t) > 0,




(t)) -a_(-p (t)) - a,p„(t) -a.p^t). (11)l v ^ '2 V r 2 2 r 2 'lr l
Furthermore, v(t) 4 almost everywhere. Differentiation of (11)












Since it is readily shown that p~(t) > for t < T, we have that
dv
-j- < for all t < T,
at
(13)
where our nonrestrictive assumption a b.. > a b_ should be re-
called.
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Considering the above, the time history of the extremal
control is readily developed for each terminal state once the





and S the length of the battle is equal to T , and the
boundry conditions of the dual variables are shown in Table IV.
It is to be noted that
for S , S , and S~
p3
(t = T) = r > (14)
For S. , S_, and S. the length of the battle is determined by the
4 5 o
time to annihilate Y so that y(t = T) = is an equality con-
straint on a state variable at an unspecified terminal time. The
boundry conditions of the dual variables are shown in Table V. It





(t = T) = 0. (15)
Moreover, for S„ , and S, we have that
J b




The synthesis of extremal control and determination of the
domains of controllability are similar to developments in Appen-
dices A and F. Consequently they are omitted here. There are
two interesting aspects that we encountered in doing this work
Table IV. Boundry Conditions of Dual Variables
for Terminal States S.. , S , and S_.
For S1> S2> and S :
p
x













= for x. (T) > 0,
v
2
;> for x (T) = 0,
P3
(t = T) = r.
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Table V. Boundry Conditions of Dual Variables
for Terminal States S,, S , and S,,
For S
.












^ for x, (T) = 0,
'1
p2









^ for x,(T) = 0,
p (t = T) =v~, where v 3
is unrestricted
However, the transversality condition
H(t = T, x± , p±, <j>*(t = T))=
yields that
P 3
(t = T) = 0.
(most of the details of which we have omitted) . These are
(a) when a switch in the target type upon which all Y-fire is
concentrated occurs without the annihilation of a target
type, the switching time depends upon the initial force
levels and possibly the valuation of Y survivors.
(b) when P = (x
,
x_
, y ) is such that when 5 < 1 an extremal
g
leads to S. (i.e. we reach S. with a switch in tactics)
4 4
with T(S, ) < T , we can also possibly steer the system to
an end point with y(T = T ) = without violating any
necessary conditions of optimality.
7. Dependence of Switching Time on Force Levels and Valuation of
Y Survivors .
We consider the case when 5 < 1. Then we saw for the Isbell-
Marlow problem (see Appendices A and F) that an extremal policy might
be to shift the concentration of all Y-fire from X to X before
the annihilation of X .
Now, there are two subcases for entry to S,. We consider
the extremals for which
!1
for ^ t £ T - x
for T - t- < t S T. (17)
Then, let us say that an extremal leads to S. when we use the
extremal control (17) and reach the terminal state x (T) > 0,
x (T) > 0, y (T) = 0, T £ T . We denote the domain of controll-
ability for S, when (17) is used by D(S ) and the corresponding
payoff by P.. It is convenient to introduce the "backwards time"
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t defined by t = T-t. Then according to previous arguments (see
Appendix A where ^(S^ is the same as x (C )) , we have
T
1














(t=T) = r (20)
Also, recalling (11), we have
v(t=0) = alP-a2 q, (21)
so that v(t=0) < when 6 = a p/(a q) < 1. Recalling (13), which
may be written as — > 0, we see that as t increases v(x)dx
must change in sign from negative to positive. Let us denote
this backwards time by t . Then by (11) , we see that
<J>*( T ) = for ^ x ^ t.. . We may use this extremal control
to integrate the adjoint equations backwards in time. We may
use the results to obtain




















The "backwards time" of the first switch in tactics, denoted by











We next prove a useful lemma,









A. We readily compute from (23)
3x
1 a + 1 - z 2-z /z 2+a 2-l
3a ' /^b~ (l+a)»/z 2 -h> 2 -l ( Z+ /z^a^-T )
(26)
B. Now 5 > 1 implies that z > 1, so that
a < za < z/z 2-fa z -l ,
whence a + 1 - z 2 - z /z 2+a 2 -l < 0,
which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
Now by Lemma 1 we readily see that




sxnce la = i-v Z-
2
- o . Furthermore, it is easily shown that






) = 0. < 28 )
r-++°°
Thus for S , if we value the survival of our own forces high
enough, we never fire at X,, when x^t) > even though
a p < a q. (To be precise, when 5 < 1, we can make the time
interval [T - t
,
T] during which we concentrate all fire on
X~ arbitrarily small be taking r large enough.)
Let us now show that when the optimal policy is to change
the allocation of fire (all concentrated on one target type) with-
out a target-type force level being driven to zero, we fire at X
longer when y(T) = than when y(T) > (assuming that R > 1
and 6 < 1). This is the significance of the theorem that we now
state and prove as Theorem 1.









A. Let us observe that both (18) and (23) may be con-
















(b) for y(T) = and T < T (i.e. for S ),
v = -r
B. Clearly, we have by (23) and (29)
^1 m *i 3a
3v 3a 3v (31)
C. Observing that -r-^ = r-^ f^ and f*- = —\/—3v 3a 3v 3v q V a
> 0, the theorem readily follows by (31) and Lemma 1, since
- r = v(S^) < v (S ) = 0. Q.E.D.
Thus, we see that y(T) affects the length of time that
Y fires at X when there is a change in the optimal tactic
(concentration of all fire) before annihilation of X . Intuitive-
ly, we see that firing longer at X prolongs the length of battle
for those cases when y(T) = 0, since a -,b, > a ob
?
. We will prove
this precisely in the next section and show that this is not an opti-
mal tactic.
8. The Case When T = T., for S,
1 4.
In the previous section we conjectured that when R > 1 and
5 < 1 , we could prolong the length of battle leading to S, by
firing longer at X- . Let us consider the following. Assume that
we have P° = (x°, x°, y
fi
) given and 6 < 1. Further assuming that
P° is such that an extremal leads to S with T(S^) < T^ we re-
call that p~(t=T) =0. We will show that by adjusting the value
of p (t=T) = y > 0, we can steer the system to y(T) = and
T = T (i.e. we can prolong the length of battle by the valuation
placed on our forces). Finally, we will show that this can never
be an optimal policy in order to drop this special case from
further consideration (as we have done in Tables III)
.
We again consider the extremal control (17) which leads
to S, : x (T) > 0, x (T) > 0, y(T) = 0, T <; T . In the special
case when T = T- , the transversality condition no longer holds
so that p (t=T) = v where v is unrestricted. Let us write
v^ = r + v so that














cosh /I^iT-x^ — sinh /a^ (T-^) , (34)
b^a-T^ + b
2




(T-^) - A^ YQ sinh /a^CT-i^) , (35)
and
,
(b.x (T-r ) + b x°)
y(T) = y(T-T ) cosh •albT t — M- sinh /ajb^ t^. (36)
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(34), (35), and (36) are readily combined to yield















) sinh /a^bj x
±
. (37)
Now T is defined by
y(T) = 0. (38)
Combining (36) and (38) with (37), we obtain
3v(T) . . l (blX
(T-t ) + b x°) 2 I
*gp . R^ y(T-Tl ) sinh^ ,tf- l^yi (I,Ty [. (39)
Let us recall the "generalized square law"




















where s(t) = b x (t) +bx
2
(t). Now (17) and (40) yield
s
2















Thus, (39) and (41) yield the following lemma
LEMMA 2: Consider y(T) given by (36) and T




< if and only if
3T
aiVo 2 K s2 '
It is convenient to obtain the following from a backwards


























- w^a^-a^) * (43)
and further analysis yields
Vs 2 - a b y 2












2 + (1-")V r-w2 (R-1) ' (45)
where
w = w(a) = cosh N/a 2b t (a) .
Now, we may use (43) to solve (34) for T - t to obtain
(46)
T - t =
1 2/1^
in











Combining (32) and (46), we obtain
z - a /z 2 + a 2 -T -









- 1 - z for a > 1. (48)
a'
Differentiation of (48) yields




— f or ^ a < 1




< for <; a < 1 and a > 1. (50)
Considering (47), it is easily seen that for P € D(S.) with
T = T and a b.y 2 < s 2 , we must have
1 s; w <WR - 1 . (51)




















3a 3v 3a 3v ,
or using (33)
3v q V a2 3a
(54)
where we recall Lemma 1 (see (25)).
Now, partial differentiation of (36) and use of (34) and
(35) (including partial differentiation of (34) and (35) with






y (T-x 1 ) sinh v^bj t^
so that
^ < for R > 1.9T
1
We now state
THEOREM 2: Assume that R > 1, 5 < 1,







PROOF: Immediate by (51), (53), (54), (56), and Lemma 2. Q.E.D
Thus, we see that by increasing the implicit valuation of Y-
forces (i.e. v) the length of battle can be extended until T = T, ,
To sum up for S , : x (T) > 0, x„(T) > 0, y(T) = 0, T ^ T , in the
special case when T = T we have so far found no violation of
any necessary condition of optimality in having -r £ v. Then
there is a region in the initial state (force level) space from
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which extremals lead to this special end condition, and in this
region extremals also lead to S, with T < T (i.e. recall that
for such P° T < T
x
when we take p (t-T)=0).
We now show, however, that although the length of battle
can be extended so that y(T=T )= 0, this results in a reduced
payoff. Recalling that we denote the payoff associated with the









-Z (ir) b2X2 -{ R ;Vr-w^(R-1) ( ' (57)
Differentiation of (57) and use of (33) readily yields




3V ^ 9a (R-w2(R-l)) 3/2
Considering (48) and (50) , we have
w(a=0) = z and ~ < for £ a < 1 and a > 1. (59)
Hence,
w(a) < z for < a . (60)
Thus, (50), (58), and (60) yield
THEOREM 3: Assume that R > 1, 5 < 1,





There are two topics that especially merit discussion:
(1) the structure of the optimal target selection policy and (2)
the development of solutions to such problems. We also suggest
a future research task.
From our work reported here in Appendix G on the prescribed
duration battle, we conclude that the structure of the optimal
target selection policy may depend (indirectly) on (initial) force
levels. This revises a tentative conclusion stated in our earlier
work [3] (see also Appendix B) . To elaborate further, if no target
type is annihilated, then there is no explicit dependence of the
optimal target selection policy on force levels. However, the non-
annihilation of all target types itself depends upon the initial
force levels. Furthermore, we saw that for 6 = a p/(a q) < 1
the optimal length of time that Y fires at X depends on
whether or not y(T) = 0. Moreover, for 5^1. not only does the
optimal target selection policy take an extremely simple form
(concentrate all fire on X while x > 0) but it also is inde-
pendent of the force levels. When 5 < 1, the solution was ex-
tremely complex except for the case when Y annihilates both
X and X in which case the same simple optimal policy as when
6^1 applies.
It seems appropriate to compare the structure of the optimal
target selection policy for the prescribed duration battle with
that for the terminal control (f ight-to-the-f inish) battle. We
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have seen that we may consider the fight to the finish to be im-
bedded in the prescribed duration battle. For such cases when
T < Eg, the solutions of the two problems are identical. Further-
more, when 6^1 the structures of the optimal policies were
identical. We conjecture that this will always be true for
n-versus-one combat when surviving target types are valued in
direct proportion to their kill capabilities. However, if the
initial force levels are such that the specified maximum duration
for the battle (denoted by T ) terminates the battle, then the
structures were different when 6 < 1. Thus, we see that even the
nature of the scenario for a target selection problem may have an
effect upon the optimal policy.
In developing a (hopefully) complete solution for the pre-
scribed duration battle, we have encountered some novel and inter-
esting features that require further discussion. First of all,,
it does not seem possible to develop an entirely analytic solution
to such problems (see Tables III). Computational methods must be
combined with analytic results arising from theoretical optimal-
ity conditions in order to determine the optimal policy. It
should be noted that difficulties (multiple extremals from an
initial point P ) arise in the n-versus-one battle when target
types are not valued in direct proportion to their kill rates.
In the second place, the theory of state variable inequality
constraints (SVIC) must be used to solve such problems. We have
already pointed this out at several places elsewhere in this re-
port (see Appendixes E and F). Thirdly, in all the problems that
we have studied in the same depth as for the problem at hand, in
developing a complete solution we have invariably come across
some special cases that require an inordinate amount of analysis.
For this prescribed duration battle, one such case was for S.
4
when T = T . However, such special cases require treatment in
order that a complete solution be obtained.
Let us point out that for the simplest (deterministic)
optimal control problems of target selection that we have now
studied a tremendous amount of analysis has been required to
develop a complete solution. We do not believe that any other
type of model or formulation (for example, discrete-time formula-
tions solved by nonlinear programming or the formalism of dynamic
programming) would reduce any of the key difficulties which have
required the majority of the analysis. We have, for example, con-
sidered a discrete-time version of the Isbell-Marlow problem (see
Appendices A and F) and used nonlinear programming (Kuhn-Tucker
conditions) to develop the basic optimality conditions. Again,
for the finite-dimensional problem, there is no way to circumvent
the non-uniqueness of extremal paths leading to different terminal
states. Similar remarks apply when one uses the formalism of dy-
namic programming.
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One task remains to be done, and we propose this to ONR
as a future research task: examination of the sensitivity of the
payoff to the target selection policy. With our solutions to
such problems (i.e. both terminal control and prescribed duration)
available, it would seem desirable to examine whether or not a
simple (probably non-optimal) target selection policy might yield
nearly the same return as the true optimal policy. For example,
for the prescribed duration battle we have seen that the solution
is amazingly complex when 6 < 1. In fact, we can't explicitly
state the optimal policy in general but can only numerically com-
pute the optimal policy for a given set of input values. A simple
target selection policy which would yield close to the optimal
return would clearly be of great value in this case.
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Appendix H. On the Solution to Lanchester-Type Equations of Modern
Warfare with Variable Coefficients.
1. Introduction .
This appendix develops solutions to extensions of F. W.
Lanchester's classical equations of modern warfare (frequently
referred to as aimed-fire equations) for combat between two homog-
eneous forces. In these extensions the lethality of the fire (as
expressed by the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) depends
upon time. When the dependence is arbitrary, the solution is an
infinite series of recursively related integrals; in special
cases, more convenient representations (including representation
in terms of tabulated functions) are available. Solutions are
obtained in the following cases: (1) lethality of each side's
fire proportional to a power of time and both lethalities initially
zero, and (2) lethality of each side's fire linear with time but
only one side's lethality initially zero. The latter case models
the constant speed approach between forces whose weapons have
different maximum effective ranges.
In a previous note published in the open literature [33] we
developed a solution to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type
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equations of modern warfare (various Lanchester-type equations of
warfare are reviewed and our terminology explained below) for combat
between two homogeneous forces in the special case of a constant
ratio of Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients. A sketch of some
previous work on variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations is
to be found there. In the present paper we develop solutions to
extensions of F. W. Lanchester' s classical equations of modern
warfare in which the lethality (or effectiveness) of fire (as
expressed by the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) may change
over time. Our results point out the complexities of analytically
treating such extensions of Lanchester' s classical work (see [24]).
Our present work considers only the purely formal, mathematical
aspects of the Lanchester theory of combat. We hope that others will
continue to address the equally important scientific questions as to
whether such hypotheses as considered here are tenable in the light
of empirical evidence (see, for example, [17], [18], [34], [35], [37]).
We must also note that S. Bonder's excellent work [4], [6] on the
Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient (see also [2], [22]) very
naturally leads to the requirement of having solutions to variable-
coefficient Lanchester-type equations available to analysts in force-
structuring and weapons system design studies. The results of this
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appendix are hopefully a step in that direction. Other recent papers
have discussed the estimation of parameters for the Lanchester attri-
tion-rate coefficient [30], [31].
Similar approaches towards variable-coefficient Lanchester-
type equations have been previously used by T. Oberbeck [28] and
F. Dashiell and W. Fain [9]. A summary of Oberbeck's work and other
early work on Lanchester-type equations is to be found in the summary
report by R. Snow [32]. Dashiell and Fain [9] base their work on a
theoretical paper by Whyburn [36], but do not cite Oberbeck's pioneering
work or any of the numerous excellent applied mathematical treatments
of systems of first order ordinary differential equations (see, for
example, pp. 53-55 of [15] or pp. 73-77 of [23]). Although Whyburn's
method of successive approximations is applicable to systems of
variable coefficient differential equations, Dashiell and Fain consider
only the constant coefficient case. This work is the mathematical basis
of later tactical simulation studies using matrix Lanchester-type
equations [7], [11].
In this appendix we first review various Lanchester-type equations
of warfare. Then we show a simpler derivation of our previous result
for a constant ratio of attrition-rate coefficients. This development
is later used for insight into cases when an infinite series may be
represented by tabulated functions. Next, we develop a general solu-
tion to variable-coefficient Lanchester-type equations of modern
warfare for combat between two homogeneous forces in the form of an
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infinite series of recursively related terms by considering an
equivalent integral equation. We then consider some special types
of attrition-rate coefficients for which this series reduces to tabu-
lated functions and an important case for which it does not. Several
numerical examples are given. Finally, we discuss the significance,
applications, and extensions of our results.
2. Some Lanchester-Type Equations of Warfare .
It seems appropriate to briefly review some Lanchester-type
equations that have appeared in the literature. In our discussion
here, we will consider equations with attrition-rate coefficients
that depend upon time, although in the original sources cited these
were assumed to be constant.
In 1914 in an article published in the British journal
Engineering (see [24]), F. W. Lanchester hypothesized that combat
between two opposing forces "under modern conditions" could be
modelled by (see [34] for a discussion of the assumptions inherent in






where x(t) and y(t) refer to the numbers of X- and Y-forces,
respectively. The functions a(t) and b(t) are usually termed
[2], [6], [22] the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients and represent
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the lethality of each side's fire. We shall refer to equations (1)
as Lanchester's equations of modern warfare . These equations are
appropriate when both sides use aimed fire and target acquisition
times are negligible [8], [34].
This paper concerns the solution of equations (1). However,
other differential equation combat models may be referred to as Lan-
chester-type equations. Although not explicitly given by Lanchester
[24], the following equations were hypothesized to describe hand-to-
hand combat (one against one) in "ancient warfare"
£=-b(t). (2)
Lanchester did give [24] the following equations for area fire (see
[34] for discussion of assumptions)
— = - a(t)xy,
^=-b(t)xy. (3)
Equations (3) are also appropriate for aimed fire when target acquisi-
tion time is much larger than the time to destroy an acquired target
and target acquisition time is inversely proportional to target density
[8]. More recently, S. Deitchman [10] used the following equations to
model ambush situations (in guerrilla warfare) in which the X-forces




The a's and b's (Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients)
may be, of course, different in equations (1) through (4) and related
to different physical quantities. Other factors such as replacements,
operational losses, effects of supporting fires, etc., may be accounted
for by appropriate modifications of the above equations, but we will
not consider these.
The above differential equation models of combat are determi-
nistic, always yielding the same result for given initial conditions.
However, such attrition equations are commonly assumed to represent
the mean course of battle (implying an underlying probability distri-
bution [32]). Other than remarking that this is why we will refer to
x(t) as the average X-force level (this is well-known to be only
an approximation [32]), we will not discuss stochastic aspects further.
3. Constant Ratio of Attrition-Rate Coefficients: Alternate
Development 1 .
We derive a previously obtained result [33] in such a manner
as to shed light on the circumstances under which our general result
of the next section reduces to tabulated functions. Let us consider
equations (1) . We have previously shown that it is inessential whether
we consider time or force separation (range) as the independent variable
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(see [33] for a transformation to change a solution with time as the
independent variable to one with range as the independent variable)
.
We may combine the two equations of (1) into the following
single equation for x(t)
d f 1 dx")
dtla(t) dt/ (t)x = 0, (5)
with initial conditions
x(t=0) = x and dx




Introducing a new independent variable u =
form equation (5) into






a(s)ds to exist in order forWe note that we require the integral
this transformation to be applicable. At this point, the form of
equation (6) makes our previous result obvious. It also is helpful in
obtaining solutions and approximations in other cases. Thus when















cosh 6(t) - yQ^~J\ sinh 9(t), (7)
ft
h(s)ds and a similar expression may be obtainedwhere 8(t) = A. k
for y(t).
There is, however, a much greater significance of equation (6).
What we really have is
j^+ I(u)x = 0, (8)
ft
where I(u) = -b(t)/a(t) and u = a(s)ds
.
Equation (8) is the "normal form" of equation (5) (after Felix Klein,
see p. 158 of [13]). There is an infinite series solution in terms
of repeated integrations (first developed by Lord Kelvin, see p. 120
of [14]) available for equation (8) (also see p. 351 of [29]). We
shall not pursue this approach further here, however.
The term I(u) is called the "invariant" of the normal form.
Richards (pp. 347-350 of [29]) has developed a table of various func-
tions, I(u) , for second-order linear differential equations written in
the normal form. He claims that over 180 of the first 220 second-order
linear equations listed by Kamke [21] can immediately be solved by use
of this table. Kamke 's [21] classic work contains among other things
a tabulation of solutions to second-order linear differential equations,
similar to a table of integrals. This means that if I(u) does not
take a form contained in Richards' tables, then it is extremely unlikely
that equation (8) has a solution expressible by any of the standard
functions of analysis and that some type of infinite series is the best
that we can hope for.
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4. Arbitrary Attrition-Rate Coefficients: Integral Equation
Approach .
In this section we derive a general solution to equations (1)
by means of an infinite series of terms with repeated integrations.
Our approach is, of course, formally equivalent to approaches mentioned
earlier (see pp. 53-56 of [15] or pp. 73-77 of [23]).
By repeated integrations, we may obtain the following Volterra






















Equation (9) is readily solved by Picard's method of successive approxi-











































The formal steps above are justified, for example, when a(t) and b(t)
are bounded for te[0,T], since f(t) is then majorized by cosh/AB t
where A = max a(t) , etc. Under these circumstances it is easy to
te[0,T]
show the convergence to this method of successive approximations (see
pp. 113-114 of p-2] or pp. 61-64 of [16]), and that f(t) is an
absolutely and uniformly convergent series for te[0,T}.
Equations (10) , (11) and (12) are a general solution to
the Lanchester-type equations (1). Being general, this solution is
complex but still is in a form amenable to computer-aided computation.
An infinite series solution, however, provides little insight into the
effect on battle outcome of attrition rate parameters, short of our
generating parametric curves by grinding out solutions for specific
parameter values. A computer may not always be available to aid in
the summing of the infinite series. Hence, it is desirable to know
when the series solution (10) may be expressed in terms of tabulated
functions. In the next two sections we examine two cases of when this
is possible. We omit verification that (10) reduces to the well-known
constant coefficient solution when a(t) and b(t) are constants,
since this has already been done by Dashiell and Fain (see pp. 94-95
of [9]), whose approach may be shown to be equivalent to that given
here.
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5. Constant Ratio of Attrition-Rate Coefficients; Alternate
Development 2 .
We show that (10) reduces to our previous result (7) when a(t) =
k h(t) and b(t) = lch(t). This present derivation plus our first
alternate are useful in providing insight into the circumstances under
which (1) possesses exponential solutions.
00
We develop the first term, f(t) = £ H (t) , in equation (10).
n=0
n
From our assumed conditions, we have that
H
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h(s)ds}, where we have made use of the
power series expansion for cosh x. A similar expression is readily
so that f(t) = cosh{/k~
k~"
obtained for g(t) , and thus (7) follows from (10) , (11) and (12) in
this special case. However, we now see that the simple "exponential"
solution (7) depends on H (t) being given by (13) . This apparently
will occur only when a(t)/b(t) = constant. Thus, this is the only
instance that we have encountered so far in which variable-coefficient
Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare have such a simple solution.
6. Another Example: Power Attrition-Rate Coefficients .
A case of probably greater practical interest is when the attrition-
rate coefficients in (1) take the following form







where we will refer to m and n as the exponents of the power
attrition-rate coefficients. We shall sketch the development of the
solution via the Volterra integral equation as given by (10) , (11) and
(12).
We focus on the development of f(t) in (10). Combining (12)











2 2 (n+1) (m+n+2)
'
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where we must place the following restrictions on m and n: m > -1







k ! (m+n+2 ) n { n+l+i (m+n+2 ) }
1=0
Equation (15) may be rearranged to yield
(15)




















s = (m+n+2) /2, p = (m+1)/ (m+n+2)
,
and I (x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and order
v







A similar result is to be obtained for g(t). Thus, we obtain the
following expression for the average strength of the X-forces
m+1

















Since few Bessel functions of fractional order are tabulated, we also
observe that this solution (18) is also equivalent to the following
power series







Similar expressions are obtainable for y(t). The same results can be
obtained by considering (8) and using Richards' table (see p. 349 of
[29]). In this particular instance, probably the easiest way to obtain
(18) and (19) is to observe the ordinary differential equations satis-
fied by Bessel functions (see pp. 166-167 in [19]).
When m = n, then s = m + 1 and p = 1/2 in (18). Observing
that
/~2




we can easily show that (18) reduces to (7) in this special case.
It is of interest to the operations research worker who desires
numerical solutions that Lebedev (see p. 112 of [25]) notes that J.
Liouville has shown that the case of half-integral order, i.e.,
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v n + 1/2 where n is an integer, is the only case where Bessel
functions reduce to "elementary functions." Hence, except for the case
m = n it is not possible to express x(t) as given by equation (18)
in terms of elementary functions.
7. Weapon Systems with Different Effective Ranges; Linear Attrition-
Rate Coefficients.
Consideration of the attrition-rate coefficients given by
equations (14) leads us to realize that they apply only to combat
between forces using weapons with the same effective range, i.e.,
attrition commencing for both sides at the same time. Consider the
example of a constant speed attack of a mobile force against a static
defense. Assuming that firing by either side commences when its enemy
is within the effective range of the weapon system, we see that (14)
has implicit within it the assumption that both forces achieve nonzero
attrition rates at the same range. Of interest is the case where
opposing weapon systems have different effective ranges. An example
of time dependent attrition-rate coefficients which correspond to the
lethality of each side's fire depending linearly upon range in such a
scenario is given by
a(t) = k t,
a
b(t) = k^t+A). (20)
The range dependence of these Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients
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We become aware of the great generality of the solution as given
by (10) , (11) and (12) when the attrition-rate coefficients in equations
(1) are given by (20) . In this case, we have not been able to develop
a solution in terms of tabulated functions via Richards' tables [29]
after (1) has been converted to the normal form (8). However, the
following solution is readily established inductively







and for n > 0, we have
1
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for 1 -£ kin - 1,
for k = n,
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for k = 0,
for 1 £ k a n - 1»
for k = n,
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A similar result is readily obtained for y(t). It is easily seen that
(21) reduces to our previous results when A 0.
The form in which we have written this solution (21) is of parti-
cular value for numerical computations, since it is of the form
(for t > 0)
x(t) =x„f(x
1
,x ) y /j~ g(x 1 ,x 2 ) ,ko v i' r '0i \




This allows us to develop tabulations of f and g, depending on
the two parameters X and X , which may be used to generate
numerical solutions to all such problems as we have considered in
this section. These functions are similar to cosh X and sinh X
(depending on a single parameter), to which they reduce when A = 0,
i.e. , X„ = 0.
It is of interest to note that if the infinite series method of
Frobenius (see pp. 78-97 of [13] or pp. 132-139 of [19]) is used to solve
the above problem, we have not been able to obtain the solution in the
form of (21) , although the series so obtained is readily verified to be
a rearrangement of (21) . The absolute convergence of the series in
question justifies this rearrangement. This shows that the solution
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representation given by (10) , (11) and (12) is a particularly
important one, since it leads to results of practical value that we
have not been able to obtain by any other means.
8. Some Numerical Examples
.
In this section we examine two numerical examples. S. Bonder
[3], [5] has pioneered in the study of range capabilities and mobility
considerations for weapon systems in combat described by Lanchester-
type equations of modern warfare. Our numerical results illustrate
how his type of analysis may be extended to weapon systems with (1)
different range dependencies of lethality of each side's fire (but the
same effective range) and (2) linear attrition-rate coefficients but
different effective ranges.
We consider a constant speed attack of a defended position with
the combat described by
dx , N /n r .m
dT
=
_a(r)y = _a (1
" R~} y '
a
jZ = _3(r)x = _ e (1 _JL} n x> (22)
3
where R and R are effective ranges of the Y- and X-force weapon
a (3






where R is the opening range of battle. Several range dependencies
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Numerical results (after an example of S. Bonder, see Tab H,
p. IV-34 of [5]) are shown in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6. These curves have
been generated by a computer program using the series solutions (19)
and (21), as appropriate. To check the computer algorithm, the series
solution (19) was compared with the solution given by (18) in terms of
modified Bessel functions of the first kind and fractional order (it
is easily seen that < p < 1) . Available tables of modified Bessel
functions are discussed in [1] (see pp. 455-456) and [26] (see p. 41).
We made use of the National Bureau of Standards' tables [27] in our work,
Although tables for I only exist for v = + 1/4, + 1/3, + 2/3 and
+ 3/4 (see also p. 235 of [20]), interpolation methods may be used for
other fractional values. In [27] Lagrange interpolation polynomial
(8th degree) coefficients are given which yield four decimal place
accuracy for I (x) for < v < 1. The above considerations are use-J
v
ful when one does not have a computer readily available for computation.
In Figures 3 and 4 both systems have the same effective range,
i.e., R = R n , and the battle commences at this range, i.e., R = R .
ot p u ex
In this plot we have held a = a(r=0) and 3 constant and have var-
ied the exponents, m and n, of the range dependencies of a(r) and
3(r), respectively. S. Bonder's pioneering work [3], [5] has exten-
sively studied the cases of m = n. We see that the nature of the
combat trajectory is quite sensitive to the particular combination of
ra and n, and that these are additional parameters which help deter-
mine who wins or loses. (In the special case when m = n, a square
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R = R = R = 2000 meters
o a £
a =0.06 X-cas./(min. x Y-unit)
o
/3 = 0.6 Y-cas./lmin. x X-unit)
v = 5 m. p. h.











The symbol x denotes the end of a force-
level trajectory due to the annihilation of
enemy forces.
Figure 3. Force- level trajectories of X for
various combinations of exponents,




= RQ = Rq = 2000 meters
a = 0.06 X-cas./(min. x Y-unit)
o
B - 0.6 Y-cas./(min. x X-unit)
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The symbol x denotes the end of a force
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level trajectory due to the annihilation of
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Figure 4. Force- level trajectories of Y for
various combinations of exponents,
m and n,in power attrition-rate
coefficients.
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F* = R = 2000 meters
o a
aQ = 0.06 X-cas./(min. x Y-unit)
@o = 0.6 Y-cas./ (min. x X-unit)
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The symbol x denotes the end of a force-level
trajectory due to the annihilation of enemy
forces.
Figure 5. Force -level trajectories of X for
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Figure 6. Force-level trajectories of Y for various
effective ranges of X- force weapons,
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law which is independent of these parameters relates the X- and
Y-force strengths.) If we refer back to Figure 2, it should be clear
why this is so: m and n reflect how weapon system kill rates
increase with closing range to their peak values at "point blank" range,
If we consider the Y-force to be the attacker who employs a weapon
whose capability varies linearly with range, i.e.,
-m = 1, then the
battle may have quite different outcomes depending on the value of n.
The reader should contrast the battle trajectories denoted as 1:0,
1:1, 1:2, and 1:3 in Figures 3 and 4.
We also see that we can use the initial trend of battle to fore-
cast battle overcome only when we know the nature of the dependence of
both weapon system capabilities upon range. Again, reference to
Figures 3 and 4 should make this clear. For example, compare the out-
comes for curves denoted as 1:2, 2:2, and 3:2. We also should note
the "compounding" effect over time: a small advantage in range capa-
bility may materially effect battle outcome.
In Figures 5 and 6 we show the effect of increasing the effective
range of the defender's weapons. Again we may consider the X-force
to be the defender. For these computations we have held the opening
range constant at R
n
= R = 2000 meters. (It is a straightforward
matter to extend this analysis to the case when R < R_ £ R_.) Both
a p
attrition-rate coefficients vary linearly with range, a and 3~
have been held constant, and R has been varied. Except for the case
B
in which R = 2000 meters when the solution to (22) is given by (7),
p
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we know of no other instance in which there is a relationship between
x(t) and y(t) that is independent of time (such as the classical
Lanchester square law) . The curves in Figures 5 and 6 exhibit the
(obvious) qualitative result of increasing the long range capability
of the defender's weapon system: more attacker casualties occur
earlier in the battle, and these are then magnified by the "compounding
nature" of the Lanchester-type equations (22). However, by considering
such an attack scenario and using analysis such as the above, one might
quantitatively assess the value of the long-range firepower capability
of a weapon system (here the defender's weapons), giving consideration
to the (hypothesized) dynamics of combat.
9 . Comments .
In this section we discuss the significance, applications, and
extensions of the results of this paper. Our research is complementary
in nature to that on the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient [2], [3],
[6], [22], [30], [31]. To make use of our work one needs to know the
range dependence of weapon system kill rates for the scenario under
study. The demonstrated sensitivity of combat outcome to the type of
range variation of weapon system kill rates makes important the deter-
mination of such range dependencies.
Our results extend the analytic capabilities for studying combat
dynamics in those instances where time or range dependence is signifi-
cant. Previous analytic results [3], [33] were limited to cases of
weapon system performances described by kill rates with (1) the same
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type of range dependence and (2) the same effective range. Our results
allow both these restrictions to be removed. We may also view previous
results as applying to the instance when the kill rate of one weapon
system strictly dominates that of the enemy's (consider the plots of
a(t) = k t and b(t) = kt when m = n) . We have presented analysis
results which apply when one weapon system does not dominate another
at all ranges. Such a situation is shown in Figure 7.
We should also note that previous analytic results were developed
only for when a square law related opposing force average strengths.
In this instance one could view the effect of range dependent attrition
rates as transforming the time (range) scale of the constant coefficient
square law attrition process [33]. Our more general results apply even
in those cases when (to the best of our knowledge) there is no time-
dependent relationship between opposing force strengths.
Our results may be used to study the effects of mobility and
weapon system range capabilities on combat dynamics. One can use our
results to extend S. Bonder's analysis [5] of the implications
and mobility considerations of Lanchester combat between forces employ-
ing weapon systems with appreciable range variations of kill rates.
As noted above our results apply under less restrictive circumstances:
opposing weapon systems' kill rates don't have to vary with range in
the same manner, and both weapon systems don't necessarily have to have
the same effective range.
Other extensions using the general solution (10) are possible for
weapon systems that have different effective ranges. In this paper we











Figure 7. Example of weapon system not dominated at all
ranges.
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kill rates which very linearly with range. Extension to other range




We have developed a general solution to variable-coefficient
Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare for combat between two
homogeneous forces. This general result was applied to two specific
types of attrition-rate coefficients to yield new analytic results for
Lanchester combat. In general, series solutions are obtained by our
approach, but we have discussed the circumstances under which these
may be expressed in terms of tabulated functions.
Solutions now exist for a wide class of variable-coefficient
Lanchester-type equations of modern warfare as a result of this paper.
We have extended analysis capabilities to include the following
important cases: (1) opposing weapon systems whose kill rates have
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In this appendix we present preliminary results from our study
of the optimal control of the Lanchester stochastic process. Our
goal is to determine whether the structure of the optimal allocation
policy for the selection of target type at which to fire is affected
by whether the attrition process is modelled as being deterministic
or stochastic. Except for the pioneering work of Isbell and Marlow
[27} (who optimized a truncated stochastic process and thus did not
account for the true dynamics of combat) , we are not aware of any
other similar work on target selection in the Lanchester theory of
combat when attrition is a stochastic process (although, of course,
numerous papers have appeared (see, for example [12], [33]) concern-
ing the application of optimal stochastic control theory to various
other different tactical allocation problems). In our initial inves-
tigation here we shall consider a one-sided optimization problem, with
our ultimate goal being the study of the corresponding stochastic
game (i.e. two-sided decision problem).
It should be recalled that two basic approaches to analytic
war gaming are (1) the Lanchester-type deterministic differential
equation models [5], [6], [16] or (2) stochastic models (such as
DYNTACS [3], a high-resolution simulation). In our past ONR sponsored
research we have extensively studied the optimal control of the
deterministic Lanchester attrition process [38], [39], [40], [41],
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[42], [43]. In such optimization problems the differential equation
models of combat are deterministic, always yielding the same result
for given initial conditions. However, such attrition equations
are commonly assumed to represent the mean course of battle (imply-
ing an underlying probability distribution [37]). In fact, one fre-
quently refers to x(t) as the average X-force level (this is well-
known to be only an approximation [37]) and the model as an expected-
value model.
As regards the optimal selection of the target type at which to
fire, it is not clear whether such expected-value methodology would
be appropriate to a situation with small numbers of combatants and
a stochastic attrition mechanism (such as occurs with DYNTACS [3]).
We base this opinion upon our consideration of the work of G. Clark,
who studied (see Chapter 11 of [3] and [9]) differences between deter-
ministic and stochastic homogeneous-force Lanchester formulations.
He concludes that (see p. 11-19 of [3]) "the deterministic model
would have difficulty approximating a stochastic simulation" with
respect to the time history of force levels. Based on our considera-
tion of the above results of G. Clark, we felt that it would be appro-
priate to investigate whether or not there are significant differences
between optimal allocation policies for deterministic and stochastic
attrition processes. If such a difference were to be observed, then
this would raise the more basic question of whether or not different
study results could be obtained merely by the choice of modelling
technique, i.e. Lanchester-type expected value equations or Monte
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Carlo simulation.
Our research approach is to consider the same scenario (prescribed
duration battle between a homogeneous Y-force and a heterogeneous
enemy, X and X_) and then compare the solution of the deterministic
model with that of the corresponding stochastic one. To this end,
we have developed a complete solution (in the sense that numberical
values may be readily obtained by means of a digital computer program)
to the two-versus-one prescribed duration battle (see Appendix G) .
In this appendix we consider the corresponding stochastic control
problem. We will develop the basic equations from which the optimal
target selection policy may be determined. When these equations are
solved, results may be compared with those for the corresponding
deterministic process. A M.S. thesis student (R. Powers, LT USN)
is currently carrying out the details of the comparison of solutions.
We hope to make a detailed comparison in our future ONR research.
It seems appropriate to briefly sketch some background on the
theory of stochastic optimal control, which we will apply to our
target selection problem. Bellman's principle of optimality (see
p. 83 of [1]) and the concept of an optimal expected-value function
(depending only upon the current state of the system) may be thought
of as forming the basis for optimal stochastic control. (As pointed
out by Wendell Fleming [20] it is a matter of taste how broadly one
interprets the phrase optimal stochastic control; we accordingly
avoid any definition here.) As pertains the problem at hand, it
may be considered to be a special case of a general model discussed
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by Kushner [30] (who cites similar work in England by Florentine
[21]). S. Dreyfus has discussed the differences between some types
of optimal control of stochastic systems [13] (see also [14]) (espe-
cially the difference between open-loop and closed-loop control,
which are well-known to be equivalent for deterministic systems [13],
[25]).
Recently, H. Kushner has written an introductory text on sto-
chastic control [31], which contains many references to the literature
(to which he has been a prolific contributor) . Other survey papers
(the first of which contains an extensive bibliography) are by W.
Fleming [20] and P. Whittle [44].
2. The Lanchester Stochastic Process .
In 1914 in the British journal Engineering F. W. Lanchester
[32] postulated that combat under the conditions of "modern warfare"
between two homogeneous forces could be described by the equations
dx
% = - bx, (1)
where a, b are commonly referred to as the Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficients and x(t), y(t) are force levels. During World War II,
B. Koopman suggested a reformulation of such a model in stochastic
form [34]. Subsequent work has been by R. Snow [37], R. Brown [7],
[8], and G. Clark [9]. B. Koopman has called the corresponding
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stochastic process, the Lanchester stochastic process [29].
Before considering the control problem, it seems appropriate
for us to review a few results for the Lanchester stochastic process.
Consider combat between a homogeneous X-force and a homogeneous
Y-force. We consider a stationary, Markov process (see any standard
text [2], [11], [35] for a further discussion). Let the state proba-
bility be denoted by P(m,n,t), where m is the number of x com-
batants alive and n is the number of Y combatants alive at time
t. Thus,
P(m,n,t) = Prob there are m X and n
Y survivors
at time t after battle begins
Making standard assumptions (see [4]), we find that the state proba-
bility satisfies the following system of differential-difference
equations
for 1 ^ m £ M and 1 ^ n ^ N (also, we adopt the conven-
tion that P(m,n,t) = for m > M or n > N)
dP
l.m,n,t; = t
- {A(m,n) + B(m,n)} P(m,n,t), (2)
i
-(m,n ) P(m+l,n,t) A(m+l,n) + P(m,n+l,t) B(m,n=l)
where
M(N) is the number of X(Y) combatants at the
beginning of battle at t = 0,
A(m,n) is the rate of attrition of X forces; A(0,n) - 0,





from t to t+At
= A(m,n)At




m X's and M X's and
n Y's at t N Y's at t=0
Of course, the state space is discrete, i.e. m = 0,1...,
M
and n = 0,1..., N. At the boundary of the system, i.e. m =
or n = 0, equation (2) takes the form
dP








(0,0, t) = P(l,0,t)A(l 5 0) + P(0,l,t)B(0,l), (3)
while the initial conditions for (1) and (2) are taken to be
P(m,n,t=0) = ll for m=M,n=N,
10 for m^M,n^N. (4)
Let us adopt the following terminology for the attrition-rate co-
efficients (and hence the process itself). We shall say that we have a
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(a) linear-law attrition process when
A(m,n) = amn,
B(m,n) = bmn, (5)
and
(b) square-law attrition process when
A(m,n) = |3m + an,
B(m,n) = bm + an, (6)
where a, 8 may be referred to as operational loss rates.
Although it is well-known that (2) through (4) yield an
exponential solution (the well-known Chapman-Kolmogorov equation
expresses the semi-group property of the state probabilities (see
[29])) when A(m,n) and B(m,n) are specified (for example, by
(6)), general solutions have been optained to this system only in a
few special cases. In the special case when a + a = b + 3, Isbell
and Marlow [27] developed a general solution to (2) through (4)
for a square-law stochastic attrition process. Recently, Clark (see
pp. 102-104 of [9]) obtained the general solution to the linear-law
stochastic attrition process (i.e. A(m,n) and B(m,n) are given
by (5)). One reason why we have reviewed this material is to now
point out to the reader that a general solution to (2) through (4)
only exists for a linear-law attrition process and is very complex
(see pp. 102-104 of [9]). In considering the optimal control ol tl
Lanchester stochastic (square-law) process, we will encounter .1
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similar system of equations for the optimal expected-value function.
Keeping in mind that a general solution to the corresponding equations
(2) through (4) for the state probabilities of the square-law sto-
chastic attrition process, we have not (seriously) tried to develop
a general solution for those equations satisfied by the optimal expected-
value function in view of such difficulties.
Additionally, using the above noted solutions for the Lanchester
stochastic process, Clark (following results in [34] and qualitative
results in [37]) made a comparison of the average force levels in the
stochastic attrition process (denoted as m(t) and n(t)) and the
corresponding force levels x(t) and y(t) in the deterministic
model (such as (1)). Unlike the corresponding situation for the
Yule-Ferry linear birth process (see pp. 77-78 of [2] or pp. 156-159
of [11]), there is a bias (due to "boundary effects") in dynamical
behavior of x(t) and y(t) as compared with m(t) and n(t) for
the same a's and b's. This is a major result of Clark's careful
investigation in which several numerical examples are given to prove
such points. Clark's solution to the stochastic linear-law process
was important in making such a comparison. This fact that the average
of the Lanchester stochastic process does not behave identically to
the corresponding force levels x(t) and. y(t) computed according
to the corresponding deterministic model has led us to make the present
investigation.
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3. The Optimal Control Problem .
In Appendix G we studied the following optimal control problem
for the deterministic Lanchester attrition process:
maximize (ry(T)-px (T)-qx (T)} with T = T specified,
<Kt) x 2 X
, . dx,













,y ^ and <. 4 <; 1,
where
x (t), x (t)
,
y(t) are force levels,






, b_ are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
and 4 is the fraction of Y fire directed at X.. ,












The above combat scenario is for a prescribed (fixed) length of time
T (although one must, of course, give consideration to "premature"
terminations as we did in Appendix G) . For convenience, we have chosen
to call this problem the "prescribed duration battle."
Let us take the following for our optimal control problem in
which the combat is described as a stationary Markov process (with




(T)} with T = T specified.
<Kt)
l x
subject to: casualties occur randomly as a stationary
Markov process corresponding to the




, n 2 and <; <t £ i,
where
m (t), m (t), n(t) are force levels (integers),
p, q, r are again utilities assigned survivors,
a
,
a„ , b , b are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
and $ is the fraction of Y fire directed at X .
Furthermore, <$> (t) is restricted to take on values from the
1 2
set {0, n, n, . . . , l}
.
4. Development of Fundamental Functional Equation .












S(T,mrm2 ,n) = ngx^mum Bj rn (T=0)-pm1 (T=0)-qm2 (x=0) , (9)
where
the system is in state m , m , n at time T (i.e. there are
m of the X -forces, etc.),
the system is in state m (x=0), m (t=0) , n(x=0) at T = 0,
$ is the class of admissible controls (i.e. 4>(t) must always





T = T - t is the backwards time from the end of battle (which
begins at t=0)
,
E-* denotes mathematical expectation (with respect to all
m,T




casualties occur in a random fashion between t and T.
In other words, S(l,m ,m ,n) is the maximum return that we get on
the average when we start with force levels m ,m , and n at
t = T-T, follow an optimal policy 4-* (s) (chosen from the class of
admissible policies $) for t <. s £ T, and casualties occur in a
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random fashion.
We consider that casualties occur as a stationary Markov process
with discrete state space (or discontinuous Markov process). Spe-
cifically, we assume that
(1) the attrition process is a stationary Markov process corres-
ponding to a deterministic Lanchester square-law attrition
process; this is equivalent to assuming
(a) the future occurrences of casualties depend only on the
state of the system at t and not on past history,

























where (Ja n is X casualty rate, etc.,
(d) Prob
more than one casualty
in interval At
= 0((At) 2 ),
where following Copson (see p. 35 of [10]) 0(x)
denotes dependence on x such that
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T 0(X) » *ljyn = a constant
,
(2) the Y-forces have perfect information as to the state of
the system at t and the expected casualty rates,
(3) the Y-forces can instantaneously shift fire from any target
at any time,
(4) the length of the battle is known.
Further defining our notation, we have
m (t),m (t),n(t) are number of X -forces, X
2
~forces, Y-forces,
respectively, as a function of time t (restricted
to be non-negative integer)
,
and
4(t) is fraction of Y-force total fire directed at X^^ (restricted
to be rational between
and 1 with denominator n(t)).
Thus , we have
state variables : m (t) ,m 2 (t) ,n(t) ,
decision (or control) variable: 4(t),
where
4(t) e $ =
°'n(t)'n(t)"-" n(t) * L
To be more precise 4 - < (n^.nyn.t) is a closed-loop (or feedback)
trol (see Appendix F for a further discussion and contrast with open-con
1-14
loop control), although for notational convenience we don't explicitly
show this dependence below. Furthermore, let T denote the "backwards
time" from the end of battle, i.e. T = T-t.
To develop the fundamental functional equation for the optimal
expected-value function, we begin by considering any interval of
"backwards time" of length At which occurs from t-At to T. There
are five exhaustive and mutually exclusive possibilities for random
events to occur in such an interval. These are
(1) one X.. casualty occurs,
(2) one X„ casualty occurs,
(3) one Y casualty occurs,
(4) no casualty occurs,
(5) more than one casualty occurs.
Let us now examine each of these cases and develop expected returns.
(1) One X .. casualty occurs in At :
By our assumptions above, we have for the probability
of occurrence of this event
Prob[one X casualty occurs in At] = <ja nAT
.
(10)
Given that one X, casualty is realized in the interval from T to
T - At
,
the optimal target selection policy for Y will consider the
maximum expected value for the return functional as casualties continue
to occur randomly from T - At to T = 0. This maximum expected value
is S(T-AT,m (t-At) ,m
2
(T-AT) ,n(T-AT)) where m (t-At) = m (t)-1,
m-(T-AT) = m (t), and u(t-At) = n(T).
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(2) One X casualty occurs In At :
Similarly, we have that
Prob[one X
2
casualty occurs in At] = (l-(j:)a n At, (11)
with the optimal expected-value function S(t-At ,m, (t) ,m (T)-l,n(T) ) .
(3) One Y casualty occurs in At :
Similarly, we have that
Prob[one Y casualty occurs in At] = (b m +b m ) At, (12)
with the optimal expected-value function S(T-AT,m (T),m (T),n(T)-l).
(4) No casualty occurs in At :
Prob[no casualty occurs in At] =
1 - {(ja^+d- cDa^+b^+b^} At + 0((At) 2 ). (13)






(5) More than one casualty occurs in At :
The probability that this event occurs is 0((At) ).
Now, by the standard dynamic programming argument which combines
the probabilities of events (1) through (5) above with the maximum
expected return to be achievable given these events occur, we obtain
the expression
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+ (l-<£)a_n Ax S(T-Ax,m ,m»-l,n) +
(b m +b m
2
) At S(t-At ,m ,m
2
,n-l) } . (14)
Rearranging terms in (14) and taking the limit as At-K), we
obtain the fundamental functional equation for the optimal expected-
value function S(T,m ,m ,n)





,n) = (b^+b^) {S (t ,m ,m
2
,n-l) - S (t ,m ,m
2
,n) }







-l,n) - S(T,m ,m ,n) }] , (15)
with the boundary condition at t = T
S(T=0,m ,m
2









and n are integers,
and
$ = {o 1 I (n-1) }
The special forms of (15) in cases when m =0, etc. will be given
later.
More concisely, we could have said that (15) results from com-
bination of the well-known formalism of dynamic programming with the
retrospective (backward) probabilistic evolution of the system over
time (c.f. [21], [31]). It is to be noted that (15) is a special
case of an equation given by Kushner in 1962 [30].
If we take (15) to be the fundamental (or basic) equation for
S(i,m ,m ,n), then (14) may be considered to be the simplest finite
difference approximation to it, i.e. the result of applying the well-
known Euler's method to (15) (see pp. 130-131 of [53]). (Of course,
a method employing a higher order approximation scheme (see pp. 132-
140 of [24]) may be necessary under many circumstances.) We will
find this point of view convenient when we consider developing a
solution to (15).
Finally, it seems appropriate for us to note that equations
(15) have precisely the same structure as the equations for the
Lanchester (square-law attrition, since the attrition rates have the
same form as (6)) stochastic process for which (to the best of our
knowledge) no general solution has been developed. This last fact
shows that although it is a well-known and trivial theoretical result
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that the solution to such a first order (finite) system of linear,
constant-coefficient ordinary differential equations is given by the
matrix exponential, there may be practical difficulties in obtaining
a more explicit representation for computing numerical values of the
solution, especially when the number of equations in the system is
variable (here depending on three parameters).
5 . On the Analytic Solution to the Fundamental Functional Equation .
The first task in determining the optimal target selection
policy (which requires obtaining the solution to (15) and (16)) is
to develop the entire system of equations (c.f. equations (2) through
(4)). We must, therefore, consider the form that (15) takes at the
boundary of the system, i.e. m =0 or m =0 or n=0, where the
target selection problem no longer exists. When n=0, arguments
similar to the above lead to





,0) = with S (T=0,m ,m
2
,0) = -m p-m q.
Hence,
for n = 0, m 2: 0, nu;>0,
S(x,m ,m ,0) = - m p - m q (17)
Similarly,
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for m = 0, m
2
= 0, n ;> 0,
S(T,0,0,n) = nr, (18)




























-l,0,n) - S (t ,m ,0,n) }
.
(20)
Equations (15) through (20) are the complete system of equations for
the optimal expected-value function in the optimal control of the
Lanchester stochastic process.
For m > 0, m > 0, n > the optimal target selection policy
is determined by the maximization operation in (15), and hence
C?*(T) =
1 for W(l,m ,m ,n) > 0,
for W(x,m ,m ,n) < 0, (21)
where we shall refer to W(x,m ,m ,n) as the "switching function."
It is defined by
for m > 0, m > 0, n>0,
W(x,m ,m ,n) = a { S (x ,m -1 ,m
2
















Let us observe that at the end of the battle at t = T, we may
combine (16), (21), and (22) to obtain
cj*(T=0) =







which the reader will recall as the same result previously obtained
for the optimal control of the deterministic process (see Appendices
A, F, and G)
.
As pointed out in Section 4, equations (15) through (20) have
the same form as the equations for the Lanchester square-law attrition
stochastic process (i.e. equations (2) through (4) when the attrition
rates are given by (6)). (We note that (15) reduces to a first order
system of ordinary differential equations for S(x,m ,m ,n) when
(j)* as determined by (21) is used. Solving for S(x,m ,m_n) for
m = 0,1,2 ,... ,etc. , we can then determine ({* by (21). The
synthesis of optimal control by combination of the control law (21)
with integration of a system of differential equations is similar to
that for deterministic optimal control problems.) We have pointed
out that (to the best of our knowledge) a general solution has not
been obtained for the Lanchester stochastic process equations. Hence,
it seems unlikely that an analytic solution is readily obtainable
for (15) through (20) (although such a solution may be considered
to be a matrix exponential (see above)).
Nevertheless, it is of value to develop a partial solution. For
example, since we use finite difference methods to generate an approxi-
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mate solution, it is desirable to check the adequacy of the approxi-
mation (in particular, the "time step size" used in the numerical
propagation of the approximate solution by "marching ahead in time")
This is easily done by comparing the approximate solution, denoted
by S, to the exact analytic solution, denoted by S. Hence, a
partial analytic solution is useful.
Careful consideration of (15) through (20) reveals that there
are restrictions on the order in which the optimal expected-value
functions S(i,m ,m„,n) for m =0,1,2, ... ,etc. can be computed.
In particular, one admissible sequence for building up the solution













Table I. Admissible Order for Computing Optimal Expected-Value
Functions (admissible order is from top to bottom)
.
Thus, we readily successively compute using (17) through (20)
S(i, 0,0,0) = 0,
S(i, 1,0,0) = -p,
S(t, 0,1,0) = -q
S(t, 0,0,1) = r,
S(t, 1,1,0) = -p-q,
/b r-a q\ -(a +b )t /a r-b q\
s(TMi,=M e +(w
/b r-a F\ "U1+b1 )T /alr
~b
lP\
s (Ti i.o 1 i ) -U-55y. + (-^bH- (24)
Furthermore, for m.. = 1, m = 1 , n = 1, by (24) equations (15) and
(16) become




){S(T, 1,1,1) + (p+q)}
+ maximum [<j>a.. {S(t ,0 ,1,1) - S(t, 1,1,1)} +
£ $ £ 1
<j> = or 1
(l-<)>) a
2
(S(T, 1,0,1) - S(x, 1,1,1)}],
with S(t=0, 1,1,1) = r - p - q, (25)
where S(x ,0,1,1) and S(x, 1,0,1) are given by (24). It is con-
venient to denote that "switching function" as w(x)
w(t) = W(t, 1,1,1) =
a^Sd, 0,1,1) - S(x, 1,1,1)} - a2{S(T, 1,0,1) - SCt, 1,1,1)}, 126)
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so that (21) becomes
4>*(t)
' 1 for w(t) > 0,
for wCt) < 0. (27)
We observe that
w(t=0) = a^p - a
2q,
(28)
so that (23) continues to hold.
Using (23), (24), (26), and (27), we may readily solve (25).
As in the deterministic case (see Appendix G) , there are two cases
that must be distinguished
Case (1) a p ^ a q,
Case (2) a p < a 2q.
For Case (1): a p ^ a„q , we have that $*(t) = 1 for
^ t £ x , where x denotes the "backwards time" of the first
switch in the optimal target selection policy, t^ is the smallest
t which satisfies w(t=t ) = with w(x) given by (26).
for £ x ^ t, when a p ^ a~q (<t>*(x)=l)
/, x -(a~+b )i





































































































We note that t
1
might be equal to + °°, i.e. we never switch.
Assuming that a switch in targets does occur, however, let us denote
S(t=t 1 ,1,1,1) by S where, as we recall, x 1 is the smallest
x which satisfies w(t=t ) = 0. Then, we have that <J>*(x) =
for x, < x i» t , where x denotes the "backwards time" of the
second switch in the optimal target selection policy. Then, we
have
















) (x 1 -x)-a 1 x n -b n x]
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Again, we note that x^ might be equal to + °°, i.e. we might
never switch targets a second time. Assuming that a second switch
in targets does occur, we have 4>*(x) = 1 for t < t si t .
We have not carried the computation of S(t, 1,1,1) past x^.
For Case (2): a^p < a
2q
, we have that <£*(t) = for
£ t £ t^, where t. denotes the "backwards time" of the first
switch in the optimal target selection policy, x is the smallest
t which satisfies w(t=t
1
) = with w(t) given by (26).








s(t, 1,1,1) = , — rmn. ^ e +































































































We note that x might be equal to + °°, i.e. we never switch.
Assuming that a switch in targets does occur, however, let us denote
S(x=x ,1,1,1) by S„ where, as we recall, x. is the smallest
t which satisfies w(x=x ) = 0. Then, we have that 4>*(x) = 1
for x < x ^ x„, where x_ denotes the "backwards time" of the
second switch in the optimal target selection policy. Then, we
have
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for x < x £ x
2




























































































































Again, we note that x_ might be equal to + °°, i.e. we might
never switch targets a second time. Assuming that a second switch
in targets does occur, we have 4>*(t) = for t„ < x~.
have not carried the computation of S(x, 1,1,1) past x«.
Although the above constitutes a complete solution for
and hence <}>*(x) via w(x)
,
these results are complex <
it is not immediately clear how <j>*(x) changes over time and/
depends on the variable model parameters. (We recall that in the
deterministic case when x.. (T) > and x
?











b 2 imP lied tiiat (I)*( T ) = 1 fo
entire battle.) We plan to analyze such aspects more thoroughly
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both analytically and computationally in the future.
6. Development of Numerical Solution .
As we have already discussed several times above, a general
solution for S(x,m, ,m ,n) which satisfies (15) through (20) for
m ^ 0, m
?
^ 0, n ^ has not been obtained and prospects do not
seem bright for this. With the advent of modern high-speed
digital computers, finite difference methods of obtaining an
approximate solution are commonly used under such circumstances.
Euler's method (see pp. 130-131 of [24]) yields the simplest
finite difference approximation for (15) . Let us denote the
approximation to the optimal expected-value function by S.
We shall compute values for the approximation to the optimal
expected-value function at discrete points in time separated by a
constant amount At. We let t = £At so that T = LAt . Then
(15) may be approximated by














m ) S(£At .m^m^n-l)
+ y(Ax) maximum [<}>a, {S(£Ax ,m.-l ,m_ ,n)






,n)} + (I-4.) a
2
{S(£Ax ,11^,111-1 ,n) - S(£Ax ,m >m
2
,n) } ] , (33)
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We earlier had seen how (33) arose in the derivation of (15)
.
Similar approximations may be developed for (19) and (20)
.
As we noted above, consideration of (15) through (20) yields
that there are restrictions on the order in which the optimal
expected-value function S (or its approximation S) . We observe
that the computation S( (£+1) At ,m
1




















Figure 1. Dependence of Optimal Expected-Value Function
on Discrete State Variables.
Based on the dependence shown in Figure 1, the solution can
be !,built-up" as shown in Table II. the general case is shown
in Table III.
It remains to discuss the adequacy of the finite difference
approximation (33). It is well-known (see pp. 130-145 in [24])
that Euler's method yields a finite difference approximation for
such a system of differential equations that is both consistent
and stable so that the approximate solution S can be guaranteed
to converge to the exact analytic solution S as Ax * (and
L -> °°) [36]. However, At must not be too large in order to
keep the truncation error satisfactorily small. Moreover, the
time step size At is also limited by the fact that a quantity
1-30











































































Table III. General Case for Admissable Order



























































































































Note : Admissible order is top to bottom, starting with column
(composed of m , nu , n) on left.
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like (At) (b m +b
?
m„) or a nAx or a nAx in (33) represents
a probability and hence must be less than one. Thus, in compu-









in2^ AT < 1>
a nAx < 1,
a„nAx < 1. (34)
Moreover, in our computational work (performed by M.S. thesis
student, R. Powers, Lt. USN) we have used a time step size which
yields agreement in the fourth decimal place to the right of the
A
decimal point when S is compared to the exact analytic solution
S in the special cases (such as (24) through (32) when the latter
has been obtained.
7 . Solution Behavior for Large Number of Combatants .
Analytically we have developed a solution to equations (15)
through (20) up through S(x, 1,1,1) (see (24) and (29) through
(32) ; see also Table II for admissible order of computation)
.
Computationally, we can generate a numerical solution up through
S(x ,10 ,10,10) (computed from (33) and requiring computation in
the order, for example, shown in Table III). However, it appears
infeasible for computational reasons (depending upon both the
amount of core storage and also CPU processing time) to generate
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a solution much past force levels of the approximate magnitude
m = 10, m„ = 10, n = 10. Thus, it is of import to consider
approximate solution behavior of (15) through (20) for large
numbers of combatants.
We will first consider limiting behavior of (15) through (20)
by (naively) replacing differences in force levels by their
approximations as partial derivatives times the length of the
interval (unity)—deliberately ignoring the fact that S(t,x ,x„,y)
had originally been defined only for integer values of x , x_
and y. We seek to approximate our problem with a discrete state
space by one in which the state of our system (i.e. numbers of
X , X ? , and Y combatants) varies continuously. Markov processes
in which only continuous changes in state occur are called dif-
fusion processes (see p. 203 of [11]). We will show that the
naive passage in the limit leads to an inappropriate equation
(one which ignores the probabilistic nature of the process) . Later
we shall give the parabolic partial differential equation (see
pp. 57-77 of [22]) which we feel yields the appropriate approxi-
mation to the fundamental equation (15)
.
Diffusion approximations to Markov processes with discrete
states have been extensively studied the past 30 years (see survey
article by Iglehart [26], sections in [2], [11], and [18], and
the papers [19], [23], and [28]). We will give some of our pre-
liminary results below. Our arguments will be formal, with a
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rigorous justification being beyond the scope of our present
investigation. (In such matters a rigorous justification requires
delicate and subtle arguments and is itself a topic of contemporary
mathematical research.) The idea of considering diffusion approx-
imations to Lanchester-type stochastic processes is due to D. Gaver.
(Of course, all inadequacies of the present presentation are my
own responsibility.) Diffusion approximations have proven to be
very useful in genetics [17] , [28] , queueing [23] , and other
areas of applications of stochastic processes.
Let us first exhibit the unsatisfactory approximation to (15).
The first thing that we will do is to replace t by T - t.
Next, we replace differences in force levels, for example, as
follows





,n) = {(y-l)-y) ||(t^ ,x2 ,y) + 0((Ay)
2
), (35)
where Ay = 1. Now, for large numbers of combatants we may ignore
the integer restrictions on the X,-, X~-, and Y- force levels
to obtain the following approximation to (15)
9S ru u.u ^ 3S
— - (b x..+b x ) — + maximum
3t i 1 2 2 9y Q ^ ^ /yl-I^W^vi-^- - (36)
where S = S(t,x, ,x ,y). The above is precisely the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs equation for the deterministic optimal control problem (see
Appendix G) . Similar approximations for the Lanchester stochastic
process have been given by Willard [45], Koopman [29], and Etter [15],
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We will show below, however, that the above approximation is
inappropriate, since the corresponding attrition process is deter-
ministic and we have thusly destroyed the probabilistic nature of
the attrition process.
We now show the equivalence of (36) with some well-known
results from the optimal control of the deterministic Lanchester
attrition process. Clearly, (36) yields the maximum principle
maximum H(t ,x.* ,p ,*,<t>) , (37)
£ <}> £ 1
x x
where
H(t,x.,p. ,<j>) = - (fia^pj^ " (I"*) a 2yp 2 - (b^+b^) p 3>
and
P i
*(t) = H-(t, X;L ,x2 ,y) for i = 1,2,
i






Denoting the value of <f> which yields the maximum in (37) by 4>*
,
we obtain the following partial differential equation for S(t .x^x^y)
|f - (Vl*+b 2x 2*> If - .^ - d-**)a 2y* g. = 0> (38)
which is readily solved by the method based on characteristics (see










_i_ = _ (l-<j)*)a
2
y*,
ff =-(blXl*+b 2x 2*),
dp i* 3H
and -^- = ~ J^ (t,x.*,p.*,4>*) for i = 1,2,3, (39)
where, for convenience, we have let x„ = y. By the above, we see
that (36) apparently corresponds to a deterministic attrition
process.
To more fully justify our claim that (36) is an inappropriate
diffusion approximation, it is necessary to review some material
from the theory of stochastic processes. We do this in the sub-
sections below. First, we discuss a diffusion approximation to a
simple random walk. Next, we apply such considerations to the
Lanchester stochastic process. Finally, we present our diffusion
approximation to the fundamental functional equation (15) for the
optimal expected value function. The diffusion approximation to
the Lanchester stochastic process is a new result, previously not
appearing in the literature.
7.1. Diffusion Approximation to a Simple Random Walk .
It seems appropriate to begin by giving our own treatment of
the diffusion approximation to the simple random walk given by
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Feller (see pp. 323-327 in [18]). Our brief treatment is based on
the theory of first order partial differential equations (see pp.
18-23 of [22]) (we refer the reader to Feller's lucid treatment [18]
for a development based on considerations of random variables) and
explicitly shows that a naive passage in the limit can destroy the
probabilistic nature of the model.
Let us therefore consider an unrestricted random walk starting
at the origin. We let p denote the probability that the
x,n
particle is at x at time n. During each time period, the par-
ticle has a probability p of moving one unit to the left and q
of moving one unit to the right (where p + q = 1) . The following
partial difference equation describes this random walk
Px,n+1




• Px.O " ° for X * °-
Let us write (40) as
p(x,n+l) = p p(x-l,n) + q p(x+l,n), (41)
with initial conditions
p(0,0) = 1, p(x,0) =0 for x 4 0.
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We observe that the time parameter is discrete (i.e. n = 0,1,2,...)
and the state space is discrete (i.e. x = - °°, . . . ,-2 ,-1,0,1 ,2 , . . . ) .
In developing a diffusion (Markov process with continuous
state space [11] approximation to (41) we let the time parameter
have increments of At and the state space have increments of
Ax and pass in the limit as At -> and Ax * 0. Then, (41) may
be re-written as
p(x,t+At) = p p(x-Ax,t) + q p(x+Ax,t). (42)
If we approximate (42) by retaining only first order terms, we
obtain
|£ At = (Ax)(q-p) |£. (43)
Letting lim (q-p)(-~) = - 2c,
Ax ^ V '
At -*
we may obtain from (43)







p(x,t=0) = fi 00 ,
or, more generally.
p(x,t=0) = 6 (x-x )
,
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where 6(x) denotes the delta function of P. Dirac. Equation (44)
is our naive approximation to the random walk described by (40).
The quantity p(x,t) is the probability density of the particle,
i.e.
p(x,t)dx = Prob[particle between x and x+dx at t].








p(x,t) = constant for -r- = 2c,dt




Thus, our random walk has become a completely deterministic process.
We may think of this as that all probability remains concentrated
at a point which moves in a strictly deterministic fashion.
Feller (pp. 323-327 in [18]) shows that an approximation to
(41) which preserves the probabilistic nature of the random walk
process is given by
|E«-2c|E-+d% (46)
3t 9x „ 2'9x
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with initial condition
p(x,t=0) = 6(x-x )
.
Equation (46) is a parabolic partial differential equation with
solution
2 1






In (46) , 2c is termed the infinitesimal mean (or drift) and 2D
is the infinitesimal variance. We observe that (44) is a special
case of (46) with an infinitesimal variance of zero, i.e. D = 0.
Hence, our statement that (44) represents a purely deterministic
process
.
Additionally, it seems appropriate to point out that there is
a gap in Feller's argument on p. 325 of [18]. We feel that he
should have said that to obtain reasonable results one must let
Ax and At approach zero in such a way that the limit of the
variance of the total displacement in time t is a finite,
non-zero quantity. Feller neglects to state the key aspect that
the infinitesimal variance be non-zero. Otherwise, as we saw
above, one can easily erroneously obtain an approximating equation
which may be thought of as representing a purely deterministic
process with no random fluctuations in the sample path.
Equation (46) is a special case of the forward Kolmogorov




= T —2 {a(x) P } ~ f^ <B(x)p}, (47)3x
where
P - p(t,x;tQ ,x ) is the transition probability density
i.e. p(t,x;t
Q
,x ) dx = Prob
particle between x
and x + dx at t
particle between x.
and x. + dx at t
We recall that the position of the particle is a random variable,
denoted by X(t)
.
Also, g(x) is the infinitesimal mean and is
given by
B(x) - lim E[{x(t+At)-x(t)} i x(t)=x]
? (4g)
At +
where E[X] denotes the expectation of the random variable X.
Furthermore, a(x) is the infinitesimal variance and is given by
a(x) - lim V[{x(t+At)-x(t)} | x(t)=x ]> ^
At ->
where V[X] denotes the variance of the random variable X. (The
definitions (48) and (49) involve conditional mean and conditional
variance.) The process corresponding to (47) is stationary, since
a and 3 do not depend upond time. The specification of the
infinitesimal mean and variance determines the Markov process
(uniquely)
.
7.2. Diffusion Approximation to the Lanchester Stochastic Process .
A number of researchers [45], [29], [15] have considered
(in a heuristic fashion as we do here) the limiting behavior of
the Kolmogorov forward equations for the Lanchester stochastic
process for large numbers of combatants. However, we feel that
the approximation to the combat attrition random process that each
developed was inappropriate, since the random nature of the attri-
tion process had been destroyed in the passage to the limit. (There
apparently are several unanswered theoretical questions in this
area, especially since Etter's development [15] is very precise.
It should be noted that Etter's results are obtained by using Lax
and Richtmyer's well-known theory (a key aspect being Lax's equiva-
lence theorem (see p. 44 of [36])) on the convergence of finite
difference operators to differential operators. This latter theory
was developed for deterministic problems in the physical sciences
(hydrodynamics, transport theory, etc.) and may require modificatic
for probabilistic systems.)
Before presenting our new results , let us show the development
of the (inappropriate) approximation given in [45], [29], [15].
For simplicity, let us consider the Lanchester square-law attrition




—(m,n,t) = a n P(m+l,n,t) + b m P(m,n+l,t) - (an+bm) P(m,n,t), (50)
where m and n are non-negative integers. Considering large
numbers of combatants, it does not seem inappropriate to replace
m and n by x and y which no longer have to be integers.
We note that when m was restricted to integer values, m + 1 =
m + Am and similarly for n. Observe that here we have Am = An
It is convenient to write (50) as
= 1.
dP
—(m,n,t) = an[P(m+l,n,t) - P(m,n,t)] + bm[P(m,n+l,t) - P(m,n, t) ] . (51)










where we allow fractional casualties in our formulation. Letting







p(x,y,t=0) = 6(x-xQ ) 6(y-yQ ),
where
p(x,y,t) dx dy = Prob at t the
X force level is between x and
x+dx and the Y force level is between y and y+dy].
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i.e. p(x,y,t) is a probability density function.
The solution to (52) is readily obtained by characteristics
to be
dx dy_ d_t dp_
ay
"' bx "" -1 "" '
or







f* - " bx. (53)
We observe that (53) are just the deterministic Lanchester equations
corresponding to (50). Using the initial condition p(x,y,t=0) =
<5 (x-xn ) 6 (y-yn ) , it is easy to show that (53) holds for the











x p(x,y,t) dx dy, etc.. We observe that
—OO —00
the system average is identical with the sample path. Thus, the
limit process (52) is inappropriate for approximating the Lanchester
stochastic process (50) , since (52) is the equation for a deter-
ministic process.
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Thus, we seek an approximation which preserves the random
nature of the attrition process. Following W. Feller (see p. 235
of [17]; see also p. 235 of [11] and [23]), we will construct an
approximation to a stochastic process with discrete states by
considering a corresponding Markov process with continuous state
space, which has an equivalent infinitesimal mean and variance.
We begin by considering a battle with discrete time steps.
Over each time step, the number of casualties that a Y soldier
2
produces is a random variable with mean y and variance ar a a
and similarly for X. We let
X = X-f orce level at time step n (a random variable)
,
n






-X X =x,Y =y] = - yy ,
n+1 n ' n n a
and
. 2
V[X ..-X X =x,Y =y] = ya .
n+1 n ' n n a




n y and a = Ay,
X 1 X
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+ V^ +bl*tM^' "6)
with initial condition p(x,y,t=0) = S(x-x„) S(y-y_).
We observe that as long as A > and B > the probability
density diffuses over time. For A = and B = 0, we have a
deterministic process. Equation (56) is the diffusion approxi-
mation to the Lanchester (square-law) stochastic process and is
the major result of this section. Unfortunately, (56) is not
readily solved by the method of characteristics as was the first
order partial differential equation (52)
.
7.3. Diffusion Approximation to Fundamental Functional Equation .
Based on our consideration of diffusion approximations in
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 above, a diffusion approximation to the
fundamental functional equation (15) is easily written down.
Recalling that t = T - t is "backwards time" and considering
the retrospective (backward) evolution of the system from end
of battle t = T (or equivalently t = 0) , the appropriate
approximation is given by
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|f Ct,VV7) - - (b lXl+b 2x2 ) ||+ -i- (BlXl+B 2x2 )
9^y
+ maximum






S(T=0, X;L ,x 2 ,y)





In (57) we have the backward operator (using "backward time") for
the continuous Markov process (see [20]).
8. Proposed Future Research .
The results presented in this appendix are preliminary and
should be expanded in two directions: (1) computational and
(2) theoretical. We propose both to ONR as future research tasks,
with the computational investigations deserving the higher priority.
The most important future task is to generate some numerical
results via the finite difference approximation (33) . As noted
above, the adequacy of the finite difference approximation (in
particular, the time step size) can be checked by considering the
(partial) exact analytic solution that has been developed. A
M. S. thesis student (R. Powers, Lt., USN) is currently performing




, USA, proved to be inconclusive.) Results of
computations for the optimal control of the Lanchester stochastic
process can then be compared with results on the optimal control
of the deterministic Lanchester process. The goal of this pro-
posed investigation is to determine the effect of the nature of
the attrition model (deterministic or stochastic) on the structure
of the optimal target selection policy. Additionally, it is of
interest to know if the optimal policy for the deterministic
process is valid for small numbers of combatants and a stochastic
attrition mechanism.
Theoretical investiations should center about gaining more
insight into the structure of the optimal target selection policy
when the attrition mechanism is stochastic. Topics such as steady-
state behavior of equation (15) , further development of the analytic
solution, development of an analytic solution to the diffusion
approximation (57) , etc. merit further investigation. Additionally,
the theoretical justification of passage to the limit for the
birth and death equations should be investiated further.
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Appendix J. Inertial Combat.
1. Introduction
.
In all the target selection problems that we have considered
previously in this report an implicit assumption has always been
that fire could be instantaneously shifted from one target type to
another. To illustrate, let us recall- a typical problem:
maximize {ry(T) - px
n

























,y ^ and £ cj> £ 1. (1)
In this problem cf> is the control (decision or policy) variable.
The reader should note that although the control must satisfy the
condition ^ $ ^ 1> the rate of change of <f> is unrestricted so
that 4> can instantaneously change, for example, from to 1.
Physically, this means that we are assuming that the Y-forces can
instantaneously shift fires as desired.
When one considers command and control problems in combat, the
above implicit assumption on
<J>
(instantaneous jumps permitted) does
not seem to be a realistic assumption. A better assumption appears
to be that there is a limit to how fast
<f>
can be changed. We
J-2
have thus been led to consider target selection problems in which
the rate of change of the allocation variable is bounded (i.e.
instantaneous shifts in fire are not allowed) . For reasons dis-
cussed below, we have chosen to call such a situation "inertial
combat ."
Although problems in which curves are restricted to lie in a
given domain were considered in the classical calculus of variations
as long ago as 1831 [3] (see also [1]) and discussed by Weierstrass
in his lectures of 1879 (see p. 395 of [1]), development of opti-
mality conditions for optimal control problems with state variable
inequality constraints has been accomplished only comparatively
recently. We have discussed such problems with a state variable
inequality constraint (SVIC) in Appendix E. Recent activity appar-
ently owes its origin to the work of Gamkrelidze (for an English
translation of his original work see Chapter VI of [8]). Gamkrelidze
points out that in many physical problems there are restrictions not
only on the control parameters but also on the state (phase) space.
He (see p. 263 of [8]) refers to piecewise continuous controls as
"inertialess controls," since such controls can, if need be, instan-
taneously jump from one value to another. Following Gamkrelidze
then, we use the term inertial combat to refer to a target selection
problem in which the rate of change of the distribution of fire is
bounded.
The problem that we shall study requires more than the theory
of Gamkrelidze (see Appendix E for further discussion and references)
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which, of course, is for optimal control problems involving in-
equality constraints on a function of the state variables with no
explicit dependence on the control variables. We recall that we
say that the problem has a k— order SVIC when the first time
(total) derivative of the state-variable constraint which explicitly
contains the control variables is the k— . The problem that we
shall study has a second order SVIC. Unfortunately, there appar-
ently has not been developed any condition analogous to, using the
notation of Appendix E, y £ for a k— order SVIC (k > 1).
Using the method of adjoining the state-variable constraint directly
to the criterion functional with an additional Lagrange multiplier,
we will develop a necessary condition of optimality on a constrained
subarc that corresponds to, again using the notation of Appendix E,
having a restriction on y. This latter condition apparently
arises because of the problem's special structure and does not
appear to be a general condition.
The method of directly adjoining the state-variable constraint
was apparently first considered by Chang [2]. However, there are
some gaps in his development. A more careful treatment is by
Speyer and Bryson [10]. Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [7] also discuss
the method of direct adjoining of the SVIC (and its relationship
to the method of adjoining the appropriate time derivative of the
SVIC) . It may be shown that results obtained by the method of
direct adjoining of the state-variable constraint correspond to
J-4
those obtained by direct application of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
in a Banach space (i.e. consider a finite difference approximation
to a variational problem (a finite-dimensional optimization
problem) and then pass to the limit)
.
The results presented in this appendix are preliminary in
nature and tentative, obtained from our first cursory examination
of such a problem. However, we feel that this is a promising
area for obtaining results and insights into principles of target
selection. We propose to ONR further examination of such problems
as a future research task.
2 . The Optimal Control Problem .
Accordingly, we consider the following problem:




subject to: ^—- = - cf^y,
dx
'
= - (1 - 4>)a y,dt v T/ 2-
f* = *b-A -b 2x2 ,
of " U > C2)
:.,, x
,





(t), y(t) are force levels,
p, q, r are utilities assigned survivors,
a^ , a„, b , b_ are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
<}> is the fraction of Y fire directed at X
,
and u is the rate of change of <t>.
We will focus primarily on the development of the basic neces-
sary conditions of optimality for (2). For this goal, of course,
the nature of the planning horizon (terminal target set or prescribed
duration) doesn't make any difference.
The reader should note that the control variable in problem (2)
is u, while
<t>
(the control variable in problem (1)) is now a
state variable . Hence, the restriction £ <|> £ 1 is now a (first
order) SVIC. When we use the approach of Gamkrelidze, we handle
it as follows:
for $ - 1 £ 1, we must have
4^- = u £ when
<J>




£ 0, we must have
- 4^" = - u £ when - 4> = 0. (4)dt
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To avoid being encumbered by too many symbols, we will consider
only the SVIC x 2: . Clearly, we lose no generality in doing
so. In the notation of Appendix E, we have then
























Now, when x (t) = for L ^ t i t- = I, we control the system
by requiring



























Hence, the origin of the term second order SVIC. Clearly, when
X- (t) = for a finite interval of time, by (9) we must have
4>*(t) = (since y > 0) and then (10) yields u*Ct) = 0,
where we have considered the state equations (2)
.
3 . Necessary Conditions of Optimality on Constrained Subarc for $_•
When Gamkrelidze's approach (see Chapter VI of [8]) and con-
siders (3) , (4) , (8) , (9) , and (10) , then the Hamiltonian is given by
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H(t, x
i(p.,u) = - p 1 <J>a1y - p 2 (l-<|>)a 2y
- p 3


















= for 4> < 1,









= for x > 0,
;> for x = 0.
We have adopted above the following correspondence between state and
dual variables:
state variable dual variable
y
4> '4*
The adjoint system of differential equations for the dual variables
is
dp,


























Assuming that time determines the termination of the battle (planning
horizon), i.e. we don't consider termination due to annihilation
of one side or the other before t = T, the boundary conditions
for the dual variable at t = T are given by
P 1









(T) = 0, (16)
P 2








(T) = 0, (17)
P 3
(t=T) = r + v
3
where
= for y(T) > 0,









= for <J>(T) > 0,
;> for <J)(T) = 0,
= for <f)(T) < 1,





, y > and < <J> < 1, the control law is deter-
mined by Pontryagin's maximum principle. Hence, we consider
maximize H(t ,x. ,p . ,u)
,
- A £ u £ B 1 1
and this yields
u*(t) =
B for p,(t) > 0,
„ -A for p. (t) < 0.
4
(20)
We must further investigate the possibility of a singular subarc
3H
[5], [6] on which — = for a finite interval of time (so that
oU
3H
all time derivatives vanish) . The condition that — = yields
3u
that on a singular subarc we must have
p 4












Proceeding to the next time derivative, we would have on the singular
















Considering (23), we see that a singular solution is impossible.
On a constrained subarc on which cj>(t) = 1 for t- £ t £ t.
the control is determined by -~ = and hence
u*(t) = for t < t < t . (24)






The condition that n (t) ^ yields that on the constrained subarc
we must have
p 4
(t) £ 0. (26)
Differentiating (25) and combining with (15) , we find that
n
1
(t) = yU^ - a 2p 2 )
,
(27)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition n (t) ^ [8] is only satisfied











which the reader will, of course, recognize as a result for the
corresponding "inertialess" combat problem. Denoting the time of
an entrance corner by t
1
and that of an exit corner by t_,
the corner conditions (see Appendix E for discussion) yield that

























where t-- denotes a left-hand limit. The reader should note that




-) = p± (t2+) for i
= 1,2,3,4. (32)













Considering (27), (31), and again n-Ct^-) = 0, we see that when








+) = y( a 2P 2 " a ip i }
dt * °* (34)
t,
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On a constrained subarc on which <$>(t) = for t- £ t si ti-
the control is determined by -~- = and hence
dt
u*(t) =0 for t
1
< t < t
2
. (35)





(t) = - p 4
(t). (36)
The condition that n~(t) ^ yields that on the constrained subarc
we must have
P4
(t) £ 0. (37)






1p 1 ) ,
(38)
so that Gamkrelidze's condition n 9 (t) ^0 is only satisfied on
the constrained subarc with <±> = when
ai (-Pl (t)) <: a2 (-p 2
(t)), (39)
which again the reader will recognize as a result which also arose
in the corresponding "inertialess" combat problem. At an entrance










-) = o = p 4
(t
x





+) = - n2 (t1+). (42)
Again, we point out to the reader that (42) is in consonance with




-) = P i
(t
2





~) = or H(t
2









Considering (38), (42), and again n2 (t 2~) =0, we see that when
there is an exit from the constrained subarc at t = t„ , then
(42) becomes
P 4








)dt £ 0. (45)
4
.
Partial Synthesis of Optimal Policy When x, , x >_ £.
In this section, we will give some preliminary results on how
the necessary conditions of the last section may be used to determine





Since we develop the solution to this problem by working back-
wards from the end t = T, it is convenient to introduce the
"backwards time" variable x defined by x = T - t. We observe
2 2
d d u d d T .that — = - 3— but —
_
= —
_. It is also convenient to define






so that differentiating (46) and combining with (12) and (13) , we
find that
dt-»3< t)('lbl-'"2b 2i - (47)
Let us now assume (without any loss of generality) that
_§.-,]!, >. a.„b_ .
It is easy to show that p~(t) > for all t and hence
^T (t) > for all t. (48)at






fr = - (W^V v + * fr (50)dt
In synthesizing an optimal trajectory there are two cases to be
considered:
Case (a) a p ^ a,,q ,
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Case (b) a p < a q.
For Case (a): a.p s a_q , it is convenient to first observe
that a Taylor series expansion of p, (t) yields
2dp 2 d p,
P 4
(t) = p 4 (x=0) + t j^- (t=0) + \ y (t=t) > (51 >dx
where t £ (0,t) .
In this case we have
v(x=0) = - alP + a2q £ 0, (52)
so that considering (48) it is readily seen that
v(x) < for x > 0, (53)
and hence (49) and (50) readily yield
dp,




q) ;> 0, (54)
,2
d P 4 (t) > 0. (55)
dx
2
Now, there are three subcases to be considered when a^p 2: a,,q
;
Subcase (al) <Kt=T) = 0,
Subcase (a2) < 4>(t=T) > 1,
Subcase (a3) 4>(t=T) = 1.
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We shall now show that subcase (al) is inconsistent with an
optimal policy and work out the solution for the other two cases
Subcase (al) <Kt=T) = when a p ^ a q.
Since <}>(t=T) = 0, (19) yields that
p^( T= 0) = v4 ;> 0. (56)
Then (51), (54), (55), and (56) yield that
P 4
(x) ;> for x ;> 0, (57)
with strict inequality holding, i.e. P/Ct) > 0, for x > 0. If
we were on a constrained subarc for a finite interval of time, i.e.
<f>(t) = for t, 2: t ^ T, then (57) is inconsistent with (37)
(also note that ru(t=T) = y(a-,P - a ? q) ^ 0, a violation of
Gamkrelidze's condition n (t) ^ (when a p > a„q)). If we
were not on a constrained subarc for a finite interval of time,
we again reach a contradiction. To see this, let us observe that
(20) and (57) yield that
u*(x) = B for x ^ 0, (58)
so that a backward integration of the state equation (2) yields that
<Kt) = - Bx,
which is impossible. Hence this case is inconsistent with an optimal
policy.
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Subcase (a2) < 4>(t=T) < 1 when a p ;> a q.
Since < <J>(t=T) < 1, (19) yields p 4 (t=0)
= 0, and (51),
(54), and (55) again yield (57). Hence, (58) again holds. Denoting
4>(t=0) by <(> , it is easily seen that
<|>n + BT = <|>(t«T) < 1, (59)






The optimal policy is then given by
u*(t) = B for £ t £ T <
l-4>,
(61)
For larger time T, we must go to the next subcase
Subcase (a3) 4> (t=T) = 1 when a.. p ^ a ?q.
Since 4)(t=T) = 1, (19) now yields
P 4
(t=0) = - v
5
^ o. (62)
It may be shown that we get a contradiction unless v, = so
that we must have
p 4
(x=0) = 0, (63)
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If <{>(t) < 1 for T - 6 £ t < T where 6 > 0, then the devel-
opment of the previous subcase holds. If we are on a constrained
subarc for t ^ t ^ T, then (recalling (46)) (53) is equivalent
to satisfying (28) (Gamkrelidze 's condition ii ^ 0). Hence, we
can remain (in our backwards progression from the end t = T) on
the constrained subarc until we have to get off to meet the initial
condition <}>(t=0) = 4>n* ^s we wor^ backwards and leave the con-
strained subarc (i.e. in forwards time, enter at t ), the corner
condition (30) yields that for £ t £ t.
dp (t -t) 2 d 2p
p4




where t € (t,^) .
Recalling (54) and (55), we see that P,(t) ;> for £ t £ t








3 £ t <. I
^ J











< t £ T, (66)
For Case (b) : a p < a„q, we now have that (recalling (46))
v(x=0) = - a p + a
2q
^ 0. (67)
Recalling (48) , we see that at some (backwards) time v(x) must
become zero. Let us denote this "backwards time" as x . Thus,
v(t=t ) = 0, (68)
Again, there are three subcases to be considered when a..p < a«q
Subcase (bl) <J>(t=T) = 0,
Subcase (b2) < <f>(t=T) < 1,
Subcase (b3) <{>(t=T) = 1.
Analysis of these subcases is similar to that given for Case (a)
,
with Subcase (b3) being impossible.
Let us now observe (recalling (28) and (39)) that in order to
satisfy Gamkrelidze's condition on the rate of change on a Lagrange
multiplier, we must have
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v(t) ^ when <J>(t) 1 for a finite interval of time, (69)
and
v(t) ^ when 4>(t) = f° r a finite interval of time. (70)
We have previously noted the correspondence of these results to those
for "inertialess" combat. We now consider the case when 4>(t=T) = 0.
Let t denote the (forward) time when we enter a constrained
subarc with <j> = ; similarly t~ the time of leaving one with
<J>
= 1. We further assume that
<j>(t) = for t ° £ ti T. (71)
We now prove that it is impossible to have v(t=t_ ) = 0,
i.e. v(t) must be > before cf> = 0. The corner condition
(41) and (49) yield that for t £ t
°
2 2
(t -t) Z d Zp





where t € (t,t )
,
so that (recalling that v(t=t ) = 0, (48), and (50)) it is readily
seen that
p. (t) > for t < t.°. (73)
4 1
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By (20) this implies u*(t) = B for t < t °, which clearly is
impossible.
Now, it is readily shown that for t_ £ t sS t
1
P 4





) = - y(t)v(t)dt. (75)
Considering the corner condition (33) and (48) , it is clear that
v(t=t
2
) < 0, (76)
while
v(t=tp > 0, (77)
We may also write
P A
(t) = y(t)v(t)dt. (78)
Considering (76) through (78), it should be clear that p^(t) <
for t 9 < t < t and hence by (20)
1 o
u*(t) = - A for t
2




Integration of the state equation (2) then yields
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y(t)v(t)dt = 0, (83)
or
T-t.
y(t)v(t)dt = - y(t)v(t)dt.
T-t,
(84)
The relationship of the times t_ , T - t , and t to the
time history of <J>(t) is shown in Figure 1.
J-23
4>=0 &
t ime , t
Figure 1. Relationship of t-





Omitting further details for now, we do reach an important con-
clusion: for "inertial" combat (see (2)) one begins to shift fire
earlier in forward time (anticipating changes in target priority)
than in the corresponding "inertialess" case. Again, the reader
is referred to Figure 1 for motivation of this statement.
5 . Necessary Conditions of Optimality on Constrained Subarc for x.
Let us first consider Gamkrelidze's approach of considering
the time derivative of the state-variable constraint on a con-
strained subarc on which x, (t) =0 (and x~ > 0) for t ^ t ^ t„.
We limit our discussion here to the necessary conditions for it
to be optimal to derive x, to zero. Recalling (8) through (10),
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the control is clearly u*(t) = 0. It should be noted that in this
case we have a second order SVIC . Considering (2) , we must clearly
also have 4>(t) = 0. However, since the choice of control is
restricted by (10) and not (4), we may take n 9 (t) = 0. The
3H
multiplier u(t) is determined by the condition *— = and
dU
hence
y(t) = — . (85)ay
The condition y(t) ^ yields that on a constrained subarc we
mus t have
P 4
(t) ;> 0, (86)
which should be contrasted to the necessary condition for constrained
subarc with <\> = and x > 0. It is also convenient to write (85)
as
y(t) a] y = P 4 (t). (87)
Differentiating (87) with respect to time and considering (2) and
(15) , we obtain
ii(t) = ]"(alPl-a2P 2 ) . (88)
It should at this point be noted that Gamkrelidze r s condition
y ^ does not apparently hold for higher order SVIC. A further





1Va2b 2 >» (89)
where we have used the fact that <t>(t) = 0.
We now will show that apparently due to this problem's special
structure a necessary condition of optimality on a constrained
subarc with x (t) = is that
ti(t) ;> 0. (90)
We do this by considering the method of adjoining the state-variable
constraint directly to the criterion functional with an additional
Lagrange multiplier [2], [10]. When we add the state-variable
constraint directly, the Hamiltonian is given by [10]
H(t,x
i ,p i
,u) = - p^a^ - P 2 U-4>) a2y - p^b^+b^) + p 4u + yxr (91)
where
y(t)





and p. and y denote the Lagrange multiplier when this method
is used (as opposed to p and y which denote the multipliers
when Gamkrelidze 's approach is used). The condition on the sign of
y(t) when x
1
= has been given by Mclntyre and Paiewonsky [7]
(see also [4]). (It is readily obtained using Valentine's method
by considering the Legendre-Clebsch condition (see [11] for the
corresponding development in mathematical programming).) The
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adjoint system of differential equations for the dual variables
is now
dp.









= Vl + (1~^ a 2P 2 (94)
dp
4
ir m ( aiPra2p 2 )y - (95)
On a constrained subarc on which x.. (t) (and x > 0)













The condition that u(t) ^ when x = for a finite interval
of time yields that
a
l
bl* a 2b 2' (99)
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since it is readily shown that p^(t) > 0. Thus, we have developed
the same necessary condition for it to be optimal to drive x
to zero as for "inertialess" combat,
A
Let us now relate the above result for y to y". Considering
(89) and (98) , we have





Assuming that y(t) > 0, consideration of the boundary condition
a
for p (t) and p~(t) (18) , the appropriate adjoint equation
A A
(and results for p, , p~, p, , and p„) , and the corner conditions
that
P 3
(tr ) = p 3 (t 1+), (101)
and the condition [10]
P 3
(tr ) = P 3 (t 1+), (102)
A
we see that p~(t) and p~(t) have the same sign. By (100) so
do y(t) and y"(t) . Hence, we have shown that
y(t) ;> when x^t) =0 for ^ £ t £ t^ (103)
6. The Special Case of Unbounded Rates.
In our target selection problem (2), the rate of change of the
fraction of Y fire directed at X (i.e. -£) is restricted.
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Thus, we must have for u =
-tJ-
- A £ u £ B. (104)
Let us observe that for - A = - °° and B = + °° problem (2)
reduces to problem (1) , the "inertialess" combat problem. Accord-
ingly, we would expect much to be similar in the solutions to these
two problems. Indeed, this has been a result of our analysis: in
both problems, for example, a necessary condition for it to be
optimal to drive x.. to zero is that a ->b ^ a ?^9'
It consequently is of interest to develop our previous results
for (1) by considering (2) with u = -j-*- unbounded. In this case,
we must allow jumps the state variable <j> . Such problems have only
recently been studied in the literature [9], [12], [13]. We feel
that the relationships between optimal target selection policies
for "inertialess" and "inertial" combat should be further examined.
7. Discussion.
The results presented in this appendix are preliminary, being
based on an initial cursory examination. We feel that this is an
important and promising area and propose this to ONR as a future
research task.










in order for it to be optimal to drive x.. to zero (while x„ >
and before t = T)
. Furthermore, we also developed a necessary
condition involving v(t) = a p (t) - a^p-Ct) for it to be
optimal to have <Kt) = or 1 for a finite interval of time.
Again, the results were similar to those for the "inertialess"
combat problem. A significant result (see Section 4), however,
was that for "inertial" combat an optimal policy for the distribu-
tion of fire over enemy target types is characterized by beginning
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Appendix K. Target Selection for Helmbold's General
Attrition Structure.
1. Introduction .
One of the objectives of this research sponsored by ONR is to
investigate the sensitivity of the optimal target selection policy to
the form of the combat attrition model. We have initiated in Appendix
I an investigation as to whether for the simplest target selection
problem the optimal policy is sensitive to whether attrition is
modelled as a deterministic or a stochastic process.
Let us now restrict our attention here to deterministic combat
formulations . As discussed in Appendix H, various forms of Lanchester-
type equations have been hypothesized to describe combat between two
homogeneous forces. These formulations are readily extended to combat
situations between heterogeneous forces. In Appendices A, B, C, E, F,
G, and J we have considered target selection problems in which the
rate of attrition of an enemy target type is directly proportional
to the number of friendly firers. For this type of target-type attri-
tion we saw that the optimal policy was always to concentrate all fire
on a single target type . The index of the target type upon which all
fire is concentrated may change (without the target type being
annihilated) over the course of battle, but we always concentrate all
our fire. In Appendix B we heuristically discussed why this is so in
an intuitive fashion. In Appendices B and D we consider a target
selection problem in which the rate of attrition of an enemy target
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type is directly proportional to the product of the number of firers
and the number of targets. For this type of target type attrition we
saw that the optimal policy might be other than concentrating all
fire on a single target type .
We were thus led to consider a general form of (deterministic)
combat attrition in a simple target selection problem in order to
study the sensitivity of the optimal policy. Specifically, we were
interested in whether the optimal policy would be to always concen-
trate all fire on a single target type. In 1965 R. Helmbold proposed
a modification of Lanchester's square law attrition model to incorpo-
rate inefficiencies of scale for the larger force when the force sizes
are grossly unequal [3]. Although unfortunately not stated in this
paper, we conjecture that this suggested modification was firmly
based upon empirical evidence: Helmbold noted in [1] (see also [2])
that if one analyzed a large number of land battles as if each were
combat between two homogeneous forces, then the ratio of attrition
-
rate coefficients was inversely proportional to the initial force
ratio.
Hence, we decided to study the two-against-one target-type
selection problem with combat attrition following Helmbold 's general
model. In this appendix we present preliminary results of our rather
brief examination. We shall only develop the basic necessary condi-
tions of optimality (and not address here the synthesis of optimal
trajectories) . These preliminary results indicate that when target-type
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attrition follows Helmbold's general model, the optimal policy is
always to concentrate all fire on a single target type . In other words,
this attrition model apparently does not lead to a singular solution
in the optimal control problem.
2. Helmbold's Modification of Lanchester's Equations .
In 1965 Helmbold [3] proposed a general Lanchester-type model
in which the effectiveness of a force is dependent upon the force ratio.
A special case (when each attrition rate is proportional to a product
of terms one of which is a power of the force ratio) of Helmbold's
general formulation is
dx c 1-c
dttz - - ax y
f* =
" by *1"*, (1)
with initial conditions
x(t=0) = xQ ,
y(t=0) = yQ ,
where a and b are Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients, x(t)
and y(t) are force levels, and c is a parameter which takes on
values between zero and one.
Helmbold gave the time solution to (1) as (for c f4 1)
:(t) = (xq 1 ° cosh(l-c)/ab" t - yQ








cosh(l-c)/ab~ t - x 1 C/- sinh(l-c)/ab" t} 1 C (2)
He also stated that equations (1) also yield that state equation
,, 2-2c 2-2c. , 2-2c 2-2c Nb(x
Q
-x ) = a(y
Q
-y ), (3)
which yields for various values of the parameter c
c = square law.
c = 1/2 linear law,
c = 1 "logarithmic" law.
When c = 1, (3) takes the form
b(£n x -In x) = a(£n yQ-£n y)
.
(4)
Helmbold also developed the "force-ratio" equation and obtained a
solution.
Let us note that when c = y, equation (3) yields a "linear
law." However, the reader should observe that although equation (3)
becomes a "linear law" when c = y, equations (1) do not reduce to
Lanchester's equation for area fire (see Appendix H) , and consequently
the time solution to (1) is not the same as that for the classical
Lanchester area-fire equations (see [7] for the time solution).
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3. The Optimal Control Problem .
Motivated by Helmbold's modification of Lanchester's equations,
we consider the following optimal control problem:










-(l-4>)a_x. ydt v T/ 22








2 ,y ^ °
and




x (t) ,x-(t) ,y(t) are force levels,
p,q,r are utilities assigned survivors,
a
1
,a ,b ,b_ are (constant) attrition-rate coefficients,
<J>
is the fraction of Y fire directed at X
,
and c is a parameter which must satisfy £ c < 1.
In our initial investigation here we will limit our discussion to the




Solution to Heterogeneous Combat Equations .
It is of interest to determine the state solution to
dx. .
1 c 1-c
= - ^a.x. ydt r 1 1
dx








. c 1-c , c 1-c ...
dt -V Xl " V x2 ' (6)






















As we have seen in Appendices A, F, and G, the state solution (7)
is useful in synthesizing optimal trajectories. A similar simple
solution also arises in the case of n-versus-one combat according to
Helmbold's general attrition model.
5. Development of Basic Necessary Conditions of Optimality .
We will focus on the development of necessary conditions of
optimality. It is convenient to consider state variable inequality
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constraints equivalent to x > 0, x £ for (5) . Instead of








where c £ [0,1) so that 1 - c > 0. When x = 0, we must therefore
have
d 1-c
—(-x ) £ 0, so that
(l-c)cj>a y




1_C £ when x
2
= 0. (9)
Following Gamkrelidze (see Chapter VI of [6]) (see also section 4.b.(3)
of Appendix E) , the Hamiltonian is given by
H(t,x
i ,pi ,<|>)
































= for x > 0,
^ for x = 0,
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and p is the dual variable corresponding to x . The adjoint system
of differential equations for the dual variables is
dp,



































When x ,x~ > 0, the control low is determined by the maximum
principle. Hence, we consider































We must further investigate the possibility of a singluar subarc [4],
ill







Investigation of Singular Subarcs .
As is well-known, since the Hamiltonian (10) is a linear function
of the control variable
<J>, the maximum principle does not determine
the control when the coefficient of $ in H vanishes for a finite












where we have observed that y > 0. Combining (16) with the expression
f° r
dt(lf) We °btain
£(if) " (l-OyP 3 (a2b 2-a1b1 ) when f| - 0. (17)
Assuming that c ^ 1 and a n b. ^ a b„, we see that —(77) =1± 2. Z at \d(J> /
when — = implies that we must have p~(t) = 0. While we have
dtp J
obtained no contradiction that p^(t) = for a finite interval of
time on a singular subarc, considering the interpretation of the
3Sdual variable p_ = — where S is the optimal value function, it
J 3y
intuitively seems impossible that p^(t) = for a finite interval
of time. (This would imply that there is no marginal return for
increasing the Y-force level.) Thus, we tentatively conclude that
there is no singular solution, and the optimal policy is $* = or
1 (with possible changes over time). Hence, we see that for Helmbold's
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general attrition model the optimal tactic is apparently always to
concentrate all fire on a single target type.
b. Optimality Conditions for Force Level to be Driven to Zero .
Let us now investigate whether it is a good policy to annihilate
a force type in this model. (The reader can find a discussion of the
theory of state variable inequality constraints that we apply here in
Appendix E.) Without loss of generality, we may consider a constrained
subarc on which x.. (t) = (and x~ > 0) for t.. £ t £ T. The control
is clearly <J>*(t) = 0. The multiplier y (t) is determined by the
condition — = and hence
U-^t) =
"^"("Pi3]^! +P2a2x2 ^' ^ 18 ^











so that Gamkrelidze's condition y, (t) £ [6] is only satisfied on










since we would expect to have p~(t) ^ 0.
However, even if (20) is satisfied, it is never an optimal policy
to drive x.. to zero (unlike the corresponding situation for the
Isbell-Marlow problem discussed in Section 4.b.(l) of Appendix E)
.
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The proof of this statement is by contradiction. The necessary
condition that y^t) ;> where y is given by (18) combined with
x = yields that
P 2
(t) ^0 for t- * t s6 T. (21)
However, for x (T) > we have the boundary condition
P 2
(t=T) = - q. (22)
By the inconsistency of (21) and (22) (both of which are necessary
conditions of optimality) it can never be an optimal policy to drive
x to zero (and have x > 0)
.
6. Discussion .
The results presented in this appendix are preliminary, being
based on an initial cursory examination. We feel that this is an
important and promising area and propose this to ONR as a future
research task.
We tentatively concluded that the optimal policy was always to
concentrate all fire on one target type (the same optimal policy as
for the one-versus-n problem (see Appendix C) with a "square-law
attrition" of target types). In other words, our analysis so far has
disclosed no singular solution [5] to (5) . Considering the time
solution given by (2) to the combat equations (1) , we see (heuristically)
that the time solution to equations (1) when c = — is closer in form
to that for a "square-law" battle than that for Lanchester's classical
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area-fire equations [7]. Hence, considering the results of Appendix D,
our tentative conclusion here on concentration of fire as an optimal
policy is intuitively appealing, although we feel that more work remains
to be done.
We finally saw that if x > 0, then it was not an optimal
policy to drive x to zero. Considering (14), this makes sense,







a_(-p_(t))x- . Intuitively this policy also makes sense, since the
motivation behind Helmbold's formulation (1) is inefficiencies of
scale for the larger force. Hence, as x.. "becomes small enough"
the Y-force is more efficient at destroying X».
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